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The aim of this thesis is to-analyse the influence 
that the North American continental imbalance has had on 
the formulation of Canadian defence policy, in order to 
derive the. defence options open to Canada in the last 
quarter of the 20th century. By continental imbalance 
is meant the disproportionate imbalance in political, 
economic and military power between Canada. and the United 
States. 
The influence of the continental imbalance on 
Canadian defence policy has varied in the last one hundred 
years, but has been most influential during periods of 
United States overseas expansion. The Cold War period 
of United States overseas expansion and consequent 
increased United States strategic requirements made it 
extremely difficult for Canada to separate national, 
continental and NATO defence requirements. The principal 
argument of this thesis is that the apparent lessening of 
United States overseas activity and changes in United 
States strategic requirements provide Canada with a wider 
set of defence policy options than it has had since 
the beginning of the Cold War. This wider set of options 
allows for a clearer separation of national, continental 
and NATO defence requirements than has been previously 
possible. The era when continental defence requirements 
have been considered as permanent and strategically 
.i 
indivisible appears to be ending. The principal. 
Canadian defence requirement in the future it likely to be 
the necessity for an independent naval capability 
sufficient to ensure unhindered use of contiguous 
waters and of the resources of the world's second, 
largest continental margin. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
General Comments 
The most striking feature of Canadian defence literature 
is the dearth of comprehensive, objective and scholarly 
surveys of Canadian defence policy. There are, in fact, 
only two such studies; one written in 19t40'by C. P. Stacey 
and the other by C. S. Gray in 1972. In the intervening 
period, there has been a plethora of articles and pamphlets, 
most of which are highly polemical and written by authors 
whose backgrounds in defence studies have been somewhat 
limited. The non-polemical literature on continental 
defence has been written mainly by Americans attempting 
to rationalize its implications for Canada. 
The high standard of Canadian historical literature, 
written with the assumption that "the military and 
diplomatic components of national security policy are, 
and ought to be, indissolubly combined, in study and analysis 
as well in formulation and execution", 
1 is in striking 
contrast to the literature on contemporary Canadian defence 
policies. The principal writers have been C. P. Stacey 
1 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great De ression, oronto: University of Toronto Press, preface. 
6 a 
and James Eayrs. Professor Eayrs freely admits he writes 
about those aspects which interest him the most. This 
leaves one, certainly in his third volume, In Defence of 
Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence (1972), with an 
impression that the. full story has not been told. 
2 
Colonel Stacey's Arms, Men and Governments: The War 
Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (1976) is a comprehensive 
and exhaustive critical examination of"Canadian Second 
World War political and military policies. Both Professor 
Eayrs and Colonel Stacey had. access to sources not readily 
available to others and reprinted, often in full, the most 
pertinent documents. Many of the references, in this thesis, 
to their books are to these reprinted documents and 
relatively inaccessible sources, such as parts of the 
Mackenzie King diaries and the Claxton and Foulkes papers. 
Overviews', of Canadian Defence Policy 
There are basically two approaches one can take in 
writing about Canadian defence policy. The first is to 
analyse it in the context of the interaction of political, 
historical and strategic factors. The second is, to analyse 
it in a largely strategic context to determine strategic 
requirements. The advantage of the former approach 
is that defence policy is placed in a larger context, 
but with the concomitant disadvantage that the clarity of 
strategic argument may be submerged by extraneous 
2 The three volumes in the In Defence of Canada series are: Vol. 1, From the Great War to the Great De'rension; Vol. 2, Appeasement and Rearmament; and Vol. 3, Peacemacinr and Deterrence. 
7 
considerations. The advantage of the latter is that 
it clarifies strategic requirements by their intellectual 
separation from other factors in the overall national 
policy equation. Its disadvantage is that apparent 
strategic truisms, removed from their political and historical 
context, beg questions rather than answer them. Generally, 
Colonel Stacey in his The Military Problems of Canada: A 
Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past 
and Present (1940) follows the former approach and Dr. Gray 
in his Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance 
(1972) follows the latter. 
Although Colonel Stacey wrote in wartime 1940, he 
attempted an examination of "the permanent elements of 
Canada's strategic position"3 using both historical and 
contemporary analyses of events. For example, in analysing 
the history of an unmilitary people with more of a 
military history than most Canadians-generally admit, he 
remarks: 
Their [the people of Canada] history is full of 
warlike episodes, and they have proved on many 
occasions that they can be skilful and 
determined fighters; yet few nations have 
shown more profound antipathy to the idea of 
military preparations in time of peace or less interest in military affairs generally except 
in moments of emergency. Canada's history is 
marked by an alternation of long periods when 
the national defences are almost utterly 
neglected with short violent interludes, arising 
out of sudden foreign complications, when the 
3 C. P. Stacey, The Ptilita Surve of Defence Policies ies and Present, oronto. yerson, 194 
Problems of Canada: 





country awakes to the inadequacy of those 




This unmilitary outlook is certainly in great 
part the result of Canada's political connection 
with Great Britain and the protection which she 
has consequently received from the mother 
country. Part of it is due to the special point 
of view of thq French. Canadians. But part of 
it is also due to geography and the North 
American environment; until a generation or so 
ago, in the days before the Battle of Manila Bay, 
much the same attitude and outlook were found in 
the United States. Finally, in the most recent 
period, American friendship, the United States 
fleet, and the Monroe Doctrine have been 
pressed into service to aid in explaining the 
continued existence of a mentality which was 
familiar even in the days when an Anglo-American 
war was far from "unthinkable". 
Dr. Gray's aim in 1972 was "to investigate what ends, 
and with likely effectiveness (and at what cost), defence 
policy can serve for Canada. "5 Canadian defence policy is 
investigated by an exploration of the contributions that 
defence activity may make towards the performance of certain 
essential services to the nation. He groups the services 
under security, sovereignty and independence, and national 
development. lie argues that "This approach serves to 
broaden the range of activity that may properly be labelled 
as defence policy activity and suggests 'trade-offs' and new 
ways of looking at problems that tend to be ignored in 
traditional analyses that focus almost exclusively upon 
4 Ibid., pp 53-4. 
5 C. S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance, (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972) p 4. 
4 
such prominent monuments as P10R. AD, NATO, and peacekeeping. "6 
The principal weakness of Dr. Gray's analysis is that 
it is too contemporary, or as Hed]v Bull in his review 
remarked, it may 
be read as a kind of extended commentary on the 
white paper [Defence in the 70s, 19711. and 
provides a critical and discriminating guide. to 
the thinking of what may loosely be called the Canadian defence establishment ... Strategy is a science of means not ends, and the question with 
which Mr. Gray's book leaves this reviewer is 
whether books should be written that confine 
themselves to its terms. 
By paying insufficient attention b political and historical 
factors, Dr. Gray places too much credence in contemporary 
government statements and public criticism by a small but 
vocal minority. The result was that even by the time the 
book was published, the government was reversing itself 
on defence policy and by 1975 had in practice reverted to 
the historical tenets of Canadian defence policy. This 
has taken place with hardly a murmur of public criticism; 
indeed it has invoked considerable support. This does not 
destroy Dr. Gray's analysis which was very comprehensive and 
objective. It does, 'however, point out the weakness of his 
approach in contrast to Colonel Stacey's earlier study, 
which had a perspective not present in Dr. Gray's. 
Continental Defence 
Continental defence began with the Ogdensburg 
Declaration of August 1940 and the setting up of the 
6 Ibid. 
7 Itod], j Bull, "Review of Canadian Defence Priorities" International Journal, Vol XXIX, No 2, (Spring 1974) p 299. 
10 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The two principal 
sources for there developments are the United States 
official history Military Relations Between the United States 
and Canada 1939-1945 (1960) by Stanley W. Dzuiban and C. P. 
Stacey's Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of 
Canada 1.939-1945. Colonel Stacey had access to the Canadian 
records and to Mackenzie King's diaries and is therefore 
the more complete study. 
Colonel Stacey's book has been very much at'the centre 
of the debate about Mackenzie King's prime ministership, 
but this thesis does not enter into it. However, in a 
recent article, 'The Turning-Point: Canadian-American Relations 
during, the Roosevelt-King Erd', he argues that by the end of 
the war King had become so disturbed over developing 
Canadian-United States ties that he told cabinet he 
"believed the long range policy of the Americans was to 
absorb Canada. "8 Colonel Stacey joins the ranks of 
Canadian tory historians, such as Donald Creighton, when 
he suggests that "the future historian may ultimately 
conclude that the worst blow Canadian nationality ever 
suffered was the decline of the British Empire. "9 I accept 
the tory"interpretation of Canadian history and this is 
reflected in parts of this thesis; hopefully in a critical 
manner. In fact, the basic argument of this thesis is that 
8 C. F'. Stacey, "The -Turning. Point: Canadian-American Relations during the Roosevelt-King Era, " Canada: An Historical magazine, Vol 1, No 1, (Autumn 1973) p 8. 
9 Ibid., p 9. 
11 
contemporary political and strategic conditions allow for a 
lessening of Canadian-United States defence cooperation, 
but that a return to the "golden age" of Canadian 
nationality is probably out of the question. 
Turning to more contemporary literature on continental 
defence, one finds only two major published studies and 
one unpublished study, all by Americans. Melvin Conant's 
The Long Polar Watch; Canada and the Defense of North 
America (1962) is an attempt to explain and rationalize 
the inescapable necessity for a permanent and intimate 
defence relationship. fie contends that the "hostility of 
the Soviet leadership toward free institutions and free 
peoples and the growth of Soviet military power makes it 
imperative that the forces that oppose Soviet ambitions be 
strongly armed, increasingly vigilant, and politically 
united. "10 fie argues further that changes in the requirements 
for the defence of strategic forces has placed Canada in 
"the forefront of Western defense" and that "without 
either nation really intending it, Canadians find 
themselves inextricably involved in the purposes and power 
of the United States. If geography has made the relationship 
inescapable, the disparity of resources has made the partners 
all too manifestly unequal. "11 From this he concludes that 
10 Melvin Conant The Long Polar Watch; Canada and the Defence of 1,1--th America, (New or arper, 17977 
pre ace, P vii. 
11 Ibid., P 1' 2. 
12 
"In'order for Canada to play its full role in the free-world 
alliance, Canadians must first realize that the defense 
alternatives open to them-and to the other members of the 
alliance are actually very few in number and permit of no 
very radical change in course., 
12 
Mr. Conant accepts the United States' assumption that 
intimate defence cooperation is a permanent aspect of 
Canadian-United States relations and that United States 
strategic requirements are the dominant factor. His 
"permanent" solution for the Canadian-United States defence 
relationship is provided in his A Perspective on Defence: 
The Canada -United Stater Compact (1974). In this he 
advocates the "creation of a single comprehensive defence 
organization embracing the land, sea, and air components of 
the Canada-United States defence relationship. "13 He admits 
it is unlikely that any new arrangements would ensure more 
meaningful consultation. Mr. Conant is sufficiently 
knowledgeable about Canadian affairs to understand the 
Canadian historical antipathy and resistance to any formal, 
comprehensive ani permanent alliance. He is also aware that 
"relations between Canadian and U. S. governments are 
probably more strained than at any other time in living 
12 I. j p 143. 
13 Melvin A. Conant, A Perspective on Defence: The 
Canada -United States Com ac ,e in the Headlines , °, No +, Septem er 1964) Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 
13 
memory 114 but he ignores the implications of this upon 
the assumption that organizational changes will suffice. 
A scholarly and comprehensive study of the most 
important and disruptive period of the Canadian-United 
States defence relationship is Jon McLin's Canada's Changing 
Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power 
in Alliance (1967). It seems unlikely when the documents 
of the period are opened that his analysis of the 
"curious contretemps which marked the relations between the 
United States and Canada during the period of development of 
the Arrow aircraft and the Bomarc missile"15 will be 
challenged., Where he is open to challenge is in his inter- 
pretation of the significance to overall Canadian-United States 
relations and in particular to defence relations of these 
"curious' contretemps". 
fluch depends on one's interpretation of the Diefenbaker 
years when the Renegade, as roter Newman in his critical 
study of Diefenbaker called him, was in power. 
16 Mr. 
14 Robert A. Dunn Jnr., "Canada and the Economic 
Discontents, " Foreign Affairs, Vol 52, No 1, (October 1973) 
p 119. Mr. Dunn begins is article with this remark and 
ends it with the'hote that both countries are in the same 
boat - and that it will not help to hit each other with the 
oars. " p 140. His assumption is the name as Mr. Conant's 
- an intimate "permanent" relationship. 
is 
Jon B. T1cLin, Canada's Chaýn , 
ingDefense Polic 
1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle ö er in Alliance, 3a timore: Johns 113pkins renn, 1967) pre ace. 
1G Peter C. Plowman Renegade in rower: The Diefenbaker Years, (Toronto: , McClelland and Stewart, . °r. Newman since then has become a fervent nationalist; one is tempted to say in the Diefenbaker mould. 
14 
Diefenbaker was an inept administrator but from the view of 
instant history, I would suggest that Mr. Diefenbaker's 
attempt to reverse the liberal continentalist flow of 
Canadian post-war history did not fail completely. One 
can find no United States commentators on Canadian affairs, 
however sensitive'to the Canadian condition, who recognize 
that Mr. Diefenbaker acted from a deep commitment to Canada 
as a viable northern transcontinental state whose history 
and interests were far from. being coincidental with those of 
the United States. An articulate, but somewhat polemical, 
statement of this commitment is George Grant's 
Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism 
(1965). 17 
I have accepted Mr. McLin's analysis of the events 
surrounding the cancellation of the Arrow, Canadian 
acceptance of nuclear weapons, the defence production 
sharing agreements, and the debate over UORAD. I 
have 
included only enough background on these events to maintain 
continuity. I have, however, concentrated on two aspects; 
the strategic requirements for air defence and NORAD, and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The purpose of concentrating on the 
strategic requirements for air defence is to argue that the 
requimment is not permanent but temporary. I afro argue that 
the Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point in the 
17 
George Grant is the grandson of "the" George ! io. nro 
Grant (1835-1902) who was one of the foremost Canadian imperialists of his era. The present George Grant's critique 




defence relationship because it demonstrated 
how political and historical factors outweighed strategic 
logic. It demonstrated that the coincidence of Canadian 
and United States interests was both less complete and less 
permanent than had been assumed. 
The most comprehensive analysis of the Canadian- 
United States defence relationship is Dr. Roger Swanson's"An 
Analytical Studv of the United States/Canadian Defense 
Relationship as a Structure, Response and Process: Problems 
and Potentialities"(1969). This is an unpublished PhD 
thesis but a summary of his analysis has been published in 
a Behind the Headlines pamphlet of the Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs. 18 Dr. Swanson's main argument is that 
... the United States contemporaneously constitutes 
a national security threat to Canada in the form 
of an inadvertent United States hegemony, resulting 
from a continental involvement oftremen'dous 
disproportion coupled , iith an unusually low degree 
of natural-cultural barriers .... casting the 
United States in this light does not constitute 
a generalized indictment of the United States nor 
an imputation of specific United States actions, 
for indeed, the United States threat is undesired, 
unconscious unrecognized, unarticulated and 
benevolent. f9 
... the United States-Canadian continental 
involvement 
is structural; the emergence of the United States 
as a national security threat arises from this 
18 Roger F. Swanson, The United States as a National 
'Security 
Threat to Canada, Behind the Headlines, Vol XXIX, 
Nos 5-61 (July , Canadian 
Institute of International 
Affairs. 
19 Roger Frank Swanson, "An'Analytical Study of the 
United States/Canadian Defense Relationships As A Structure, 
Response and Process: Problems and Potentialities, " 
unpublished PhD dissertation, American University, 
(Washington, D. C., 1969) pp 465-66.. 
16 
structural continentalism; the continuation 
of the United States threat will become ever 
more serious ac the technological-industrial 
age advances demanding ever-increasing 
economic-defensive integration and centralization; 
the alleviation of the United States threat -- it can never be eliminated because it is 
structural -- necessitates a paramount United States-Canadian effort if Canada is to survive as 
a distinct national unit; this effort must be 
based upon a realistic appraisal of the nature, 
of the United States threat, and above all, 
a recognition that it constitutes a threat of 
national security dimensions. 20 
Although the word structural is used many times, it is 
not entirely clear what Dr. Swanson means. He analyses the 
defence relationship as a series of structural components such 
as air defence and the defence production sharing arrangements. 
He argues that these structural components were both 
inevitable and necessary because of geography, economic- 
technological requirements and the assumption by the United 
States of a world role. When he says, for example, "the 
United States-Canadian involvement is structural" he seems 
to mean both the components themselves and the factors that 
brought them into existence. Because the most fundamental 
problems are structural, his solution is to tidy up the 
present "unstructured" defence relationship by eliminating, 
"all unnecessary, duplicatory, and defunct organizational 
components and functions" and establish a bilateral Joint 
International Defense Commission which is formalized by 
treaty. 21 fie, as does Conant, sees as paramount the 
requirement for a formal defence treaty in which obligations 
are defined clearly and are assumed to be permanent for the 
20 Ibid., pp 510-511. 
21 Ibid., p 550. 
17 
foreseeable future. 
Dr. Gray, in his Canadian Defence Priorities, devoted 
a chapter to the Swanson thesis of the United States as a 
security threat to Canada. Fie concludes that "the Swanson 
thesis would seem to err in its assumption of the fragility 
of Canadian nationality and in its implicit dismissal of many 
of the parameters of-Canadian economic, military, political 
and psychological life. "22 It is difficult to gain a 
perspective on present Canadian-United States relations 
and the "threat" that the continental imbalance is posing, 
but Dr. Gray's assessment probably is sounder than Dr. Swanson's. 
The Swanson thesis makes a strategic assumption that 
political and strategic factors that brought the present 
Canadian-United States defence relationship into existence 
are permanent. This derives from a lack of detailed 
strategic analysis, which would suggest the "structural 
components" have been and are continuing to change, and 
thereby allowing, for reduced Canadian defence contributions 
to meet United States strategic requirements. The strategic 
requirements' for a permanent formal defence treaty may well 
be becoming a matter of history. 
The lack of careful strategic analysis in. the Swanson 
" thesis resultcjn a number of serious errors of fact that 
adversely affect his conclusions. The most obvious is 
a Dr. Swanaon'n confusion over the command arrangements for 
22 C. S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities, p 168. 
18 
NORAD (North American Air Defence Command). Even after 
quoting verbatim the NORAD Agreement on command arrangements, 
he confuses the terms "unified command, " "joint command" 
and "operational control" and ends up calling NORAD a 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff unified command, 
23 which 
earlier he had correctly shown that it was not. 
Anti-Americanism and Canadian Defence Policy 
. 
In the 1960s, Canadian historians began a detailed 
re-examination of Canadian history from the 1860s to the 
1920s; the period of transformation from colony to nation. 
This has led to studies in Canadian military history of the 
period, of the development of the Anglo-Canadian alliance, 
and the rise to statehood. The foremost historian of. the 
Canadian militia is Desmond Morton with his Plinisters and 
Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904 
(1970) and The Canadian General: Sir William Otter (1974). 
Of greater interest to this thesis are Carl Berger's 
The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian 
Imperialism 1867-1914 (1970) and Norman Penlington's 
Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899 (1965). Both these studies 
analyse the inter-relationships of the growth of Canadian 
imperialism, fear of American absorption, the strengthening 
of the Anglo-Canadian alliance, the creation of a national 
army and navy, and anti-Americanism. The period from 1895- 
1905 was one of deteriorating Canadian-United States 
23 Roger r. Swanson, "An Analytical Study of the United Staten/Canadian Defense Relationship, " p 144. 
19 
relations, United States overseas expansion and general 
bellicosity, fear of United States absorption of Canada 
and intense anti-Americanism by particular groups in 
Canada. Although there are dangers in historical comparisons, 
the 1960s and early 1970s do suggest very similar forces 
at work: 
In 1960, James ? i. Minifie published his Peacemaker or 
Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World, 
the first of a number of polemics with highly emotive titles. 
Mr. Minifie was the C. B. C. correspondent in Washington in 
the 1950s and became a United States citizen. Hardly had he 
done so than he discovered that United States foreign and 
defence policies were morally reprehensible and came back to 
Canada. What seems to have upset Mr. Minifie the most was 
the conduct of United States imperialism in Latin America, 
which he saw as a betrayal of the virtues of early Republican 
America. That the United States had considered itself the 
imperial guardian of the Western Hemisphere since its 
independence and that republican virtues had never seemed 
very virtuous to Canadians, seems to have escaped Mr. Minifie. 
However, the arguments he made have been echoed in the 
succeeding literature; in fact it has been one long footnote 
to Mr. Minifie'c book. The result has been a low standard 
of scholarship and analysis, for what is a credible argument 
if expressed in more realistic terms. 
Hr. Minifie argued that Canadian leadership in the 
Western Hemisphere was imperative because Canada had no 
revolutionary tradition. In the third world, "Canada could 
20 
play a far more effective role than it has yet envisaged as 
interpreter of the ideas and experience of the West, and as 
a representative of the tradition of progress by evolution 
rather than by force and violence, a role from which the 
United States is°precluded by its history. "24 He advocated 
Canadian neutralism because it'%4ould have a healthy effect 
in purging Canada of a tendency to free-load on American 
defence efforts. "25 Canada should withdraw from NORAD and 
NATO because "It is time to cease walking; with the Devil; 
the bridge has been reached. "26 and this withdrawal would 
turn "Canadian thoughts to the northern frontier rather than 
to the flesh-pots beyond the southern boundary. "27 
To be fair to Mr. Minifie he did advocate that neutrality 
would have to be armed neutrality, bomething no other 
Canadian has advocated, rather the reverse. Through all his 
emotive rhetoric he did see that an essential component of. 
Canadian independence was an independent military capability 
based on strategic realities. His solution was for 
Canada to take over the complete air defence responsibility 
for the northern half of the continent and create its own 
nuclear deterrent with nuclear powered submarines. 
24 James, M. Miniiie, Peacemaker or Powder-tionkc : 
Canada's Role in a Revolutionary or , 
(Toronto: Mc, elland 
an Stewart, p 166. 
25 Ibid., p 16. 
26 Ibid., p 26. 
27 Ibid., p 86. 
21 
The titles of some of the succeeding anti-American 
literature are a sufficient protrayal of. their content: 
Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question 
(1968) by Lewis IIertzman, John Warnock and Thomas Iiockin; 
Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite 
(1970) by John Warnock; and "Canadian Defence Policy and the 
American Empire" by Philip Resnick in Close the 48th Parallel 
etc: The Americanization of Canada (1970). 
More realistic and serious attempts to examine the 
Canadian-United States defence relationship, but only in 
article and pamphlet form, are'Canada'a Long Term 
Strategic Situation" (1962) and "The Strategic Significance 
of the Canadian Arctic"(1965) by the late Robert J. Sutherland 
of the Defence Research Board; "Canadian Defence Policy in the 
Nuclear Age"(1961) and"The Complications of Continental 
Defence"(1966) by the late General Charles Foulkes; and 
Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues 
(1970) by John W. Holmes. A recent addition, The Diplomacy 
of Conitraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States 
(1974) by Denis Stairs, is a diplomatic history of the 
Canadian participation in the Korean War. Ile argues that 
Canada certainly had far greater freedom of action in its 
relations with the United States than the polemical 
literature asserts. 
Canadian Naval Policy 
The Canadian navy has been the cinderella of the 
military establishment since its inception in 1910, and this 
status is reflected in the paucity of available literature. 
22 
Gilbert Tucker's two volume The Naval Service of Canada: 
Its Official History (1952) is the primary source for Canadian 
naval developments from 1910 to 1915. There is no aspect of 
Canadian defence policy requiring more investigation than 
Canadian naval policy. Particularly lacking are any 
interpretative studies of Canadian naval policy and its 
relation to national interests. This thesis devotes a 
good third to Canadian naval policy in an attempt to remedy 
this situation. 
Internal Security 
The requirement for a military internal security 
capability has its own raison d'etre. However, that internal 
disturbances would bring United States intervention is one 
of the unstated assumptions of the Canadian condition. 
Only in fiction, such as Ellis Portal's Killing Ground: 
The Canadian Civil War (1968) does it appear. 
28 This thesis 
accepts the validity of the assumption of United States 
intervention as simply a consequence of the continental 
imbalance. 
The requirements for internal security are something 
that most Canadian commentators are ignorant of, avoid, or 
dismiss with the fallacious argument that internal security 
is a police matter. Professor Eayrs went so far as to advocate 
that '. t would be best to have no military establishment at 
the disposal of the central government lest it yield to the 
28£11is Portal, Killing Ground: The Canadian Civil War, 
(Toronto: Peter Martin, ortal was a pseudonym for a 
serving army officer. 
23 
temptation 1129 to use it to maintain the Canadian body politic. 
Professor Eayrs does not examine the argument that a 
professional and bi-racial military establishment is one of 
the instruments available to government for preventing 
Canadians from allowing emotions to dictate action. 
Aside from the pros and cons of using military forces 
for internal security, the only reliable source on the use of 
troops for internal security is B/Gen McLearn's testimony to 
the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National 
Defence in 1972 and his article "Canadian Arrangements' for Aid 
of the Civil Power" in the Canadian Defence Quarterly (Summer 
1971). B/Gen McLearn was Judge Advocate General of the Armed 
Forces at thzt time. 
Summary 
All the major studies of the Canadian-United States 
defence relationship in the post Second World War period have 
been by Americans. They have been primarily concerned with 
rationalizing the requirement for a permanent, formal and 
intimate defence relationship. Canadian defence requirements 
have been assumed to be simply a corollary of United States 
strategic requirements. National, as opposed to continental 
defence requirements, have been considered to be virtually 
non-existent. 
Although no Canadian has undertaken a comprehensive 
study of the relationship as it has effected Canada, there 
29 James Eayrs, Future Roles for the Armed Forces of 
Canada, Behind the Hea ines, Vol , No 1-2. (Tpril I -Canadian Institute of International Affairs, p. 8. 
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has been a plethora of articles and pamphlets that reminds 
one of past Canadian sectarian battles. 
30 The sectarian 
character of the debate between the pro MORAD/NATO adherents 
and those opposed, has retarded the development of a Canadian 
defence policy that is both politically acceptable and 
strategically realistic. It has also retarded the development 
of independent Canadian strategic thought. 
31 The continental 
imbalance in military power has been mirrored by the 
literary imbalance between major studies of Canadian defence 
policy written by Canadians and those by non-Canadians. 
This thesis analyses the historical, contemporary and 
likely future influence of the continental imbalance between 
Canada and the United States on the formulation of Canadian 
defence policy. It examines the influence of the continental 
imbalance from the Canadian perspective. The aim is to derive 
possible Canadian defence options that allow for a clearer 
separation of national, continental and alliance defence 
requirements than has been possible in the pact twenty-five 
years. The suggested options are considered to meet the 
requirements of political acceptability and strategic realism. 
30 One is reminded of Dr. McCulloch'c interventions in 
the sectarian battles of early Nova Scotia. In 1808 he wrote 
Popery [NORAD/NATO] Condemned by Scripture and the Fathers 
and in Ponerv Again Condemned by Scripture . 1810 and the Fathers. 
31 For the need for independent Canadian strategic 
thought see Colin S. Gray, "The Need for Independent 
Canadian Strategic Thought, " Canad%tan Defence Quarter, 
Vol I. No 1, (Sunvner 1971) pp 6-2. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CANADIAN DEFENCE-POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH 
THE UNITED STATES 1867-1945 
The United States as The Enemy 
During the wars of the French and British colonial 
periods, geography "imposed upon Canada a definite 
strategic pattern of warfare" with the strategic centre 
along the St. Lawrence River. ' There were two main 
approaches to the centre; one by the sea into the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence and the other by land north along the 
river systems to the upper St. Lawrence. 
Via the land approach came the Iroquois, and during 
the 18th century, the British and the American colonists 
used both approaches. During the Revolution, the 
Americans, lacking seapower, relied on the land 
approach. They failed to conquer Canada and British 
seapower secured Nova Scotia. In the War of 1812-14, 
the land route predominated, but naval supremacy on the 
Great Lakes was critical for both sides. 
2 
With the signing of the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, 
the last invasion attempt in Canadian history came to 
1George F. Stanley,. Canada's Soldiers The Military 
History of an Unmi, litar eo e, revised edition, 
oronto: acm an o Canada, 1960) p 1. 
2For 
a recent history of the war see J. Mackay 
tlitcman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Militar History, (Toronto: University of 'pronto 'resat 1965) - 
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an end. The continental designs of the United States 
continued to threaten the existence of British North 
America. They were one of the primary factors in 
bringing about Confederation. The British government's 
efforts to bring about Confederation were related to 
reducing British defence commitments. 
3 The defence 
policy of the'new Dominion government was directed mainly 
at retaining the British commitment to defend Canada. 
4 
The militia system in the laut half of the 19th 
century was based on the voluntary principle. The concept 
was for a number of selected units to undergo periodic 
training at public expense. The units were called the 
Active Militia and formed the basis of the Canadian defence 
organization until the post Second World War period. In 
" 1869, the Active Militia had a voluntary enrollment of 
nearly 40,000 and the Reserve Militia a potential of a 
levee en masse of over 600,000 eligible males. 
The threatened United States invasion after the Civil 
War did not materialize, but the Fenian raids from the 
United States were testing enough for the Militia. The 
Fenians were followed by the Red River expedition of 1870. 
3 See C. F. Stacey, Canada and the British Arm 
184G-1871: A Study in the ractice of ec onni e Government, 
(London: Longmans Green, , Chap VI, Canada and 
M -e 
American Civil War,, pp 117-78 in particular. 
4 See Desmond Morton, Ministers and Gencraln: 
Polities and the Canadian tßi itia 186s- 4, oronto: 
University of Toronto Press, ,p" 
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In 1871 the British regulars, with the exception of a 
a garrison at Halifax, were withdrawn. This withdrawal 
forced Canada to create a small permanent force to provide 
standards and training for the Militia. The threat of 
United States invasion declined after the signing of the 
Treaty of Washington in 1871 which settled most of the 
outstanding Anglo-Canadian-American dispute, s. 
5 
The years between Confederation and the First World 
War saw the creation of a Canadian Army. Although defence 
against the United States remained the ostensible first 
priority, the development of a national army was moulded 
by imperial influence and sentiment. Militia efficiency, 
never high, seriously declined in the 1880s and 1890s, 
notwithstanding the performance in the Second Riel Rebellion 
in2885. By the mid 1890's, the Militia was in a state of 
decay having suffered, from, 1892 to 1896, five ministers and 
rampant political patronage. 
6 The change in the Militia's 
W. L. Morton, The Critical Yearn: The Union of 
British North America 1857-1-8730 (Toronto: McClelland 
and tewart, 19647pp 257-58. The treaty "rested on' the 
withdrawal of British military power from the St. Lawrence 
Valley and the interior of the continent. The military 
supremacy of the United States in America ... was tacitly 
recognized .... The way was ... open 
for American 
acceptance of Canadian nationality, however slow, reluctant 
and ungracious that acceptance might be. " p 257. 
6 There is no detailed history of the Canadian 
militia in the period 1867-1914. See however Desmond 
Morton's Ministers and Generals and The Canadian General: 
Sir William Otter, Canadian War Museum, Historical 
Publication NumBer 9, (Toronto: Ilakkert, 1974). See also 
my review of The Canadian General, Dalhousie Review, Vol 
SU1 No 3, (Au umn 1974) p M. 
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fortunes coincided with the accession of the Laurier government. 
in 1896 and the appointment of Frederick Borden as Minister 
of the Militia. 
Because of the relative weakening of Britain's position 
in the world, the British government was anxious to raise 
the efficiency of colonial forces and for colonial commitments 
to imperial defence. The British firstrequested a commitment 
to imperial defence during the Russian war scares of 1877-78 
and again in 1885 after Sudan. 
7 Canada consistently refused 
to make any commitment. 
It was the Venezuela Incident of 1895-96 that revived 
fears of a United States invasion and the apparent necessity 
for the continued commitment of Britain and the Empire to 
defend Canada. The boundary dispute between Venezuela and 
British Guiana, fanned by the jingoism of the time, was 
settled without an Anglo-American war, but "laid bare Canada's 
strategic dependence on Britain., 
8 
The Canadian realization that an Anglo-American war 
would be fought primarily on Canadian soil, and the 
jingoistic anti-Canadianinm of the United States government 
and press, resulted in h resurgence of anti-Americanism. 
The Venezuela Incident revived interest in national defence 
and gave impetus to that curious phenomenon of Canadian 
imperialism as "one variety of Canadian nationalism -a 
7 Norman Penlington, Canada and Im erialicm 1896-99, (Toronto: University of Toronto Preis, p 23. 
8 Ibid., p 38. 
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type of awareness of nationality which rested upon a certain 
understanding of history, the national c1nracter, and the 
national mission. "9 The Canadian imperialists were in the 
forefront of efforts to increase military preparedness, in 
supporting Canadian participation in the Boer War, and to 
create a Canadiin navy to support British naval power. The 
principal argument of the imperialists was that Canada's 
destiny lay in the necessity of an at least tacit, if not a 
formal Anglo-Canadian alliance, to prevent absorption by 
the United States. 
The shock of the Venezuela Incident, the indifference 
to Canadian economic interests by the United States, and 
the predominance and behaviour cfAmericans during the Yukon 
Gold Rush "forced Canada b turn from the United States to 
Britain. "l° This turning; coincided with the burst of 
pro-imperial feeling in Great Britain personified by Joseph 
Chamberlain's accession to the colonial office. In 1898, 
Chamberlain chose Colonel Edward Hutton as his "imperial 
agent" to re-establish British influence over Canadian 
9 Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas 
of Canadian Imperialism 1967-19149 (Toronto: University o 
Toronto Press, p 9. 
10 Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899, 
pp 261-62. Canada had attcmpte wit out success from -t 7c 
18600 to the 1890s to gain favourable trade agreements with 
the United States. By the 1890s, trade reciprocity with 
the United States had become a loyalty to Empire issue. The 
Laurier government in 1911 was to suffer defeat over its 




ll Ilutton's policy was to create a balanced 
militia army 
. 
with t}r necessary staff and services to fight on 
its own until British help could arrive. His tenure was 
the shortest of all the British General Officers Commanding 
(GOCs) but he laid the "basis for a self-confident, unified, 
military institution. 1112 
Canadian-United States relations in the late 1890s 
were further worsened by the failure of the Anglo-Canadian- 
United States Joint High Commission (1898-99) to settle 
outstanding dinagreements and by the belligerent attitude of 
the United States over the Alaska Boundary dispute. 
Canada was pre-occupied with United States relationships 
in a period of bellicose United States imperialism 
exemplified by the Spanish-American War. Canada's positions 
on the issues in dispute in this period "abstractly considered, 
were not unreasonable, but practically they were excessive 
and provocative in relation to the limitations of Canada's 
power. "13 To offset Canadian weakness, there was Britain 
and the Empire. 
11 Desmond Morton, Minintern and Generalrat Politics 
and the Canadian Militia 1868-19M p 133. 
12 Ibid., p 161. 
I 
13 Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism 1896- 
1899, p 262. 
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The triumph of Canadian imperial sentiment was 
Canada's participation in the Boer War despite the resistance 
of both French and English Canadian nationalists. The 
nationalists. viewed Canadian participation as a precedent for 
involving Canada in imperial wars in which Canada had no 
interests. The pressure of public opinion and general 
enthusiasm resulted in a contribution that numbered more than 
8,000. For Canada, participation was an emotional self- 
offering and a quid pro quo for British support in Canadian- 
United States disputes. Britain used "Canada's fear of 
the United States to stimulate militia reform and inculcate 
the possibility of participation in [imperial] war[s]., 
14 
After the Boer War, there was continuous improvement 
in the Militia under the ministries of Frederick Borden 
(1896-1911) and Sam Hughes (1911-191G). Expenditures rose 
from $3 million at the turn of the century to $11 million 
in 1914. The Militia Act of 1904 ended the employment of 
British officers as GOCs, and a Militia Council with a Chief 
of the General Staff substituted. As the Canadianization 
of the Militia progressed, so did the strengthening of 
imperial ties by the standardization of war organization, 
adminietration, training and armament. By the outbreak of the 
First World War, the authorized establishment of the 
14 Ibid. It has been argued that the Militia Act 
of 1904 (777w. VIII c. 23) allowed active service for the Militia overseas. See Richard A. Preston, "Contraction of Imperial rower, " The Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 2, 
110 4, (Spring 1973) p 145. 
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l5 Canadian ttilitia was 77,323 all ranks. 
Constitutionally, Canada was at war when Great Britain 
declared war on It August 1914, but Canada had the power to 
decide the level of contribution. On 2 August the Prime 
Minister, Robert Borden, had already offered an expeditionary 
force and on 3 October 1914 the thirty-three thousand men of 
the First Division sailed from Canada as the largest force 
that had ever crossed the Atlantic. By December 1915, the 
government had act the objective of an army of 500,000. Over 
400,000 served overseas and the Canadian war dead total of 
48,121 was barely short of the United States total. Canada 
came of age in the First World War. In the words of 
Donald Creighton: 
The Canadian Expeditionary Force was the greatest 
collective enterprise that Canada had ever 
attempted. The War of 1914-1918 was the greatest 
experience that the Canadjgn people had ever 
known, or would ever know. 
Imperial control over the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
was resisted, and the gaining of military autonomy found 
its 
counterpart in international recognition of Canada's status 
17 
as an autonomous member of the new Empire-Commonwealth. 
15 For Canada's defence capability at the outbreak of 
war Gee Colonel G. W. G. Nicholson, Official History of the 
Canadian Arm in the First World Waar: Cana ian Expeditionary 
Force 1914--1919, (Ottawa: Queen's rinter, pp b-11. 
16 Donald Crei hton, Canada's First Century 1867- 
1967, (Toronto: Macmillan o ana a, p 132, 
17 For a recent study ece Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: 
11cC1e1 an and Stewart, Chap 4, "Th e Continent and the Empire-Commonwealth, " pp 275-93. 
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Despite some United States opposition, Borden fought for and 
gained recognition of independent Canadian statehood at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
The debate between the Canadian imperialists and 
nationalists from the 1890s to 1914 was not over Canada's 
membership in the British Empire, but whether closer imperial 
relationships were a necessity to offset the continental 
imbalance. For the imperialists, the magnitude of the threat 
of absorption was such to warrant closer imperial ties and 
contributions to imperial defence and unity. They saw the 
Empire as the focus of Canadian international endeavour. In 
their imperialist euphoria, they saw Canada as the ultimate 
leader of the Empire. Sentiment, interest and anti-Americanism 
were entwined. For the nationalists, there was little fear 
of American invasion and a certain admiration for the 
unfolding dynamic society to the south. They were most 
opposed to imperial defence contributions because they would 
draw Canada into the vortex of militarism and imperial wars. 
The Monroe Doctrine was sufficient defence against non- 
continental threats. The nationalists took for granted 
British support for Canadian interests but there was to be 
no quid pro qRo in terms of overseas commitments. 
Because of the changing European balance of power, 
British policy was to maintain good Anglo-American relations. 
British support for Canadian claims during the Alaska 
Boundary dispute was lens than total when faced with a 
bellicose Theodore Roosevelt. The weakness of Canada was 
34 
clearly demonstrated. 18 It was the unfavourable outcome, 
of the Alaska Boundary dispute that forced Canada to accept 
greater responsibility for its international relationships 
and for its defence. The way chosen was basically that 
advocated by the imperialists. It was an alliance-oriented 
way that chose greater Canadian defence effort and overseas 
commitments to offset the continental imbalance. The 
confidence thus engendered, and the increased international 
stature, allowed Canadian-United States relations to 
develop on a more equitable basis. This became apparent 
after the United States entered the First World War and in the 
economic and defence cooperation that ensued. 
19 
The United States as Neither Enemy nor Friend 
The repatriation of Canadian troops from Europe was 
completed as fast as possible. This rapid withdrawal 
reflected the deeply felt disenchantment for the outside 
world and heralded the isolationism which was to dominate 
Canadian policy in the inter-war years. The predominant 
politician of the period was Mackenzie King who opposed 
the concept of collective security whether or not it wore 
the clothes of the League of Nations or the Empire-Commonwealth. 
18 Ibid., pp 44-6 for an analysis of the negotiations. 
19 See ibid., Chap 14. "The change in the Canadian- 
American relationship was the result of 'war conditions. ' Unexpectedly, the war had driven two distrustful neighbours into each other's arms. " p 279. 
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Any form of collective security meant the possibility of 
commitments, and to this he was unalterably opposed. The 
only form'of collective action that he supported was 
appeasement. If Canada had no commitments and no apparent 
enemies, then there was a, requirement for only the minimum of 
defence. forces. His policies reflected the mood of the 
country. R. A. Sennett, when Prime Minister (1930-35), was 
not opposed to collective security. However, he had no more 
interest in the defence forces than Mackenzie King, except 
for using them to undertake measures for unemployment 
relief during the depression. 
It was in this political climate that defence planning 
was undertaken in the inter-war years. The Militia was to 
fare better than the navy, if only because aid of the civil 
power was a role that no politician could entirely dismiss. 
It was this role that absorbed the attention of the Militia 
in the immediate post-war years. 
Canadian defence planning revolved round the production 
of four defence schemes. Planning was the responsibility of 
the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, who 
from 1920 to 1927 was Colonel J. (Buster) Sutherland Brown. 
20 
lie operated largely in a strategic void because no one really 
believed another war involving Canada was likely to occur 
20 James Dayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great 
War to the Great Depression, Vol , (Toronto: 
University 
0 oronto res ,p 70. The details of the four defence schemes are taken from this volume and its companion Vol 2, A easement and Rearmament, (Toronto: University of Toronto press, --1965), 
0 
j 
for at least ten years. Geographical isolation and Aný, lo- 
American naval supremacy made Canada secure from direct attack 
across the seas. There was no inclination to' plan for 
expeditionary forces, although some outline planning was done 
during the Chanak Incident of 1922. Only the threat from the 
south remained and it was related to the state of Anglo- 
American relations. The two issues that could have led 
plausibly to serious friction were firstly the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty, dating from 1902, and secondly the naval 
balance of power. The first was removed when, under 
Canadian pressure registered at the Imperial Conference of 
1921, the British government decided not to renew the treaty 
to which the United States was most opposed. 
21 The second 
was resolved at the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament 
of the following year. This Save Japan naval supremacy in 
the V&stern Pacific and ended Anglo-American naval rivalry with 
the United States Navy left dominant in the Western Atlantic 
The capability of Britain to use naval power for the defence 
of Canada against an American invasion was formally ended 
long after it had ceased 'to be a likely contingency. 
22 
The political deduction from the resolution of these 
issues was that war between Canada and the United States 
21 Roger Graham, Arthur tiei then 
Vol 2, And rortune 
Fled, (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 19639 pp 87. -96, 
22 Georgs r. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p 351. 
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could no longer be considered a possibility. However, 
Defence Scheme No 1, issued on a highly restricted basis in 
1921, but cancelled in 1931, was based on an American invasion 
of Canada against which the full weight of the Empire would 
be deployed. 'The Imperial General Staff's planning priorities 
were for war with a European combination, the United States, 
Japan, or a combination of any of these. Colonel Brown 
decided that Canada's priorities should be defence against 
the United States, against Japan, and for expeditionary 
forces for Europe or for a minor crisis elr., ewhere. 
23 
Colonel Brown was not alone in planning for a North 
American war. The United States had plans for attacking 
a combination of Britain and Japan. United States' plans 
for war against Britain and Canada were not destroyed until 
six months before: Munich. In R. A. Preston's opinion: 
The chief value of American and Canadian 
planning for war in North America, though 
it 
was not directed towards the correct objective, 
lay in that it provided a rationale for military 
training in general. Institutionalized 
political-military co-operation would not 
necessarily have meant more reliable planning., In 
times when appropriations for defence were much too 
small, if there had been closer politico-military 
links and planning had, as a result, been closer 
to political reality as seen by the politicians, 
the armed forces of both countries might have been 
deprived of a valuable format for training. In 
that case the military potential of both countries, 
23 Richard A. Preston, "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: 
American Plans for the Invasion of Canada 1919-1939, " 
Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 3, No 4, (Spring 1974) 
P 49. 
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and their readiness for war, might have beý 9i1 
reduced - in Canada's case perhaps to zero. 
Defence Scheme No 2 was to be directed against Japan, 
but until the fear that Japanese-American friction could lead 
to a threat to Canadian neutrality in the 1930s, no plans were 
made. 
Beginning in 1926, attention was concentrated on Defence 
Scheme No 3 for an overseas expeditionary force; the impetus 
being the staff planning for the Imperial Conference of the 
same year. It was just such planning to which Mackenzie 
King and his principal advisor, O. A. Skelton, were so 
opposed because it amounted to "a blank cheque from the 
Dominion to be filled in at a moment's notice without any 
reference to any particular situation that might arise.... 112S 
Defence Scheme No 3 was submitted finally to the Bennett 
government in 1932 and approved the same year. 
26 Defence 
Scheme No 4 was for the dispatch of a Canadian contingent as 
part of an Empire force to deal with a minor crisis. It never 
got beyond the draft stage. 
24 Ibid., p 57. 
25 Observations made by Mackenzie Kind; at the 1923 
Imperial Conference quoted in James l, ayrs, In Defence of 
Canada: Vol 1, p 79. From the King; Papers. 
26 For a description, see C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War: Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second 
World war, Vol 1,70ttawa: Queens Printer, pp 29-3j. 
" 39 
Defence Scheme No 2 wan finally ±sued in 1938 and 
was called the Combined Services Plan for the Maintenance 
of Canadian Neutrality in the Event of War Between the 
United States and Japan. The fear was that Japan would use 
Canadian waters in operations against the United States, and 
thereby cause the United States to take over defence of 
Canada's Pacific coast. It was United States fear of a 
Japanese attack that gave the initial impetus to Canadian- 
United States defence collaboration as world events moved 
towards war. 
Inter-war defence planning was largely illusory because 
no government wan prepared to do anything more than 
maintain a semblance of defence forcer. The financial cuts 
during the depression had, by 1935, left Canada virtually 
disarmed; in that year the defence budget was $13 million. 
In 1935, Mackenzie King led the Liberals to victory 
over the Bennett government and by the summer of 1936 the 
new government accepted that something had to be done about 
defence. The basic premise was that all defence planning 
and rearmament was to be directed towards the direct defence 
of Canada and not to the equipping of an overseas 
expeditionary force. Although Mackenzie King accepted that 
Canada would participate in a major European war involving 
Britain, lie war, never prepared to state this publicly. 
The government continued the policy of avoiding any 
Empire-Commonwealth defence commitments that could be construed 
asa commitment to cnp. i in a war or as an infringement of Canadian 
autonomy. This policy was carried to absurd lengths when 
40 
Skelton instructed the members of the Joint Staff Committee 
attending the 1937 Imperial Conference that they must not 
discuss, with their British opposites the question of the 
defence of Newfoundland. 27 
The decision that action should be taken in defence 
emphasized the divergence of views between the Departments 
of External Affairs and of Defence. Skelton, who dominated 
External Affairs, saw Canadian foreign policy in the context 
of the "struggle" for autonomy from Whitehall. Ile was 
strongly isolationist and prepared toalvocate neutrality in 
a major war in 1937, but by 1938 had accepted the impracticality 
of neutralism. 
28 In contrast, the Joint Staff Committee 
assumed, particularly after General McNaughton became Chief 
of the General Staff in 1929, that Canada would participate 
in a major war'and that this participation would consist 
primarily of an expeditionary force. 
29 
Although coastal defence had been. made the focal point 
of Canadian rearmament, little was accomplished because of 
27 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and C; overnmento: The War 
Policies of Canada 1939-194b, ttawa: Queen's rinter, 1970) 
pp 89 and 92. 
28 Ibid., pp 7,37 and 138-9. 
29 The Joint Staff Committee's view of'the world 
situation and its consequences for Canada are in a memorandum 
written by Colonel H. D. G. Crerar submitted in September 1936. 
An extract from the memorandum is reprinted in James Cayrs, A., ýeasement and Rearmament, Document 1, Extract from Tbemoran um y oi. nt taffCommittee, Department of National Defence, 5 September 1936 (Army Records), pp 213-22. 
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budgetary restrictions. More was achieved on the Pacific 
than on the Atlantic coast. The Canadian forces at the onset 
of war were capable of dealing with very minor raids and a 
skeleton for mobilization for overseas operations was available. 
In Colonel Stacey's words: 
The justification of Mr. King's policies - and it is a powerful justification - must be sought in the fact that, after all the uncertainty and 
debate of the pre-war years, Canada entered the 
conflict in September 1939 a united nation. Yet 
it should be said that military policies such as 
she pursued in those years were luxuries which 
could not have been afforded by any other country 
which did not, like her, enjoy the double 
advantage of having both great physical obstacles 
and polsrful friends between her and the potential 
enemy. 
In the inter-war years, the continental imbalance had a 
limited influence on Canadian defence policy. Any form of 
overseas commitment was eschewed and Canadian foreign policy 
was formulated in an isolationist framework. This framework 
would only have been realistic for defence planning if 
Canada had had a declaratory policy of neutralism and was 
prepared to have sufficient defence capability to preserve 
that neutrality. Both were politically unacceptable and 
Canada went to war unprepared to defend its coasts and 
contiguous waters. The policy combination of no commitments 
and no defence served the cause of national unity, but it was 
carried to such extremes that Canada was too weak to defend 
the homeland in the early years of the war. This weakness 
brought the continental imbalance into play once again, but 
this time in the context of the United States as a friend 
30 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, P G. 
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or "big brother"31 which was coon to become the most powerful 
state in the world. 
The United States as A Friend - Initial Contacts 
In the inter-war years there was no military contact 
with the United States. The United States reacted to the rise 
of Nazi Germany by emphasizing its policy of isolation 
from any European conflict and its concern for hemispheric 
defence. In 1936, President Roosevelt stated that the United 
States would defend itself and its neighbours. In 1937, 
Mackenzie King and Roosevelt did discuss, in a very general 
and informal manner, aspects of common defence. This was 
followed by a courtesy call by Colonel Crerar, Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence, on General Craig, 
the United States Chief of Staff. A more serious contact 
was the highly secret visit by the three heads of the services 
to Washington in January 1938. This wan followed by the 
public speeches of. Mackenzie King and Roosevelt in which the 
President affirmed that the "people of the United States will 
not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is 
threatened.... "32 In reply to this unsolicited American 
31 Mayor La Guardia, after he became Joint Chairman of 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (discussed later), wrote 
to President Roosevelt in reference to Canada "We may encounter 
the usual difficulties because of pride and the little brother 
attitude with which you are familiar. " See C. P. Stacey, "The Turning-Point: Canadian-American Relations during the 
Roosevelt-Kind; Era, " p 6. 
32 Quoted in Stanley W. Dzuiban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-194b, U. S. Army in °r ar It-Special Studies, (Washington, D. C., Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960) pp 3-4. 
11 3 
concern, t iackenzie King gave the now classic basis for 
Canadian-United States military relations: 
We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly 
neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at 
our own instance, our country is made as immune 
from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably 
be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion 
ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to 
pursue their way, either by land, sea; o53air to the 
United States across Canadian territory. 
The tentative nature of these contacts derived not only 
from the historical lack of any contact but also from differing 
perceptions of the threat to North America held by the military 
leaders of each country. The Canadian Joint Staff Committee 
saw the defence of Canada as beginning in Europe and in terms 
of Anglo-Canadian cooperation. Canadian military organization 
and training was designed for easy cooperation with British 
forces. The Joint Staff Committee expected United States 
neutrality and no invasion threat to North America. 
Canadian military efforts would be directed overseas and 
Canadian-United States military cooperation would be a secondary 
preoccupation. 34 
In drafting the pre-war. RAINBOW series of plans, the 
United States military planners were concerned solely with 
the direct defence of the Western Hemisphere and with United 
States Pacific interests. They were concerned principally with 
the defence of eastern Central and South America against 
33 In a speech at Woodbridge, Ontario 20 August 1938 
and restated in House of Commons, Debates, 19141, Vol 1, p 57. 
34 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp 99-100. 
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political infiltration and with the setting up of German 
and Italian air bases from which the Panama Canal and the 
United States could be attacked. 
35 The collapse of France 
in June 1940 gave a new direction to United States planning, 
and RAINBOW It became the main preoccupation. It had, as 
its main assumption, the collapse of British and French 
resistance in Europe and the loss of their fleets. The 
primary concern became the defence of northeastern Brazil 
against an attack launched from West Africa. Brazil 
became "the pot of Fold at the rainbow's end. ""36 
The initiative for greater military cooperation 
between Canada and the United States came from the United 
States President. He requested the meeting between himself 
and Mackenzie King on 18 and 19 AUgust 1940 which produced 
the Ogdenaburg Declaration sanctioning the setting up of 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). 
37 Mackenzie 
35 Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework 
of Hemispheric Defence, United States Army in World War II, 
The Ostern emiep here, (Washington, D. C., Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960) p 15. 
36 Ibid., p 367. 
37 This meeting and the setting up of the PJßD are 
described in C. P. Stacey, Arms Men and Governments,, pp 
339-43; Dzuiban, Militar e ations, pp 22-30; James Dayrs, 
AU easement and Rearmament, -PP-19 ý00; and J. W. Pickersgill, 
The Mackenzie King Record, Vol 11 1939-1944, Toronto: 
University o Toronto rcus, lpp) IJU-4U, Mackenzie 
King tabled the complete Privy Council Minute for the 
establishment of the PJt3D in House of Commons, Debates, 1941; Vol 1, pp 56-7. In referring; to the permanency o tie PJBD he said it "war, not being formed for a single occasion to meet 
a Particular situation, but was intended to deal with a 
continuing problem. " Ibid., p 56. 
I 
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King agreed to the establishment of the PJBD without 
consulting either his cabinet colleagues or his military 
advisers. The PJBD consisted of Canadian and United States 
sections each headed by a civilian, representatives of the 
services, and a civilian secretary. The practice was to 
submit joint recommendations, (the PJBT had no executive 
authority)-to each government and during the war 33 
recommendations were made, the majority in the first two 
years of its operation. 
38 It was involved primarily in the 
drafting of the plans for the joint defence of North 
America. 
Joint Planning; 
Planning began early in September 1940 and a final 
joint draft was called the Joint Canadian-United States 
Basic Defence Plan - 1940. It provided for the defence of 
Newfoundland, Canada, adjacent portions of the United States, 
and Alaska. 
39 It was drafted to meet the feared emergency 
arising from the defeat of the United Kingdom or if the 
Royal Navy ceased to control the North Atlantic. The 
possibility of attack by Japan was also considered. The 
plan, although listing joint tasks, did not state how and 
with what resources these were to be carried out, nor did 
it describe the command arrangements. 
38 A history of the PJI3D is in Dzuiban, Military Relations in which the recommendations are published in Append x A, pp 347-65. Ile did not have access to Canadian 
records which have been used by Colonel Stacey. 
39 Ibid., pp 88 and 100 contain the details of the plan. 
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The plan apparently was not formally approved dr 
disapproved by either government. The United States Army 
War Plans Division was critical of the absence of detailed 
command arrangements. It wanted the Maritime Provinces, 
Newfoundland, and British Columbia to be included as sectors 
of the United States North Atlantic and Pacific Frontiers* 
40 
The sectors were to remain under Canadian tactical command 
(operational control), except that the United States would 
assume command in the Maritimes or Newfoundland sectors 
when its forces in either had reached preponderant levels. 
Planning was resumed in March 1941, as part of the 
overall planning between the United States and Great Britain, 
on the assumption that the United States would enter the 
war. Canada war not a party to these discussions which resulted 
in a plan known as ABC-1 (America-British Commonwealth), 
designed for the defeat of the Axis powers once the United 
States entered the war. This resulted in the PJ1D 
simultaneously attempting to work out the command arrangements 
for Basic Defence Plan - 1940 and drafting a new plan to 
supplement ABC-1. 
I; 1 This new plan was known as the Joint 
Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No 2 or more 
commonly as ABC-22. 
In the discussions for Basic Defence Plan - 1940, 
Canada resisted direct United States control over Canadian 
forces in Canada. Subject to prior consultation with the 
40 Ibid., p 111. 
41 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p 349. 
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Canadian chief of etaff concerned, Canada proposed that 
"strategic direction" of the two countries' land and air forces 
be vested in the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. 
This was accepted by the PJBD on 15 April 1940 in what is 
known as the "Montreal Revise" of the Canadian proposal. 
Strategic direction was defined as the "assignment of 
missions and the allocation of the means required toýaccomplish 
them. 1142 
The issue of command arrangements was by no means 
settled as discussions now concentrated on the command 
arrangements for ABC-22. The United States proposed that it 
should have strategic direction of all forces in Newfoundland, 
the Maritime Provinces, the Gaspe Peninsu]a and British 
Columbia. The intention of the United States (not apparently 
revealed to the Canadians) was to incorporate these areas 
into the United States Northeast and Western Defence Commands. 
Canadian officers would still hold the Area. Commands, except 
in Newfoundland when United States forces outnumbered 
Canadian forces, but these officers would be under the direct 
command of senior United States commanders. It became clear 
during the discussions that, for the United States, the 
operational meaning of strategic direction was complete 
operational command of Canadian forces. In essence, the United 
States wanted to impose its concept of unified commands which 
would have included control over the administration and 
142 Ibid. 
118 
discipline of the assigned Canadian forces. 
43 
The initial opposition to United States strategic 
direction came from the Chief of Naval Staff, who pointed 
out that Canadian strategic control of naval forces would be 
limited to "coastal and inshore patrol vessels and aircraft 
in inshore waters of Canada and Newfoundland. 1,44 Canada would 
lose strategic control in her contiguous sea areas. 
The Chiefs of Staff took their reservations to the 
Cabinet War Committee, arguing against giving the United States 
unqualified strategic control over Canadian forces. They 
proposed, instead, that specific operational tasks be assigned 
to Canada and the United States, and that mutual cooperation 
be the basis of command arrangements. 
45 The Chiefs drew 
the distinction between the two draft plans. They accepted 
that for the direct defence of North America, for which the 
1940 plan had been designed, the preponderant power of the 
United States made it reasonable that it should initiate 
strategic direction of the combined forces. However, 
ABC-22 was offensively oriented and the primary objective 
would not be the defence of North America, but to assist 
in 
destruction of the enemy in any part of the world where 
allied forces would be sent. The concession of strategic 
direction would give the United States supreme command 
43 Sea Ibid., p 354 for the disputes in the PJBD over 
the meaning of rategic direction. 
tilt 349. Quoted in ibid., p 
145 Ibid., p 350. 
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over Canadian forces in Canada. The 1940 Plan only became 
operational in the likelihood of an invasion; a 
contingency the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had largely discounted 
even in the darkest days of 1940. ABC-22 would become 
operational once the United States entered the war, a most 
likely event. Canada refused to concede strategic direction 
to the United States and the Canadian concept of mutual 
. cooperation became the basis of the command arrangements. 
Newfoundland 
In the 1930s, the service chiefs had etresced the 
strategic importance of Newfoundland to Canada but had 
been precluded from discussing arrangements for its defence 
with the British. When war came, no information had been 
exchanged and the British had made no arrangements for its 
defence. It was not until June 19'40 that Canada sent troops 
for the defence of the island. 
tIG Two days after the Ogdensburg 
Declaration, Canada reached an informal agreement with 
Newfoundland which gave Canada wide responsibilities for 
its defence and it was included as part of the Canadian 
Army's new Atlantic Command. As a result of the Destroyer- 
Bases Agreement with the United Kingdom, the United States 
became involved in the defence of Newfoundland. 
Canada was not a direct participant in the discussions 
which began in January 1941 but did have observers attend. 
Canadian concern was both political and military. There 
46 C. F. Stacey, Six Years of War, p 179. 
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was the problem of harmonizing any arrangements reached 
with the United States with the possible future accession 
of Newfoundland to Canada. The Chiefs of Staff made it clear 
that Canada retained the right to establish any defences 
in Newfoundland which it considered necessary. They became 
alarmed at United States demands for complete military 
control in an emergency and to regulate all communications 
within, to and from any areas leased. Under the final 
agreement signed in London on 27 ttarch 19141, the United 
States acquired six leased areas for 99 yearn. Although 
Canada was not a signatory, it was one for a protocol 
signed the same day in which special Canadian concern for 
the defence of Newfoundland was recognized. Neither 
Canadian political nor strategic interests were well served 
by the leasing of base areas in Newfoundland, and the 
consequences flowed over into the post-war years and are 
still with us. 
Northwest Canada - Routes to Alaska 
The idea in the 1930s of a great circle air route to 
the Orient, and the need for air communications in the Canadian 
Northwest, had resulted in some airfield construction before" 
1942. The PJIU recommended completion of the airfields 
because of the need to move aircraft to Alaska. After Pearl 
Harbor, the facilities of the Northwest Staging Route (as 
the line of airfields became known) were made available to 
the United States. The United States became involved in 
further construction and it was not until near the end of 
51 
the war that Canada regained control over the route. 
47 
Canada had little wartime use for the route and it was mainly 
used by the United States for the movement of aircraft to the 
Soviet Union. Its significance for continental defence was 
far less than had been anticipated. 
Before the war, there had been some political pressure 
from Canadian and United States Pacific coast areas for a 
highway through Canada to Alaska. The proposed route 
was to run along the coast and west of the Rockies. 
Canadian and United States military authorities did not 
consider a highway a military requirement and certainly not 
for one that ran along the coast rather than followed a 
well protected inland route. However, United States 
military interest developed after Pearl Harbor, spurred by 
the desire for a secure alternative to the sea route to 
Alaska and as a means of supplying the developing Northwest 
Staging Route. It was this latter requirement that determined 
the final choice of the route as the United States moved with 
considerable speed to obtain Canadian acceptance to build the 
highway. Canada agreed to its construction but on the condition 
that the United Staten pay the full cost and at the end of the 
war the highway would become part of the Canadian highway 
system. The highway was not used for carrying military supplies 
to Alaska and "apart from its utility in connection with the 
airway, there was no real military requirement whatever for 
47 For a description of the United States role in its 
construction see Dzuiban, Military Relations, pp 200-1G. 
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the Alaska highway. "ý; II 
The Eastern Arctic and Routes to Europe 
. 
United States involvement in the Eastern Arctic was far 
less massive than in the Northwest, but its implications were 
far more significant for the future. The requirement for 
staging airfields to ferry aircraft to the United Kingdom 
arose early in the war. There was a requirement for an 
alternative to Gander for use by short range aircraft. 
The alternative, jointly selected by Canada and the United 
States, was Goose pay, which Canada agreed to construct and 
maintain. root-war control over the Goose Say complex was 
secured by Canada, with certain limitations, in an agreement 
with Newfoundland. The agreement, signed in 1944, provided 
for a 99 year lease but made provisions for United States and 
British military use "for the duration of the war and for such 
time thereafter an the Governments agree to be necessary or 
advisable in the interests of common defence. "49 This 
proviso was to prove of some significance in the post-war 
period. 
Plans for the massive movement of aircraft overseas 
resulted in a project called CRIMSON which was a series of 
airifeldo in Canada along the polar route to Europe. 
" The 
48 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p 383. 
140 Memorandum of the Agreement Between Canada and 
Newfoundland Relating to the Establishment of an Air Base at 
Goose Day, Labrador, Canada Treaty Series, 1944, No 30, 
10 October 1944. 
a0 For a history of the project see Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemispheric Defense, pp 399-403. 
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United States was most enthusiastic about the project but 
the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had reservations. Project 
CRIMSON failed to meet expectations and few aircraft were 
moved via its airfields. Canada, under a June 1944 exchange 
of notes, reimbursed the United States for all expenditures 
of "permanent value! ' The airfields were handed over to 
Canada, starting with Churchill and ending with Frobisher 
Bay in September 1950. 
United Staten Benevolence and the Continental Imbalance 
The United States attitude to Canada in the 19th 
century was one primarily of indifference intermixed with 
occasional bellicosity. The Canadian attitude was generally 
one of respect but underlaid by an aversion to American 
extremism and fctzr of absorption. ' During the Second World 
War, American indifference was replaced by a benevolent or a 
big brother attitude. 
Canada accepted continental defence in the early 
years of the war from presumed necessity. After the direct 
threat to North America had ended, United States military 
activity in Canada was directed to support the war effort 
overseas. The requirements for continental defence only 
existed for a short period, but the die had been cast. 
Whether or not Ogdensburg had taken place, some form 
of continental defence arrangements probably would have been 
necessary. However, if Canadian defences had existed 
that were strong enough to defend contiguous waters and coastal 
areas, the cooperation would have been much less. Certainly 
United States presence in Newfoundland could have been 
c, ýý 
resisted more successfully. Canadian public opinion would 
have been lcrs receptive to continental defence and the 
military reservations about its requirements would have 
surfaced more strongly at the political level. 
51 An armed 
Canada would probably have given Canada the confidence to 
resist the temptations of continental defence and to have relied 
on its own resources; in fact to have continued the policy of 
no commitments until the United States had entered the war. 
Once continental defence was accepted as policy, its 
implementation was dominated by the informal arrangements 
of the PJBD. This unquestionably worked well and in Canada's 
favour. The United States was not prepared to force through 
measures about which Canada had strong reservations. The 
United States did not attempt to expand its activity in 
Canada and Newfoundland beyond that for military requirements. 
The United States displayed at least a benevolent attitude, if 
not understanding of the Canadian sensitivities towards the 
extensive Unitcd'States presence that developed. Once the war 
was over United States presence rapidly declined, but interest 
in continental defence did not. The continental imbalance 
began to affect-Canadian defence planning for peacetime well 
before the war ended. 
51 For an analysis of, Parliamentzary reaction to Ogdensburg 
and Canadian-United States defence cooperation see Chun-Chang 
Chu, "Canadian Attitudes to Continental Defence Co-operation 
with the United States, 1936-1960, An Expressed in Parliament, " 
unpublished thesis, Dalhousie University, 1967. The Quebec 
Liberals had considerable reservations about the United States 
as an ally. The Ogdensburg Declaration made no special appeal 
to the Conservatives and they suspected the United Stater. had 
extracted political concessions from Canada. The CCF (socialists) fully supported the Ogdensburg Declaration but had reservations later in the war. 
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CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE AND NORAD 
Post-War Political Objectives 
Canada entered the Second World War as the oldest and 
most prestigious of the Dominions, with a foreign policy almost 
entirely concerned with "autonomy" within the Empire- 
Commonwealth. Canada ended the war as a minor great power 
with her economic strength greatly expanded, probably the 
fourth most powerful military state in the world, and with 
the potential capability to produce nuclear weapons. This 
status had its ephemeral aspects and there was little-desire 
to exploit it. 
During the war years, the Canadian government gave 
considerable thought to the organization of the post-war 
world and Canada's place in it. 
' The primacy of the Great 
Powers was accepted, but in the context of a world collective 
security system. Canadian planners considered any reversion 
to regional systems to be undesirable. The aim of Canadian 
policy was to keep the Great Powers united in their responsibility 
for the maintenance of security. - Divisions among them were 
to be avoided, particularly between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Nothing was to preoccupy the government and 
1 The detailed consideration of post-hostilities problems began in July 1943. See James Dayro, In Defence of Canada Vol 3 ? encemakin and Deterrence , (Toronto: University o Toronto resß, .jp 143. 
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its planners more than the consequences to Canada of its 
geographical position between these two powers. 
Countering American Strategic Requirements 
It was understood from the very beginning that post-war 
defence arrangements with the United States would be one of 
the most difficult areas of policy. In May 1944, government 
planners began the preparation of a paper called "Post-War 
Defence Relationship with the United States: General 
Considerations. " The paper Was based on the following 
assumptions: 
as It may be assumed that international 
problems arising from purely Canadian-United 
States relations are unlikely to bring about 
a conflict of policies serious enough to 
prejudice general friendly relations and that, 
therefore, any threatening difference of view 
would only be occasioned through differing 
attitudes towards events in other parts of 
the world. The possibility, however, of the 
United States being moved to exert undue 
pressure on Canada, particularly as respects 
matters of defence, should not be overlooked. 
b. That for several years at least a direct 
military threat to North America is unlikely, 
although the means to meet such a threat 
should be available during this period. 
c. That victor nations, including the United 
States will maintain larger armed forces than 
before the war to enforce the peace. 
The paper analyzed the changes In the strategic 
environment. In the past, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 
controlled as they were by the British and United States 
2 Rrnort of the Advisory Committee on rost-Hostilities Problems oat_ ar Defence Relationship with the United 
try ca: General Considerations, " (23 Januaryý1945), 
(Tbpartmcnt of external Affairs' riles ), reprinted in ibid. as the z ent 1, pp 375-380. 
a 
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navies, had provided immunity from attack. This control 
remained but "the development of air power [had] diminished 
the physical isolation of the North American continent by 
opening up the northern approaches. " Canada had now become 
of "more strategic importance to the United States because, 
it lay across the shortest air routes from either Europe. or 
Asia. " 
The experience of the war had shown that the United 
States was prepared or even anxious to proceed alone with 
defence measures on Canadian territory that it considered 
necessary. It was apparent that the existence of major 
military installations in Canada built, paid for, and operated 
by the United States might impair Canada's freedom'of action. 
The fears were that this interest would be expressed "with an 
absence of the tact and restraint customarily employed by 
the United Kingdom" and that a "militant form of continental 
defence-mindedriess" could develop in the United States. 
Therefore, "the pressure on Canada to maintain defences at a 
higher level than would seem necessary ... might be very 
strong. " 
There seemed to be no option but to accept the necessity 
for coordinated continental defence planning with Canada 
carrying out a greater peacetime defence commitment than ever 
before. It seemed clear that in future it should be part"of 
Canadian policy "to accept full responsibility for such 
measures of local defence as the moderate nature of the risk 
to which we arc exposed may indicate to be necessary. " 
Canadian policy planners did not believe that the Soviet 
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Union posed an immediate and direct threat to North America. 
It was not conc; idered to be-in a position to wage another 
war and its policy was defensive. 
Hardly a month passed after victory in Europe before 
the United State,, through the PJBD, requested''bonversations 
to provide, in the light of changed world conditions, a 
continuing basis: for joint action of the military, forces of 
Canada and the United States in order to ensure the security 
of Alaska, Canada, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the northern 
portion of the United States. "3 The desirability of the 
standardization of Canadian and United States forces, and of 
Canada becoming a member of the "military family of American 
nations" was suggested. 
4 
The Canadian government gave approval for continued 
collaboration in joint planning. A joint planning staff 
was organized which shortly after became the Military 
Cooperation Committee. It was composed of Canadian and 
3 Ibid., p 336. Quoted from Department of External 
Affairs i ilec. 
4 Stanley W. Dzuiban, Military Relations, p 334. The 
issue of standardization arose in 1 for operations in the 
Pacific theatre. The final decision was a compromise. C. P. 
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp 54-62. General 
fcNaughton, then Minister o National Defence, considered that: 
"One of the primary reasons for the decision to associate the 
Canadian [Pacific] Division with a United States Corps was 
to obtain experience with the United States system of Army 
organization and U. S. equipment in view of the obvious 
necessity for the future to co-ordinate the defence of North 
America as a firm base against possible contingencies. " John Swc: ttenham, McNau ,h ton 
Vol 3 1944-1966, (Toronto: 
171 Ryerson, 1969), p. 
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United States military officers in equal numbers and corres- 
ponding ranks, and who were also members of the PJBD. 
Agreement was reached on an appreciation of the military 
situation 'relating to continental defence. This appreciation 
formed the basis for a revision of the now dated ABC-22 
and was ready for governmental approval by 5 June 1946. 
The United States was very much in a hurry. 
The appreciation focused on how military technology 
in the form of long range bombers, guided missiles, atomic 
weapons and submarines had removed the immunity from attack 
that geography had previously provided to North America. 
5 
It was appreciated that by about 1950 the enemy (the Soviet 
Union) would be capable of an all out attack on North America. 
including the seizure'of Arctic bases. The attack would come 
across the polar cap and northeast Canada into the heartland 
of industrial North America. The first priority. was for an 
effective air defence system, including early warning, 
meteorological and communications facilities, a network of 
airbases deployed as far north as feasible, fighter- 
interceptor aircraft, and anti-aircraft defences. 
The draft Basic Security Plan of 5 June 1946 followed 
the format of its predecessors. 
6 The joint tasks differed 
little from the wartime ones, but Joint Task No 1 was to 
5 
James Eayrs, Peacemaking And Deterrence, pp 337-8. 
6 
Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan, 5 June 1946, -(King Papers) reprinted in ibid., as Document 2, pp 381-88. 
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protect the vital arean of Canada and the United States'from 
air attack. Complete Canadian responsibility for the defence 
of Newfoundland was not conceded. The command arrangements 
were to be "effected. by mutual co-operation except where unified 
command [was] determined to be appropriate. " The Chiefs of 
, 
Staff of each nation retained the strategic direction and 
command of their forces. 
The Canadian government's reaction was to accept what 
amounted to a United States appreciation of the threat, but 
to question the urgency of countering it. Mackenzie King's 
initial reaction was to question the bilateral formulation of 
the plan and to exchange views with the British, something 
to which the United States would have been opposed. The 
United States'policy of insisting on the bilateral character 
of Canadian-United States defence arrangements was not to 
be deviated from, regardless of Canadian desires. 
Mackenzie King, was invited to the White House in. 
October 1946 where President Truman tried unsuccessfully-to 
"obtain sanction .... to go ahead and work towards an 
agreement as a result of which plans for defence would be 
coordinated and developed. "7 The following month Cabinet 
considered the matter, and heard the Chief of Air Staff, 
Air Marshal R. Leckie, argue against the United States 
proposals for air defence. Ile thought that attack on North 
America would be just a feint for an attack on Europe. To 
Quoted in J. W. Piekersgill and D. F. Forster, The 
Mackenzie King Record Vol 3 1945-45, (Toronto: University 
0 Toronto Press, p" 
6l 
counter this, 'much less elaborate defence arrangements 
were necessary than the United States had proposed. Again, 
it was the Canadian military authorities, who in disagreeing 
with United States threat perceptions, gave the government 
cause to pause. Cabinet decided notto accept the joint 
. appreciation nor'proceed with joint planning until there 
had been additional discussions at the diplomatic level. 
These took place in the utmost secrecy in Ottawa, and 
George Kennan for the Americans gave a much less alarmist 
appreciation of the threat. 
8 The United States no longer 
attempted to present demands for requirements such as 
Arctic fighter bases. The Basic Defence Plan was, however, 
approved. 
The government had successfully residted the initial 
rather heavy pressure for elaborate continental defence 
measures. It had accepted the principle of coordinated 
defence measures and in particular continental air defence. 
General Foulkes, then Chief of the General Staff, later 
stated in defence of the 1958 NORAD agreement that "the 
decision for joint air defence was taken in 1946 not 1958. "9 
8 "Memorandum of Canadian-United Stater. Defence 
Conversations Held in Ottawa in Suite E' Chateau Laurier 
hotel, December 16 and 17,1946. "De artment of State Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1946, Volume V, (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1969) p 70. 
9 General Charles Foulkes, Canadian Defence Policy 
in a Nuclear Ae Behind the flea iinec. Vol XXI, No It 
aY Canadian Institute of International Affairs, p 2. 
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The government was not unaware of the implications of 
Acceptance of this principle, and in late 19146 authorized 
studies by technical teams of the requirements for continental 
air defence. 
One of the principal component studies was for an 
Arctic radar chain located somewhere between the national 
transcontinental railway and the Arctic Ocean. The concept 
was discarded at the time because of cost and impracticality. 
As the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, later 
told the House of Commons: 
... such a radar chain 
[across the rar North] 
might give us early warning of an approaching 
attack, [but] between this Arctic radar chain 
and the main radar control system far to the 
south lay a vast and isolated area in which it 
was simply not practicable to build the complete 
gridwork of overlapving radar coverage which is 
necessary to keep attacking planes under 
continuous observation. Thus by the time any 
attackers had travelled the hundreds of miles 
between the first alarm and the nearest desirable 
target they would be completely lost to our 
defending, control system. 
Therefore such an isolated Arctic radar chain 
might provide an alarm which might not lead to 
effective action, while it might nevertheless be 
likely to immobilize all activities in all 
target areas. Moreover, it would be very WHY" to create this result by "spoofing" raids. 
Although initial United States pressure had been resisted, 
there had been no real agreement on the form that post-war 
military relations should take. Earlier, the PJDD at its 
November 19'45 meeting had drafted some principles for future 
cooperation. These appeared to the Canadian government to 
362.10 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953-4, Vol 1, 
p 
ý3 
ll take the form of a basic security pact and were unacceptable. 
The PJBD undertook'a revision and simply recommended close 
cooperation for the provision of security fir the northern part 
of the Western Hemisphere. This formed the basis of the 
Board's 35th Recommendation of 16 September 1946 and subsequent 
joint public announcement. 
The Recommendation was approved by Cabinet and on 
Mackenzie King's insistence the British were informed, but 
the policy was to make no public announcemount. This was 
changed when the Soviet Union levelled charges against Canada 
of aiding, United States imperialist designs in the rar North 
and the Canadian press took up the cry. The government 
convinced the United States of the necessity of making a joint 
public announcement and this was done on 12 February 1947.12 
It said that it had been decided to continue collaboration 
in peacetime on a limited basis but that no treaty, 
executive agreement or contractual obligation had been 
entered into. Either country could discontinue the 
collaboration at any time. The new arrangement was rationalized 
on the basis that each country could fulfil its obligations 
under the UN Charter more effectively because such collaboration 
was a contribution to stability. 
fiowever, 'Canada war, now involved in a bilateral defence 
arrangement. The disparity of resources, the strategic 
11 James Fayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 345. 
12 Joint Statement By the Governments of Canada and the United States Regarding Cooperation Between the Two Countries, 
made in Ottawa and Washington on February 12,1947, Canada Treaty Series, 1947, No 43. 
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significance of Canadian geography, the intensifying Cold 
War, and advances in military technology were to create 
even greater United States pressures for closer bilateral 
defence cooperation. The continental imbalance had become 
the dominant factor in the formulation of Canadian defence 
policy in the post-war period. 
Immediate Post-War Military Activity in the North 
The United States withdrawal from the Northwest had been 
complete, but there was a United States desire to ensure that 
the air and road facilities should be maintained. 
13 The 
Canadian Army was made responsible for the Northwest Highway 
System (Alaska Highway) and the RCAF took over the 
administration of the Northwest Staging Route from Edmonton 
north. 
Of far greater moment were United States desires 
concerning the eastern Arctic and Goose Bay. Although 
the air bases of the CRIMSON Route were being handed over 
gradually, the United States wanted them maintained. In 
the early months of 1946, Canada gave permission to the 
United States to fly ß-29 aircraft over Arctic Canada to 
conduct experiments using LORAN (long range aids to 
navigation). Permission was then granted for the United 
States Coast Guard to set up static LORAN stations in 
the Arctic. 14 In the same year, but with considerable 
13 Journal of the PJBD, 29 April 1946, Department of 
External Affairs' Files in James Eayrs, Pencemakinn and 
Deterrence, p 351. 
Canada In World Affairs From UN 14 Robert A. Spcricer, 
to NATO 1946-1949, (Toronto: x orr Uni ersity-Press, 1959). 
P 315. 
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reluctance, permission was granted for suitable sites 
for meteorological stations. 
From 1947 to 1950 five weather stations were set 
up. 
15 
Alert, the one farthest north, was to become an important 
electronic listening post. These were joint ventures in that 
the costs were shared and the officer in charge of each 
station was a Canadian as were fifty per cent of the staff. 
The situation was far from satisfactory because initially 
no one could reach or leave these stations except in 
United States planes or ships. Within a short time the 
RCAF was supplying half the maintenance lift. By 1954, 
Canada had assumed responsibility for resupplying all the 
stations except Alert. 
16 Only in 1972 was full operational 
responsibility for all the stations assumed. 
Goose Bay was the largest northern base covering the 
shortest approach to the industrial heartland of North America 
from European Russia. It was the continental terminus for 
the strategic air route from Europe to Iceland and across 
Greenland. The United States wanted to build up Goose 
Day into a giant base with an establishment of 10,000 men 
with subsidiary bases in the eastern Arctic 
)? Goose Bay 
was considered to be the "only suitable base for very 
15 Polar Record, Vol 5, Nos 33-34, (January-July 1947), 
p 96. 
16 Canada, ! louse of Commons; Debcr, 1953-54, Vol II9 
p 1905. 
17 James Fayrz, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 354, 
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heavy bombardment groups and in fact could be said to be 
the most important all-round strategic air base in the 
western hemisphere. "18 There was some Canadian resistance, 
but by the end of 1947, ß-47 bombers were operating from it. 
Canada, with much reluctance, had become involved in providing 
facilities for United States offensive systems, though not 
until 1963 would it grant permission for the United States to 
store nuclear warhead, at Canadian baser. The strategic 
importance of Goose Bay rapidly declined with the opening of 
Thule Airbase in 1952. 
Continental Air Defence and the Pinetree Line 
By 19118 air defence had become a matter of public 
debate. A member of Parliament, L. W. Skey, in stressing 
the importance of air defence, favoured the RCAF being 
given priority for the defence of Canada. 
1'9 Colonel 
Wallace Goforth, recently retired Deputy Director of 
Defence Research, argued for greater emphasis on air defence. 
18 "Memorandum of Canadian-United States Defense 
Conversations field in Ottawa in Suite 'C' Chateau Laurier 
Hotel, December 10 and 17,1946, " p 73. In 1952, Canada 
granted 7,000 acres at Goose Say for a 20 year lease to the 
United States for a fighter base. R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's 
Long Term Strategic Situation, " International Journal, Vol 
XVII, No 3, (Summer, 1962) p 211. It was announce on 
12 January 1973 that the United States might continue to 
use the facilities until 1976 and that discussions. were 
underway whereby the Canadian Ministry of Transport would 
acquire the present United States facilities and operate 
and manage the airfield for both civilian and military 
purposes. International Canada, (January 1973) Canadian 
Institute of International airs. 
19 Canada, Ilouse of Commons, Debates, 19118, Vol VT, 
p 5293. 
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Basing his argument on the new technologies available and 
that the oceans and Arctic wastes were no longer effective 
barriers, he concluded that: "Geography underlines the logic 
of [a] Canadian interceptor role, as a first requirement of 
defence. "2° The government was most reticent about discussing 
air defence, but the 1948 estimates called for greater RCAF 
expenditures than for either the Army or the RCN. The increase 
was related to the development of the Canadian designed CF-100 
fighter begun in 1946. Brooke Claxton conceded that "the only 
kind of attack which is envisaged as possible should war 
break out in the immediate future is an attack of a diversionary 
nature which would be cleared up quite speedily. , 
21 It 
was admitted that such an attack could only come by air. 
General Foulkes, in an informal secret talk to officers 
on 28 January 19'8, provided an appreciation of the Soviet 
threat. Having reviewed the deterioration in Great Power 
relations during 19147, he had no doubt that the Russians were 
capable of overrunning Europe, but doubted tth probability of 
them doing so. His reason was that "no nation will attempt 
a planned war until it possesses sufficient atomic weapons 
' 20 Wallace Goforth, "We Do Not Stand On Guard, " 
MacLean's Magazine, 15 June 1948, p 51. 
21 Canada, Ilouso of Commons, Debates, 1948, Vol 
II, 
pp 1117-21 and reiterated same, Debate! s, 1949, Vol II, 
p 1663 when he said "Since an attack on Canada could only 
be made by air and by sea, emphasis must be on defence 
forces; by air - radar stations and communications, 
backed 
by interceptors and a relatively small mobile brigade 
group.; by sea - antisubmarine and antimine vessels 
for the 
protection of shipping and coastal waters. " 
G8 
for ... 1=1] 'Super Blitzkrieg' ." 
22This 
could happen in the time 
period 1952-57, 'but there war, a possibility of a conventional 
or accidental war between 1950-52. The day of complete 
air invasion (sic) of Canada had not yet arrived, but Canada 
could expect to be bombed with the aim of tying down troops 
and upsetting morale. Europe would be the primary theatre 
of operations and the aim would be to prevent the'war from 
spreading to North America. 
Other than stating the requirement for and initiating 
come research into the problem of air defence, the government 
took no steps in the immediate post-war years to develop 
an air defence system. In the United States, air defence 
from 1945-48 was practically non-existent. The impetus to 
develop an air defence system was provided by the 1948 Soviet 
May Day Parade display of lone range bombers. This impetus 
was reinforced by the Auc*ust 1949 detonation of a Soviet 
nuclear device. The United States informed Canadian planners 
that they considered that the Soviets might have 150 bombs 
by 1954, sufficient, if delivered without warning, to cause 
enough damage that the war would be lost. 
23 
It had been understood from the very beginning that 
early warning was the key requirement for any type of air 
defence system on a continental scale, and it was upon this 
22 "Extracts from an Address by the Chief of the 
General Staff, Lt. -General Charles Foulkes, To Officers of Army Headquarters, 28 January 1948 (Foulkes Papers) 
reprinted as Document 3 in James Eayrs, Peacemaking,, and 
Deterrence, p 390. 
23 James Dayrc, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 359. 
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aspect that research and development war, concentrated. But 
this research received a relatively low priority as attention 
became focused on the buildup of the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC), on the Korean War and on the dispatch of Canadian 
and American troops to Europe. 
Canadian defence expenditures for 1949 were the modest 
amount of $360 million. The White Paper on Defence that year 
stated the three basic objectives or Canadi': n defence 
policy al,: 
a. to provi. de the force estimated to be 
necessary to defend Canada against any sudden 
direct attack that could be or is likely to 
be directed against it in the near future. 
b. to provide the operational and administrative 
staffs, equipment, training personnel and reserve 
organization which would be capable of expansion 
as rapidly ar. necessary to mvrýt oar nne-rls; and 
e. to work edit wi. t1 oth'r fr., -ý- nations flans 
for joint defence boned on self-help and mutual 
aid as part of a combined effort ýq preserve 
peace and to restrain aggression. 
In expandi. nt' on the 19119 White Parser on Defence in the 
House, Brooke Claxton said that the Soviet Onion was the 
only possible as±rressor and that any attack would come by 
air. To meet auch can attack by air, there would be required: 
jet interceptors and Konti-nircraft Puns with 
the necessary radar equipment and communications 
system, backed by a relatively small but highly 
trained, efficient and mobile force of ground 
troops. The territory of Canada iv°co vast 
that it is obviously impracticable to construct 
a chain or grid of radar warning station n ... 
24 Cin<ida, Department of National Defence, Minister 
of National Defence, Brooke Claxton), Canada's Defence Programme 1949-50, (Ottawa: King's Printer, p 11. 
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nevertheless an early warning system to cover 
vital approaches and areas is being developed. 
25 
The early warning stations were envisaged to form the 
basis of the Pinetree line. During 1950-51, the United States 
and Canada reached agreement to proceed immediately to 
build up a single system working upward and outward from the 
principal target areas to provide protection to the most 
vital areas. 26 About one-quarter of the stations were to 
be in Canada. The United, States had already begun the 
construction of 75 stations in continental United States 
and Alaska. The agreement was formalized with an exchange of 
notes on 1 August 1951.27 
The detailed planning had begun in 1949 under the 
auspices of the PJID. An air defence planning group was 
established in Ottawa and this group formed the basis 
for the RCAF air defence headquarters established 
near Montreal soon afterwards. 
28 Air defence 
25 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1949, Vol II, 
p 1701. In September 1950 he spoke a out the requirements for 
radar coverage over all vital approaches and remarked that the 
Americans "have as great interest in their defence being 
effective in Canada as they have in its being effective in 
the United States. " Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953, 
2nd less., p 325. 
26 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1953-54, Vol I, 
p 362. The Pinetree line was only an outer layer of a system 
of search radars that could be used to direct interceptors 
and to control air traffic. The total number of search radars, 
including the Pinetree line ones, eventually built was 193. 
27 Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United 
States of America Contributing to an Agreement Regarding the 
Extension and Co-ordination of the Continental Radar Defence, 
August 1,1951, Canada Treaty Series, 1951, Ido 31. 
28 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National 
Defence (SCD), Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 27th Parl., 
let seas. , No 13, June 28, , testimony ot Air re A. C. Hull, p 389. 
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identification zones were set up on both sides of the inter- 
national border and along both coasts. Canadian and United 
States interceptors were given authority to cross the border 
to make interceptions. 
Construction of the Pinetree Line began immediately. 
Canada paid one-third of the cost of the thirty-three stations 
built in Canada. The Pinetree line ran from Vancouver 
Island into the Peace River country down into the northern 
states of the United States Prairies, up again into Ontario 
and Quebec and ended up at the Atlantic coast of Newfoundland. 
The Pinetree line was operational by 1954, A number of the 
stations located in Canada were. manned and commanded by 
Americans, but Canada retained title to all sites and the 
right to take over the manning of such sites if is no 
desired. Government sensitivity over having the United 
States operating some of the stations was reflected in having 
it operate the ones farthest away from Canadian population 
centres. 
29 
Perhitpr the most revealint*, as well as the most terse, 
statement came from the RCAF in June 1952. It stated that 
United Staten Airforce personnel would arrive soon to man 
"a number of radar installations being constructed in Canada 
ns Part of the North American radar system. " These would 
be stations "primarily intended for the defence of localities 
29 Michael ßarkwiy, "Canada's Changing Role in NATO 
Defence, " International Journal, Vol XIV, No 2, (Spring 
1959) p 10.. 
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in the United States" and the whole project was'in line 
with long-term plans for joint Aanada-US aerial defence. 
30 
With the adherence of both Canada and the United 
States to NATO, strong pressures developed from Canada to 
associate continental defence with NATO. The idea of trans- 
ferring the measures for continental defence from the PJBD 
to NATO was discussed in 1950 at a'Joint meeting of the 
Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff. This was part 
of the discussion for the setting up of the Canada-United 
States Regional Planning Group (CUSRP(). The CUSRP was 
one of the five regional planning groups being set up 
under the auspices of NATO, the four others being European. 
According to General Foulkes, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff 
were "under some political pressure to bring North American 
defence measures into the NATO fold; but as the practical and 
strategic reasons far outweighed the theoretical arguments, 
it was decided to go along with the U. S view. "31 The United 
States simply refused to contemplate any arrangement that 
interfered with what they considered to be the "permanent" 
character of joint planning (NATO was a 20 year treaty) or 
any form of multilateral arrangement or veto over the use of 
SAC to which continental air defence was becoming linked. It 
was decided to retain the PJBD sind to report to NATO on 
. 30 Quoted in ibid. 
11 General Charles Foulkes, "The Complications of 
Continental Dcfnnce, " Livingston T. tMtenccfant, cd. , Neurs Taken for Granted, (Toronto: Burnn and tiacEachcrn, 
p 118. 
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continental defence measures. 
In 1952, NATO decided to introduce integrated commands 
to supercede the regional planning groups. It was then 
realized that if this was applied to continental defence, a 
United States over-all commander would be appointed. 
32 
Canadian policy, ever since the PJi3D had been formed, had 
been to avoid any form of unified command except in the 
direct of emergencies. This cooled much of the Canadian 
ardour for the previous proposals. The United States was 
not at this time interested in a unified command. There was, 
therefore, no desire in the early 1950s for a unified 
command in either country. 
The Pinetree line was expanded in both Canada and the 
United States when it was apreed in 1959 to build seven more' 
heavy radar sites. As a result of an asreement in June 19G1, 
Canada agreed to fund and operate ten of the stations in 
Canada and in addition to man five more, but these were to 
be funded by the United States. But, in 1963 under a new 
agreement, the RCA! ' assumed financial and manning responsibility 
for all stations in Canada except six in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, although it manned the one at Gander. By 1969, as 
a result of reductions, there were 27 stations manned and 
operated by the Canadian Forces Air Defence Coma nd out of the 30 still 
operating in Canada. 
33 The three remaining ones were in 
32 rbic", p 119. 
33 Canada, ! louse of Commons, Standinn Committee on 
External Affair: and National Defence (SCEAND), Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 28th Parl., ist sc;; c., ,-, 
jjjy'6$ 1969, No 41, ppetiaix XX, p 1417. 
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Newfoundland and Labrador and were operated by the United 
States, Since then, Canada has taken over responsibility 
for the station at Goose Bay and closed down the t"loosonee, 
Ontario station leaving 25 stations still in operation. 
The remaining United States bases, are an inheritance 
of the Anglo-American destroyer bases agreement. When 
Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949, the United 
States retained the use of the bases but agreed to a suspension 
of jurisdictional rights for a five year trial period. This 
arrangement was worked out by the PJBD and implemented by 
an exchange of notes. The United States has not requested 
any change. 
The Mid-Canada anci Distant early t^ºarninr Lines 
From 194 the United Statoo undertook a number of measures 
for air defence, but these were discrete and were not 
designed to fit into any continental air defence concept of 
a massive scale. 
314 A crucial factor was the lack of the 
necessary technology to provide a high enough kill ratio to 
make an air defence system effective arainSt nuclear armed 
bombers. In 1951, the United States employed scientists 
at the Marnachurcttn Institute of Technology to study the 
technical problem of air defence. 
35 This study (Project 
Charles) resulted in the formation of the Lincoln Laboratory 
and the-study was carried out throuchout the winter and 
311 Samuel P. ituntington, The Common Defense, (flew York: 
Columbia University Press, mol p. 
35 Ibid., p 329. 
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spring of 1951-52. During the summer,. a report called Summer 
Study Group Report was produced. From the very beginning of 
Project Charles, there was unofficial Canadian military and 
scientific participation. 
The Summer Study Group Report: (1) estimated that in 
two or three years the Soviet Union would have sufficient 
aircraft and atomic weapons to cripple the United States in 
a surprise attack; (2) declared that existing and planned 
American defences were inadeIuate and improperly integrated, 
and that under optimal condlA:. tions would achieve only a 20 
per cent kill-ratio; and (3) argued that new and probable 
technological breakthroughs made it feasible to develop 
an air defence system that could hope to achieve a kill-ratio 
of 60 to 70 per cent. 
36 The report urged that a distant early 
warning system across northern North America to rive three 
to six hours warning be given top priority. The early warning 
system was to consist of two lines of radar stations separated 
by about 400 miles. This was to be supplemented by a set of 
sea wings - airborne and shipborne radars, extcndinr from 
Alaska to Midway in the Pacific and from Labrador to the 
United Kingdom in the Atlantic. 
To determine the feasibility of a distant early 
warning, system, the United States decided to carry out an 
engineering and systems study in 1952. Canada was prepared 
to agree to cooperate, but only if a joint military study 
group was formed to study the whole concept of continental 
36 Ibid., pp 329-30. 
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air defence. To this, the United States readily agreed. 
The Canadian aim was to ensure that the government would have 
available the necessary and technological information upon 
which to make its decisions. 
The Summer Study (Troup Report created a major debate 
within the incoming Eisenhower Administration which was 
bent on decreasing defence expenditures. The explosion of 
a Soviet hydrogen bomb device in August 1953 gave a new 
urgency to the debate. The proponents of air defence, 
largely scientists, argued that the advent of Soviet fusion 
weapons challenged the low priority being given to air defence. 
This was because the fear of a crippling surprise attack was 
now a real threat to both SAC, concentrated as it then was 
on a few bases, and to the civilian population. They saw 
the requirements of air defence as (1) early warning, 
(2) air defence forces to destroy enemy aircraft at long 
ranges, (3)area defence of populated regions, and (4) short 
range defence. A fundamental premise was that the problem of 
early warning was än separable from the cost of an effective 
over-all air defence system. 
37 A piece-meal or discrete 
approach to air defence was no longer possible. 
The proponents of air defence sought a strategic 
counterbalance, in continental air defence, to the United 
States Airforce doctrine of "offence is the best defence" 
37 James R. Killian and A. G. Hill, "ror a Continental 
Defense, " The Atlantic tlonthl , Vol 1929 No S. (November 1953), p 39. Both were involved wit the Lincoln Laboratory and the 
article supported the concept of continental air defence. 
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with its emphasis on SAC. The strategic and doctrinal 
confusion was not to be sorted out until the concept of first 
and second strike forces was developed in the middle fifties. 
38 
Also, in the early fifties, relations between European defence, 
SAC and continental air defence were not perceived with any 
clarity. The Eisenhower Administration introduced tactical 
nuclear weapons into the'European theatre in 1954 as a 
means of saving on manpower costs. It was then realized 
that this could mean the near automatic use of nuclear 
weapons in Europe in a war. Therefore, the Soviet Union 
would be tempted or forced into attemptinc to destroy as 
much of SAC as possible on the assumption that nuclear 
escalation would not be limited to central Europe. 
European defence became dependent on the ability of 
SAC to massively retaliate. The credibility of SAC was 
dependent in turn on its invulnerability to surprise attack, 
and, therefor(-, on the air defence measures designed to 
provide the necessary early warning to pet it off the ground 
and protect its bases. 
The consequences for Canada of European dependence 
on the massive United Startes retaliatory capability and the 
requirement to provide forks invulnerability far exceeded 
those entailed in purely continental defence. The strategic 
significance of the Canadian Arctic and its airspace now 
assumed an importance directly related to the defence of the 
38 R. J. Sutherland, ''The Strategic Significance of tho 
Canadian Arctic, " in R. St. J. Macdonald, ed., The Arctic 
Frontier, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press e 
p266. 
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Western World. As R. J. Sutherland remarked in 1965: 
Domestic North American concerns were sufficient 
to bring about the Canada-United States alliance, but they did not call forth the great expansion in United States nuclear striking power, the build-up in continental air defences or the construction of the Arctic warning systems. These were an investment 
security. The beneficiaries of the investment included Canada and the United States owing to their fundamental interest in the security of 
western Europe. r, 1his is something which few North Americans and few S Europeans have 
understood with any clarity. ýýýa, rji n,.. Ht r+y' ý ýa1ýto irý"tý ý. /ZG. /týxý. dý.. C Jt1. o" .9 Ae" tim.. at & The urgency of reaching a decision on air defence bore 
fruit with the approval, on 6 October 1953, of the National 
Security Council (NSC) Paper 162. THe paper identified the 
Soviet threat as 'total", and recommended the adoption of nearly all 
the proposals of the Summer Study Group Report, and contemplated 
spending $20 billion over a five year period for air defence. 
40 
The studies for the Joint Military Study Group were by no means 
complete when, in November, the Eisenhower Administration 
accepted the approved plans of the Canadian and United States 
Chiefs of Staff for an early warning system. In the same 
month, Canada permitted the initiation of siting surveys. 
After a series of complex negotiations, the agreement to construct 
the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line was announced in Parliament 
in November 1954. 
It had been recognized that if the United States decided to 
go ahead with a comprehensive air defence system, it would be 
very difficult for Canada to refuse to cooperate and to provide 
39 Ibid., pp 266-7. 
40 Samuel P. J. Huntington, The Common Defense, p 334. 
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facilities on Canadian territory. On 3 October 1953, Brooke 
Claxton suggested in a memorandum that whether or not Canada 
thought such projects necessary: 
... it will, of course, create many serious problems for Canada. The Canadian Government mayor may not 
be convinced, when United States projects are proposed, 
that they are reasonably necessary when weighed against 
global strategic factors and political obligations 
overseas; as well as against the possibility of air 
attack taking new forms in the next decade. However, 
it may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian 
Government to reject any major defence proposal which 
the United States Government presents with conviction 
as essential for the security of North America. 
If new United States defence projects in Canada, and 
in particular new radar defences, should become 
inevitable, the Canadian Government will be faced by 
the question whether Canada should share in the cost 
and operations of the new projects or whether the 
United States should be allowed to develop and 
operate them exclusively with United States money and 
men. If Canada is to share in these projects, how will 
that affect the level of future defence expenditures 
and, in particular, 4janada's continuing share of 
NATO 
defences in Europe? 
In 1947, Canada had discarded the concept of an Arctic 
radar chain. Research had continued on radar equipment that 
would be relatively inexpensive and require . 
a. minimum of 
attention. The concept was for a tactical warning line 
that would provide some degree of early warning but avoid the 
cost of an Arctic warning system. In mid-October 1953, the 
Joint-Military Study Group recommended the construction of the 
McGill Fence, or as it became known, the Mid-Canada line. 
Feasibility studies were completed by June 1954 and the government 
approved its construction that month. 
41 James Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 369. 
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The Mid-Canada line provided a thin vertical electronic 
fence capable of detecting aircraft passing through its 
coverage from ground level up to a great height. It was 
sited along the 55th parallel, 400 to 800 miles north of the 
main Canadian population centres, but within relatively accessible 
areas, thereby easing construction. 
To what extent there was United States pressure to 
construct a mid-Canada line is not known. There seems to be 
no evidence to suggest that if Canada had notbuilt it, the 
United States would have wanted. to do so. For Canada, its 
construction had a paramount political purpose. It was 
believed to be a relatively inexpensive way of providing for 
a major and independent contribution to a larger joint 
project. The Mid-Canada line was solely Canadian in design, 
construction and equipment. 
42 Coverage of the sea approaches 
would be required, and by building a mid-Canada line Canada 
could argue, justifiably, that it had done its share and 
could leave the seaward extensions to the United States. 
This is in fact what happened, and the United States paid the 
full cost of the seaward extensions. In a memorandum to Prime 
Minister St. Laurent on 21 October 1953, Brooke Claxton 
provided the political rationale for constructing a mid-Canada 
line. 
42 See John Swettenham, McNau hton Vol 3, p 199-201. 
McNaughton, as Canadian Chairman off the PJ from 1946 to 1959, 
had insisted that Canadian electronic firms be given the 
contracts for the Pinetrec line. This laid the basis for a 
high technology electronic industry of over 400 firms and made 
possible the complete Canadian input for the construction of 
the Mid-Canada line. 
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[The construction of a mid-Canada line] would 
... give us the initiative and enable us to tell 
our own people and the Americans that we were . 
quite prepared to do anything we thought necessary 
in continental defence. 
Our taking the initiative with regard to the 
McGill Fence would put us in a better position 
to say, "Well, we think we have done what we 
thought was necessary for continental defence. If 
you want to go on and do more, we are not going to 
stand in the way", and keep our self-respect without 
having to put out too great an45xpenditure of 
materials, manpower and money. 
The Korean War was the trigger which, in 1951, launched 
Canada on a massive rearmament programme with expenditures of 
$5 billion over a three year period. 
44 Initially, all three 
services benefited but it soon became clear that air defence 
expenditures were going to take increasing amounts of a declining 
defence budget after 1954. The first sign that air defence was 
going to cost a great deal of money was the cost of the Mid- 
Canada line, which, when completed in 1957, had cost $210 million45 
Such expenditures were attacked by Generals Guy Simonds and 
W. S. Macklin. t6 They considered the whole idea of continental 
air defence as a "Maginot Line" strategy destined to be a costly 
failure. They argued for balanced conventional forces useful 
43 James Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 370. 
44 Sec below pp 201-2 
45 Canada, I1ou6o of Commonfl, Deb, 1957, Vol II, p 1411. 
46 See General W. H. S. Mscklin, "The costly roily of Our 
Defence Policy, " MacLean's Magazine, (18 February 1956); and 
General Guy Simonds, where eve -gone Wrong on Defence, 
" 
MacLean's magazine, (23 June 1956); and "We're Wasting Millions 
on an so ete Airforce, '' MacLean'n Magazine, (4 August 1956). 
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for operations in defence of the north, NATO and later 
peacekeeping. These public criticisms were not made until after 
their retirement (1056) but it seems reasonable to assume that 
they were made privately in the early fifties, but without 
apparent effect. 
The decision to construct an early warning system in the 
Arctic was an integral part of a comprehensive continental 
air defence system involving the extensive use of Canadian 
geography. 
47 Canadian geography offered the possibilities of 
early warning, defence in depth and increased range and 
response time for interceptor forces. The further north the 
early warning system, the greater the warning time for SAC and 
civil defence measures. 
The DEW line stations were sited as far north as was possible 
without incurring prohibitively heavy costs. To have gone 
further north would have magnified the costs and gained only 
two hours of additional warning. With the advent of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), early warning 
time became a matter of minutes. In 1956, Lieutenant General 
Gavin of the United States Airforce was quoted as saying: "As 
we look ahead we can see considerable payoff in being able to 
put stations on the polar ice cap to detect missiles early in 
their flight, perhaps at the instant of take-off. 148 Much to 
47 See R. J. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the 
Arctic, " pp 267-8 for an analysis of the strategic importance of 
Canadian geography. 
48 Quoted in Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1956, 
Vol VII, pp 6955. Mr. Alvin Hamilton in using thi quote 
remarked "For one of the essentials would be another DELL line, 
500 or 600 miles further north, running from Ellesmere Island 
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the relief of Canadians, who were concerned about a challenge 
to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, the United States chose another 
system; the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) 
with stations in Alaska, Greenland and the United Kingdom. 
The second benefit offered by Canadian geography was 
defence in depth. There were two advantages to be obtained; 
first, enemy bombers could be engaged before reaching their 
targets; and second, by extending the area of radar coverage 
the risk of saturation of defences could be reduced. To achieve 
defence in depth there were two main options. The first was 
to extend northwards the system of radars for controlling inter- 
ception and the airfields for the interceptors. The second 
was to construct a long range aircraft possessing integral 
radar that could operate beyond the range of ground radar 
cover. The final decision was to use the Mid-Canada line 
as the most northward radar system capable of assisting 
interceptions. The nine Canadian cr-loo squadrons were located 
on bases in southern Canada just south of the Mid-Canada line. 
This solution achieved some defence in depth for the United 
States but none for Canada. The interception battle would be 
fought over the populated southern part of Canada, a 'fact that 
was to influence the later debates over NORAD and nuclear 
westward over the Arctic ice. This area is regarded by Canada 
as Canadian territory on the sector principle by which eastern 
and western boundaries are carried northwards to the pole. The 
United States however does not recognize this principle, and 
might not concede Canada's claim if it were formally presented 
which has not yet been done. ' 
4 
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weapons. One determining factor in not extending the systems of 
radars and airfields further north was cost. Another factor 
was that if there was a northern extension, Canada probably would 
have to accept United States interceptor bases on Canadian 
soil in addition to the Newfoundland ones. 
An exchange of notes on 15 May 1955 provided the . gal 
basis for the construction, which by then was well under way. 
Canada provided the, sites and reserved the "right, on reasonable 
notice, to take over the operations and manning of any or all 
the installations 49 All entry had to be in accordance with 
Canadian customs regulations and there were no restrictions 
in the jurisdiction of Canadian law. When, in the House, 
the issue of Canadian sovereignty was raised, the Minister of 
Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, Mr. Jean Lesage, 
said; "Our sovereignty has never been endangered by the 
existence of the D. L. W. line. We have agreements with the 
United States and the facts are there to prove we have 
sovereignty over our northern territory. "50 The United States 
bore the complete cost of $2 billion for the DEW line. 
In R. J. Sutherland's view, Canada derived two principal 
benefits from the construction of the DEW line. Firstly, 
Canada secured what the United States had up to that time 
assiduously endeavoured to avoid, namely, an explicit 
recognition of Canadian claims to the exercise of sovereignty 
49 Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States 
of America Governing the Establishment of A Distant Early 
Warning System in Canadian Territory (emphasis added), May 5, 
1955, Canada Treaty eriec, 1955, No 8. 
5o Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1956, Vol VII, 
p 6955. ' 
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in the rar North. Secondly, it diminished the threat of 
hostile encroachments into the Canadian Arctic by making it 
clear that the region constituted a part of a security zone 
of North America and NATO. 
51 
The Canadian government of the day, if not later 'governments 
and the general public, was clear on the strategic reasons for 
continental air defence. Canadians had participated from the 
very beginning in United States studies. It has been stated 
that it was a Canadian "who first drew attention to the vital 
distinction between first-strike and second-strike capabilities, 
and to the corollary, that the key targets of a Soviet first 
strike would be the bases of the United States Strategic Air 
Command rather than North American cities. "52 Mr. Claxton in 
1954 made it clear that the Soviet fl-bomb detonation reinforced 
the rationale for air defence to protect the SAC bases. 
53 The 
following year, his, successor, Mr. Campney, argued that the 
improved Soviet nuclear delivery capability required greater 
efforts to strengthen the defence of the continent "because 
North America is the only great base from which operations for 
the defence of Europe can be supported, and also because of 
51 F. J. Sutherland, "The Strategic' Significance of the 
Arctic, " p 271. 
52 Ibid. In all probability it was R. J. Sutherland 
himself. 
53 Canada, House of Commons, Debi, 1953-54, Vol V 
pp 4903-05. 
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the necessity of protecting the thermonuclear retaliatory 
capability of the United States. "54 
Canada then, by 1955, was committed to continental defence 
on a large scale in peacetime. It had accepted that continental 
air defence was designed primarily to protect SAC from 
surprise attack. Such an acceptance was never seen in purely 
continental terms but as essential to the defence of the whole 
North Atlantic area. It was a contribution to Western security 
far exceeding any national air defence requirements or even 
continental ones. Canada's perception of the need to defend 
Europe was exemplified by the stationing of 12 squadrons of 
day fighters in Europe, compared to the nine squadrons for 
continental air defence. 
Until the building of the DEW line, there had not been a 
disproportionate sharing of the costs of continental defence 
and the costs had not been prohibitively high. The DEW line 
was a project of great magnitude, complete in itself, stretching 
across the Canadian north, completely United States financed 
and controlled, and in a largely inaccessible area where 
Canadian sovereignty had never been fully accepted by the 
United States. The construction of the DEW line involved 
Canada in a United States alliance more intimate and embracing 
than any previous agreement. 
The NORAD Agreement 
The arrangements for command of the developing continental 
air defence cyctem had followed the traditional pattern of 
mutual cooperation. The cooperation that developed between 
54 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1955, Vol 1, pp 629-30. 
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the RCAF Air Defence Command and the United States Air Defence 
COmmand was far more intimate than had been previous arrangements 
in war or peace. This intimacy was natural once the decision 
had been made to consider air defence in a continental context 
and to give it a high priority. It resulted in military 
planning being directed to the natural military solution of an 
integrated command. 
The developing military requirement for an integrated 
command conflicted with Canadian political reticence about 
too close an association with the United States. To find a 
solution, a joint United States-Canadian operational and 
scientific group was set up in May 1956 to study the problems 
of continental air defence. 
55 One of its recommendations to the 
national chiefs of staff in December 1956 was for the operational 
control of air defence forces by an integrated command 
structure. The United States was desirous of giving rapid 
implementation to the recommendation, but the Canadian 
government, faced with an election, declined to act. The 
election was held on 10 June 1957 and the Progressive 
Conservatives came to power under Mr. Diefenbaker with a minority 
of seats. This was to be turned into the largest majority 
in Canadian history after another election a year later. 
When the Diefenbaker government, specifically the Prime 
Minister and }u Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, 
came to consider the proposed agreement, they were under 
55 Canada, House of Commons, Deb , 1957-58, Vol II, p 1061. 
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intense pressure to conclude it. 
56 The government did not 
do so until an exchange of notes on 16 May 1958. However, in 
August 1957 the government had agreed to make a joint statement 
accepting a "system of shtegrated operational control of air 
defence forces ... under an integrated command responsible to the 
Chiefs of Staff of both countries., 
57 The phrase "joint command" 
did not appear, rather it was to be an "integrated command, " a 
more intimate command relationship. 
The text of the actual agreement can be broken into two 
parts. The first part was concerned with justifying the 
agreement, and the second with the actual organization of NORAD. 
It began'by noting that it had been recognized for some years 
that the air defence of Canada and the United States had to be 
considered as a single problem. Coordination of separate air 
defence plans did not provide for the necessary "authoritative 
control. " This was required because: 
The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvement 
in the means of effecting their delivery, and the 
requirements of the air defence control systems 
demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the, speed 
and tempo of technological developments. To counter 
the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of 
the air defence system, defensive operations must 
commence as early as possible and enemy forces must 
be kept constantly engaged. Arrangements for the 
coordination of national plans requiring 
consultation between national commanders before 
56 The United States wanted thejdnt command to become 
effective by mid-1957 when the last of the radar networks would be 
operational. Delay was considered to be dangerous at a time when 
the Soviet Long Range Airforce had become substantial, Jon 
McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, pp 39-40. 
57 Joint announcement is reprinted in ibid., p 46. 
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implementation had become inadequate in the face of 
the possible sudden attack, with little or no 
warning. It was essential, therefore, to have in 
existence in peacetime an organization, including 
the weapons, facilities and command structure, 
which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan55 
approved in advance by national authorities. 
On Canadian inisistence, the relationship of continental 
defence to NATO was defined in more precise terms. The 
Canadian-United States region was described as an "integral" 
part of NATO. And "In support of the strategic objectives established 
in NATO for the Canadian-United States region and in accordance 
with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, " the two 
governments recognized the desirability of integrating 
headquarters exercising operational control over assigned 
air defence forces. The "strategic objectives" of the 
Canadian-United States region were not defined. However, 
NORAD was not a command of NATO, and regardless of Canadian 
political desires, its association with NATO was so tenuous 
that no organizational relationship could be used as a 
justification. The failure to provide a strategic rationale 
for continental air defence left a void that could not be 
filled by the previous description of the changing technological 
environment and of the resulting military requirements. Even 
in the litter, no mention was made of ballistic missiles and 
their implications for air defence. 
The military arguments for an integrated command structure 
58 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States of America Concerning the 
Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence 
Command (NORAD), Mdy 12,1958. Canada Treaty Series, 1958, No. 9. 
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were very strong. The political problem lay in how to ensure 
that NORAD's actions would not involve Canada in situations 
over which it could exercise little influence. The issues of 
consultation, of responsibility of CINCNORAD (Commander-in- 
Chief North American Air Defence) and of advanced planning were 
of paramount importance. CINCNORAD was to be responsible to 
the Chiefs of Staff of both countries, who in turn were 
responsible to their governments. The plans and procedures 
to be followed in wartime were to be formulated and approved 
in peacetime, and were to be capable of rapid implementation 
in an emergency. The arrangements of, consultation, responsibility 
and planning did not and never have made clear what control 
Canada would exercise over NORAD's actions in a crisis. 
The difficulty lay in the intimate strategic relationship 
of NORAD to United States deterrent forces and the direct 
presidential control exercised over them. Because the 
"strategic objectives" were not defined, this relationship 
was not explicitly defined. Because the survivability of the 
United States deterrent was of paramount interest, what 
measures NORAD. took in a crisis also had to be controlled by 
the president. In practice, therefore, consultation with 
Canada in a crisis was a matter of presidential discretion. 
The emphasis thus had to shift to working out procedures 
. that could 
be implemented in a crisis. 
The problem was further complicated by having a Canadian 
as deputy commander with full powers to act in the absence of 
CINCNORAD. This could result in a president giving orders to 
a Canadian officer whose government disagreed with, or had 
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not been informed of, those orders. The United States has always 
been particularly careful never to place any restrictions on 
the authority of the Canadian deputy on the assumption, 
presumably, that there could never be a conflict of authority. 
59 
NORAD was to consist of separate Canadian and United 
States contributions of air defence forces, as determined, 
by each government. It was to be commanded by an integrated 
headquarters exercising not unified command or operating on 
the basis of mutual cooperation, but by having operational 
control over the nationally assigned forces. Operational 
control was defined in the agreement as "the power to direct, 
coordinate, and control the operational activites of forces 
assigned. " All other aspects of command were to remain the 
responsibility of national commanders, such as the Commander 
of the RCAF Air Defence Command. The main difference between 
NORAD and previous Canadian-United States mutual cooperation 
command arrangements was that there was to be one headquarters 
instead of two. Instead of two headquarters each with a 
national commander reporting directly to his respective 
government, there was to be one headquarters of Canadians and 
Americans serving one commander (CINCNORAD) who was responsible 
to both governments for the operational control of the assigned 
forces. Normally, forces under operational control are assigned 
for only short periods, but in the case of NORAD, it was for 
ten years. The channels of command from the two governments 
59 General Charles Foulkes, "The Complications of 
Continental Defence, " p 119. 
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to CINCNORAD and the arrangements for consultation between 
the two governments were of particular importance to Canada. 60 
Re-equipping NORAD 
Complementing the decision to integrate the North 
American air defence command system, were the decisions to 
automate the air defence system, re-equip the air defence 
forces, and embark upon civil defence measures designed to ensure 
the survival of North American society. It had been understood, 
since the exploratory work of the. Lincoln Summer Group, that the 
manual type of command and control system would be unable to 
contend with the increased speed, and after 1954 the presumed 
larger numbers, of Soviet bombers. Joint command arrangements 
greatly improved the efficiency of a manual system, but the 
introduction of SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment) made 
a fully integrated system a necessity. 
Before the introduction of SAGE, the Canadian air defence 
commander operating from his headquarters at St. Hubert, controlled 
all Canadian air defence forces. Once NORAD was agreed to, the 
Canadian commander came under CINCNORAD'and had the authority 
to order Canadian forces into action in accordance with the 
previously agreed rules of engagement. He could do this without 
first gaining governmental authority. However, until SAGE was 
introduced, he was still a national commander controlling all 
Canadian air defence forces, but with a United States superior) 
60 As part of the NORAD Agreement, a Canada-United States 
Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence was created. It has 
met only four times: in 1958,1959,1960 and 19614. There is 
no evidence that it was a useful instrument for defence 
coordination. 
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CINCNORAD. It was, in fact, the command relationship the United 
States had wanted in 1940-41. 
NORAD was divided into eight regions embracing the 
complete area of North America. The regions were sub-divided 
into divisions and SAGE was built into all the regions 
exceptlhosc in Alaska, and Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Because the NORAD regions ran geographically south to north, 
practically all the populated area of Can da was placed under 
the operational control of United States officers. The 
areas under Canadian operational control were northern Canada 
and the Maritimes. 
Canada had been developing a successor to the CF-100. 
By 1957-5ß, the development of the CF-105, or Arrow, had 
reached the stage where a decision had to be made on whether or 
not to put it into production. 
61 For reasons that were eventually 
made public, the projected cost per aircraft had risen from 
$1.2 million to $8 million, compared to a United States 
equivalent interceptor for $2 million. The government decided 
to cancel the Arrow. 
Estimating the significance of Soviet military technological 
advances has never been easy, and in the later 1950s and early 
1960s it was particularly difficult. That the threat was shifting 
from manned bombers to ICBMs was clear, but the time scale of 
this shift and the proportion of bombers to missiles were not. The 
61 Jon UcLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy 1957-1963, 
pp G1-84 deal in detail wit i the cancellation of the Arrow. 
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continuous revision of estimates during this period 'resulted in 
rapid changes in United States procurement programmes. 
General Foulkes remarked: 
In the assessment of the threat, Canada is 
dependent upon the United States for virtually 
all principal intelligence estimates. The Canadian 
contribution is limited to the analysis and 
assessment of the information and to collaboration in a joint estimate of the threat. This joint 
judgement is often a compromise and has not always 
been accurate. As a result, it has been necessary 
for Canada to make considerable change and 
expensive adjustmcnt6lo its contributiorcto 
continental defence. 
When cancelling the Arrow, the government suggested that 
it "felt justified in deciding that we should spend a much 
smaller amount of money on joining in the chain of ground 
to air missile bases which the United States was developing 
for the protection of their SAC bomber bases and for the protec- 
tion of the main centres of industry in the northeast portion 
of the United States and Canada. "63 This was reference to the 
BOHARC ground to air missile, which wasan area weapon designed 
to supplement interceptors, both being integrated with SAGE. 
One of the justifications for the cancellation of the Arrow 
was that "by the 1960s manned aircraft ... will be less effective 
"64 in meeting the threat than previously expected. i3OtIARC and SACS 
62 General Charles Foulkes, "The Complications of 
Continental Defence, " p 101. 
63 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1960, Vol VII, p 7649. 
64 Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Statement, September 23,1958. 
Prime Minister's Office. It is reprinted in on HcLin, Canada's 
Changing Defense Policy 1957-1963, Appendix II, pp 225-8. 
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bccLurme linked in the public mind as a substitute for the cancelled 
Arrow. 
The United States was initially opposed to the deployment 
of BOMARC in Canada because of previous political problems 
over the Newfoundland bases and the stationing of United States 
personnel at the Pinetree radar sites. However, General 
Pearkes took the political initiative because of his concern 
that any new air defence system should operate sufficiently 
far north to provide protection to the Montreal-Toronto region. 
65 
The result was that two bases planned for northeastern United 
States were moved to North Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, 
Quebec. Only cursory consideration was given to more bases. 
Three difficulties arose over the BOMARC decision. 
Firstly, its had had such an unsatisfactory development history 
that there was strong pressure to cancel the programme. Secondly, 
it had been developed in two versions, "A" and "B" versions. 
The "A" version could use either a conventional or nuclear 
warhead, but performance limitations caused the United States 
to discard it. The "B" version could une only nuclear warheads 
and this fact triggered off the now famous or infamous debate 
over the adoption of nuclear weapons. The third difficulty 
concerned its strategic usefulness. Because of programme 
delays it would not come into service until 1962, after the 
period of considered maximum danger from the Soviet bomber 
threat. It was also vulnerable to a Soviet "first wave" 
65 For an analysis of the BOMARC decision see Jon McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy 1957-1963, pp 84-100. 
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missile strike. Partly because of the Canadian commitment to 
IOMARC and possible consequences to Canadian-United States 
relations of its cancellation, and partly as a result of the 
collapse of the Paris Summit Conference in 1960, the United 
States decided to construct ten IOHARC bases, two of which 
would be in Canada. 
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had always been clear 
in their advice that fOMARC or no BOMARC, Canada would have 
to have interceptors. The RCAF had not been in favour of 
the BOMARC or of any ground based missile system. The 
government was in the predicament, partly of its own 
making, of having Canadian air defence forces consisting 
of only two BOMARC sites once the Cr-laos were retired from 
service. 
Having cancelled the Arrow, ostensibly for strategic 
reasons but tactually because of its cost, the government 
found it politically difficult to buy a United States 
interceptor outright. The alternative was to divert United 
States aircraft already in service. The final arrangement was 
that the United States Airforce diverted 66 McDonnell riot-13' 
"Voodoo" fighters. These were in exchange for Canada 
taking over the United States operated Pinetree line 
stations and paying $50 million towards the cost of Fl04s 
(Starfighters) for European members of NATO under mutual 
assistance arrangements. 
66 In addition, Canada would manufac- 
ture, under licence, the F-104n to re-equip its own air 
66 Ibid., p 190. 
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division in Europe and the airforces of certain European 
countries. The F-104 order was worth 1,6? 200 million to the 
Canadian aircraft industry. 
These highly advantageous purchase arrangements were 
an extension of the benefits Canada derived from the Canada- 
United States Defence Production'Sharing Programme which had 
begun in 1959. The United States accepted that Canadian 
cooperation in continental defence was very much dependent 
upon Canadian industry obtaining a fair share of contracts. 
This was notwithstanding the fact that the United States 
paid two-thirds of the cost of continental air defence 
installations in Canada and the complete cost of the DEW line. 
The Defence Production Sharing Programme was different 
from previous post-war arrangements because it was related to 
United States procurement in Canada of defence material for 
the total United States defence programme, and not just for 
continental defence. The programme allowed the Canadian 
defence industry to gain access to the United States 
defence market by waiving the Buy America Act, and ignoring 
customs duties and fiscal regulatory restrictions. 
G7 The aim 
was to increase United States defence orders in Canada and 
over the period. 1959-1969 Canada had a net favourable balance 
of $505 million in defence purchases. 
68 
67 For an analysis of Defence Production Sharing see 
John Gellner, "The Place of Defence in the Economic Life: 
of Canada, " (lector J. Massey, cd. , The Canadian Afilitary: A Profile, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972pp 130-35. 
68 Thid., p 133. 
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Even .i cursory i)erunnl of the figurer, of the period 
1959 to 19644 demonstrates the advantages of the agreement to 
Canada, if it was determined to maintain a relatively large 
military establishment with sophisticated weapons. In 1956-57 
the Canadian defence budget was $1.8 billion, but by 1960 it 
was down to $1.5 billion and was not to reach the former 
figure until the 1970s. In 1958-59 the cost of the Canadian 
contribution to NORM) was $163.8 million and the following, 
year it was down to $101.4 million. It gradually rose to 
$154.6 million in 1963-64.69 Since then it has steadily 
declined. Canada was, therefore, from 1959 onwards reducing 
its overall budget and the amount of its NORAD contribution 
in absolute terms. At the came time it was assuming greater 
responsibility for United States manned installations in 
Canada and re-equipping its airforce with BO? IARCs, r-101s and 
r-104s. 
This was partly because under the United States/Canada 
cost sharing agreement for air defence, the United States 
paid two-thirds of the capital costs of CAUIII (Continental 
Air Defence Integration North) facilities. These included 
the SAGE system for the Northern HHORAt) region, the long 
range radar sites built in Canada riß an extenr, ion of the 
Pinetree line, the telecommunications requirements, and the 
69 Colin S. Gray, Canndrt and HORAD: A Study in Strategy, 
Behind the ücadlinec Vo , os -4, (June 1912 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Appendix A, 
Estimated Costs of the Canadian Contribution of HORAD by 
Canadian riccal Year 1 April - 31 March from 1958/59 to 1970/71. Data provided by the Department of National Defence. 
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two ! OMARC squadrons. Canada's share of CADIti was $150 
million. 
70 The Voodoos were in essence a gift. 
The growing; confusion over defence was further intensified 
by the debate over nuclear arms for the Canadian forces. 
The Diefenbaker government had agreed to deploy the BO? IARC B 
in 1958, to buy surface to surface missiles for the brigade 
group in Europe in 1957, to re-equip the air division with 
Starfighters in 1959 and-to use the Voodoos with air to air 
missiles. All these weapon systems required the use of 
nuclear warheads if they were to be effective. Yet this was 
not initially made clear and was deliberately obscured by 
the government until a cabinet revolt over the issue brought 
the government down in 1963. The succeeding Liberal 
government under Mr. Pearson accepted nuclear arms, but made 
it clear that its policy would be to withdraw from these 
nuclear commitments in the future. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis 
Canadian-United States relations, already under consider- 
able strain over the nuclear arms issue, were further 
aggravated by the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. 
Canada was the only NATO ally that publicly questioned the 
American blockade, when Mr. Diefenbaker suggested an impartial 
inquiry into the state of affairs in Cuba. Although Mr. 
Diefenbaker accepted United States leadership of the Western 
World, he was not a continentalist and viewed close Canadian- 
70 SCCAND, Ninth Report, 28th Parl., Ist seas., No 49, 
June. 2G, 1969, p 8. 
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United Stater relations with suspicion. In the view of Donald 
Creighton, the doyen of Canadian nationalist historians, Mr. 
Diefenbaker 
resented the American claim to a special and 
exclusive protectorate over the affairs of the 
Americas; and, in common with many Canadians, 
he disliked the fanatical excess of American 
antipathy to Communism, and disapproved of the 
extreme methods - commercial embargo and military intervention - by which the United States had 
tried to bully Cuba into conformity with the 
American way of life. 71 
Such lone opposition to United States policy would not 
have had serious repercussions except for BIORAD. Canada was 
no more consulted about the United States action over Cuba 
than was any other state. However the United States required 
Canadian cooperation: (1) to brink; tIORAD to a high state of 
readiness, (2) to arm its interceptors with nuclear weapons 
deployed in Newfoundland and Coosa Day, (3) to disperse its 
interceptors further north to Canadian airfields, and (4) to 
have authority to overfly Canadian air space and use 
Canadian air fields for the nuclear armed SAC bombers. 
To what degree Canada acquiesced to the United States 
requests remains uncertain. CINCNORAD put NORAD on Defence 
Condition 3 (DEFCON 3) alert from the normal DFFCON 5, the 
highest being DDFCON 1.72 Canadian air defence forces were not 
put on equal alert with United States forces, although the 
Minister of National Defence, Mr. Douglas Narknesc, without. 
71 Donald Creighton, Cnnadä'n timt Century, p 324. 
72 SCPAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., ist ncss., May 27, 
1969, No 47, Appencix jjL, paper by John Gellner, p 1695. 
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the approval of the Prime Minister, did put Canadian forces 
on an increased alert status within 24 hours of the United 
States alert. 
73 The other requests may not have been met. 
Apparently, for example, permission was granted for only 
eight of the 640 SAC overflights requested. 
The Canadian argument was that under the NORAD agreement 
consultation should take place before the plans an3 procedures 
to be followed by NORAD in a crisis were implemented. The 
NORAD Agreement, however, made clear that "the plans and 
procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be 
formulated and approved in peacetime by the appropriate 
national authorities and shall be capable of rapid 
implementation in an emergency. " Such an arrangement was 
acceptable when there was a common perception of the threat 
and for Canada this meant a clear casus belli such as a 
Soviet invasion of Europe. Over Cuba there was no common 
threat perception. 
The issue'of prior consultation arose again during 
the 25 October 1973 Nixon alert during the fourth Arab- 
Israeli War. Again, apparently, NORAD forces were alerted with 
orders going directly to Canadian officers from the United 
States government, without prior consultation with the 
Canadian government. The alert for Canadian forces seems to 
have been cancelled. The alert then pertained only to forces 
of the United States Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) 
of which CINCNORAD was also the commander. This did not solve 
the problem because the Canadians at the integrated NORAD 
73 Ibid. 
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headquarters were involved in the operational control of 
the alert. They seemed to have been removed from duty for the 
remainder of the alert. 
74 Government statements during the alert 
would suggest that the nature and implications of the NORAD 
integrated command structure are either not understood or not 
accepted after 14 years of operation. 
Canadian refusal to accept the full military implications 
of continental defence arrangements resulted from a lack of a 
common political perception of the threat. The underlying 
political assumption of the NORAD Agreement was that a military 
threat to the United States was by definition a continental 
threat requiring a joint automatic military response. In 
the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States 
interpreted it as a military-threat to its national security 
but also as a threat to United States national interests in 
Latin America. The Nixon Alert was an exercise in superpower 
diplomacy and there was no direct military threat to North 
America involved. 
The Canadian-United States disputes, during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the Nixon Alert, were re-enactments of 
similar disuptes during the Second World War and immediate 
post-war years about the military threat to North America. 
74 The government initially said that Canadians were not 
involved in the alert as only the United States Continental Air 
Defense Command was alerted. It was later admitted that 
Canadians at NORAD 11Q were involved for a time. There were 
calls for the dismissal of the Chief of Defence Staff for 
misleading, the government. Halifax Chronicle-herald, 27 October 
1974. This incident is a good example of the sensitivity 
that some Canadians have over NORAD. 
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In these periods, Canadian defence cooperation with the United 
States was conditional to the extent that Canach would never 
allow its territory to be used in a manner inimical to the 
security of the United States. Canada assumed that the operations 
of HORAD would be conditional upon a common political perception 
of the military threat to North America. However, a conditional 
relationship was impossible because NORAD was an essential component 
of the United States deterrent over which Canada could not have 
any political control. The United States did not require 
Canadian political acquiescence but it did require military 
acquiescence when it put its deterrent forces on alert, whatever 
the reason. 
The Canadian view of the relationship of continental 
defence and the defence of Canada was given by the new minister 
of National Defence, Mr. Paul Ilellyer, in his 1964 White Paper. 
It is, for the foreseeable future, impossible 
to conceive of any significant external threat 
to Canada which is not also a threat to North 
America as a whole. It is equally inconceivable 
that, in resisting clear and unequivocal 
aggression against Canadian territory, Canada 
could not rely on the active support of the 
United States. Recognition [of this] ... must 
not be permitted to obscure certain national 
responsibilities of which account must be taken 
in Canadian policy. 
Canadian defence is part of the defence of 
North America but it is, in certain key respects, 
a clearly distinguishable part of thelurger 
strategic task. One can define the defence of 
Canada an those aspects of North American 
defence which must, for reasons based upon 
Canadian national interest, be subject to Canadian 
control. The minimum requirements for the defence 
of Canada arc the ability to maintain surveillance 
of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial 
waters; the ability to deal with military incidents 
on Canadian territory; the ability to deal with 
incidents in the ocean areas off the Canadian 
10ft 
coasts; and the ability to contribute, within 
the limit of our resources, to the defence 
of Canadian airspace. 75 
Quantitative Reductions and Qualitative Improvements 
The 1964 White Paper on Defence forecast that "failing the 
wide-scale deployment of an AICEM (anti-ICBM), the proportion 
of Canada's resources directed to air defence will gradually 
decline through the balance of the decade. "76 The Soviets did 
not decrease their bomber strength as much as had been 
anticipated, keeping in service about 150 long range bombers. 
In the middle sixties, quantitative reductions were made in 
NORAD's structure but these were complemented by qualitative 
improvements. NORAD moved into ballistic missile detection 
and tracking of space objects in space. Canada was, to 
varying degrees, involved in all these changes. 
The weapon sind radar cyctems were reduced gradually, 
beginning in 1961 with the reduction of the nine Canadian 
interceptor squadrons to five, and later only to three 
squadrons (44 aircraft in 1975). The Voodoos were exchanged 
with the United States Airforce for 66 improved versions 
(F-1018/C) of the same aircraft. This only involved an 
expenditure of $7 million for modifications. The Mid-Canada 
line was closed down during 1964 and 1965. The United States 
75 Canada, Department of National Defence, (Minister of 
National Defence, Paul i{ellyer), White Paper on Defence, 
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, tfarch 1up 13. The first part of% 
the statement reflects what R. J. Sutherland called the "involuntary 
American guarantee. " R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term 
Strategic Situation, " International Journal, Vol XVII, No 3, 
Cummer 19G2) p 202. 
76 Ibid., p 1'4. 
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in 1965 closed down the sea and air extensions of the DEW line. 
This was followed in 1969'by the thinning out of the radar 
stations in 37 NORAD Division (Newfoundland and Labrador). 
Canada closed down its two BOMARC sites in 1970 and the 
United States sites were reduced to nil by 1972. The 
continental air defence system of the first part of the 1960s 
had by the end of the decade become primarily a perimeter 
air defence system. 
77 
The qualitative improvements involved the installation of 
BUIC (Back-up Interceptor Control) and SAGE command and control 
centres underground. In 1973, all BUIC centres were placed on 
semi-active status except one at North Bay, which is the 
headquarters of the Northern NORAD region. It was developed 
into an underground Regional Control Centre-SAGE (RCC-S) and 
is considered to be virtually invulnerable to nuclear attack. 
78 
It is the only one in Canada, out of a total of six in 1974. 
All limited status DUIC centres are to be phased out by 1978. 
The United States bore about 95 per cent of the cost of the 
BUIC installations and two-thirds of the $51.8 million for the 
construction of the underground facility at North Bay. 
79 
NORAD was given the responsibility for the detection of 
ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). 
77 SCEAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., ltt Ges$., No 41, 
May 6,1969, Appendix X, North American Air Defence, p 1413. 
78 Ibid., No 47, May 27,1969, Appendix EEE, p 1695. 
79 Ibid., No 41, May 6,1969, Appendix XX, North American 
Air Defence, p. 1417. 
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The BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) sites were 
established between 1960 and 1963 and the United States bore the 
total cost of $920 million. The information from the sites is 
relayed over cables and radio circuits, many of which run 
through Canada. The information is processed by NORAD headquarters 
and passed to such users as the National Defence Headquarters 
in Ottawa. 
NORAD was also made responsible for the United States 
SPADATS (Space Detection and Tracking System). The information 
is relayed to NORAD headquarters and it tells a sensor where and 
when to look for a specific satellite; the sensor then sends 
the data back. There are four Baker-Nunn space tracking 
optical sensor sites, one of which is in Canada at Cold Lake, 
Alberta. 80 
By 1970, NORAD had developed the capacity and Structure 
that it has today. Its operztionalforces of 85,000 personnel 
are deployed at about 300 loeations. 
01 Canada provides 
11,000 of the personnel and there arc about 200 Canadians stationed 
in the United States. There are about 250 United States NORAD 
personnel in Canada, involved in co-manning and custodial 
activity for the nuclear weapons stored at six sites under the 
two-key arrangement. Thirty-seven NORAD Division had been 
almost entirely United States manned until 1971 when Canada todc 
80 Ibid., p 1418. 
81 Ibid., p 1413 and testimony of General R. Lane, Deputy 
CINCNORAD, SCEAND, Evidence, 29th Parl., 1st ecss., No 2, 
March 2,1973, p 7. 
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over responsibility for the manual Division Direction Centre and 
heavy radar site at Goose Bay. 
82 The aim was to assume greater 
responsibility for the surveillance of the air space approaches 
to Eastern Canada. There are also about 500 United States 
civilians and six officers involved in manning the four main 
stations of the DEW line located in Canada. All stations 
are commanded by a Canadian officer and Canadian civilians 
are also employed by the Federal Electric Company, which holds 
the United States Airforce contract for the operation of the DEW 
line. The United States pays the full cost of operating the 
DEW line which is estimated at 5100 million per year. 
Canada has been contributing about one-fifteenth of the 
total cost d NORAD; by 1969 this share war, roughly estimated 
at 8 to 10 per cent. 
°3 Canadian expenditures were related directly 
to early warning, bomber defence, and surveillance of North 
American air space and in the early 1970s have been about 
$150 million per year. 
The command structure of 1IOMD was also revised during 
the 1960s. The number of regions was reduced from eight to 
the four existing today; Western, Eastern, Northern and Alaskan. 
The Northern Region is commanded by a Canadian and he exercises 
operational control over the DEW line, over all the airspace of 
northern and western Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces, 
82 Defence 71, Department of National Defence, (Ottawa: 
Information Caanada, 1972) p 414. 
83 SCDAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., let cesc., No 41, 
May 6,1969, Appen ix XX, North American Air Defence, p 1418 and 
see also Colin S. Gray, "Canada and NORAD, " Appendix A. 
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and over the interceptors located at Bagotville, Quebec and 
Chatham, New Brunswick. 
The remaining airspace, including heavily industrialized 
southern Ontario, is under the operational control of 
the three adjacent NORAD regions with control centres in the 
United States. 84 A Canadian is deputy commander of each 
region and he may act on behalf of the Canadian government 
where Canadian national sovereignty is concerned. In 1970, 
the Cr-104s of the Operational Training Squadron at Cold Lake, 
Alberta were given the task of carrying out interceptions 
over Western Canada. 
85 As part of the continuing negotiations 
for changes inthe boundaries of the NORAD regions, it was 
announced in May 1975 that a regional headquarters would be 
established near Edmonton. 
86 This will allow interceptions over 
Western Canada to be controlled from a Canadian headquarters. 
The Canadian interceptor squadron at Comox, British Columbia 
is responsible for interceptions on the Pacific Coast but 
apparently will remain under the operational control of the 
Western Region NORAD Headquarters in the United States. 
84 SCEAND in its ninth report recommended "that the 
principle be accepted that there should be Canadian commanders 
in those areas where essentially all the territory is Canadian. 
The possibility of extending, at reasonable cost, the Northern 
Region (which is under Canadian command) to include the heavily 
populated and industrialized area of southern Ontario should 
also be considered carefully, " SCEAND, Ninth Report, 28th Parl., 
lot sess.,, No 49, June 26,1969, p 20. 
85 Canada, Department of National Defence, (Minister of 
National Defence, Donald Macdonald), White Paper on Defence: 
Defence in the 70c, (Ottawa: Information Cans a, August 1971) p 20. 
hereafter re erred to as Defence in the 70s. 
86 Globe and Mail, May 2,1975. The Globe and Mail reported 
the announcement as stating that this change "will bring Canadian 
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The Post-War Options 
From 1944 onwards it was accepted, certainly by government, 
that continental defence arrangements in some form would continue 
in peace, and that Canada would have to have larger defence 
forces than before. The policy of no commitments and no 
defence was no longer possible. Until the construction of the 
DEW line, the imbalance between Canada and the'United States 
in terms of'resources to meet changing defence requirements was 
not great. It was the escalation in defence requirements of the 
United States, deriving from its dominant position in the 
Western Alliance, that resulted in the expansion of continental 
defence arrangements. Canada was caught up in a vortex of 
technological change by reason of its geographical position 
and United States superpower status. 
The technological requirements and the cost precluded 
Canada undertaking the requirements in Canada for continental 
defence with its direct relationship to the expansion of United 
States nuclear capability. This left basically three options 
. for Canada. Firstly, accepting that absolute refusal to allow 
use of Canadian geography would not have been in the national 
interest, as well as politically unacceptable to Canadian 
public opinion, Canada could have allowed the United States to 
do what it wished and pay the full cost. Continental defence 
air space under Canadian control for the first time since the NORAD Agreement was signed in 1958. " To the best of this 
writer's knowledge, there have been no arrangements reached 
for Canadian headquarter's control over interceptions for southern Ontario or for the Pacific coast. The statement probably means 
all interceptions in Canadian airspace will be carried out by Canadian aircraft. The statement was probably deliberately 
misleading in order to lessen any public criticism of a 
renewal of the NORAD Agreement which P1r. Richardson has publicly 
supported. 
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in the nuclear age would have been a complete United States 
responsibility. The second option would have been to devote 
all the Canadian defence effort to continental defence, including 
a major contribution to the DEW line. The third option, and the 
one chosen, 'was more complex. It required a substantial, but 
clearly defined, Canadian contribution to continental defence 
and an overseas peacetime commitment to European defence. 
The first option could have been acceptable only if 
Canada lacked the resources for any other option. This, it 
patently did not. The second option had the advantage. of 
increasing Canadian control over United States military activity 
in Canada and perhaps of greater influence over United States 
decisions for continental defence. Its principal disadvantage 
was that Canadian defence policy would have become even more 
dependent than it did on the vagaries of technological change 
and United States threat perceptions. Canadian defence forces 
would have become appendages of those of the United States. 
The structural imbalances that did develop would have been 
accentuated, not lessened. Canadian foreign policy would have 
been severely constrained in its European policies. The 
second option would have been a continental and isolationist 
option. The third option provided a greater degree of foreign 
and defence policy flexibility, and served to offset the continental 
imbalance. Its choice was consistent with previous choices in 
Canadian history when the old world was used to offset the 




THE OPTIONS IN AIR DEFENCE 
The New Debate 
There has developed a strong aversion in Canada to 
buying into new and costly weapon systems. For Canada, 
the primary factor in air defence procurement decisions 
is not strategic, but political. The United States may 
make continental air defence decisions on strategic and 
financial grounds, but the effects on Canadian-United 
States relations are secondary. For Canada, they are the 
primary factor. 
During the spring and summer of 1969, the Commons' 
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence held 
hearings on the renewal of the NORAD Agreement. The, 
hearings concentrated on three aspects of continental air 
defence. The first was concerned with the strategic 
need and structure of NORAD including its responsibilities, 
command arrangements, resources, and the. Canadian contribution. 
The second aspect was the possible consequences to Canada 
if the United States proceeded to develop an anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) system. The third aspect was an analysis 
of proposed improvements of NORAD including the Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Over the Horizon- 
Backscatter (0TH-fl) radar and the Improved banned 
Interceptor (IMI). 
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The committee had as a basis of discussion the new 
defence priorities given in the 3 April 1969 announcement 
by Mr. Trudeau. ' The first two were of direct relevance: 
the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines, i. e., 
the protection of our sovereignty; and the defence of 
North America in cooperation with United States forces. 
Canadian Priorities and Continental Air Defence 
The 1964 White Paper had made a clear demarcation 
in theory between the Canadian role in the strategic 
task of air defence and those aspects which had to be 
related to more specific national interests. Canada had 
never, publicly at least, differed with the United States 
over the strategic rationale for air defence. The 
differences that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and the Nixon Alert had been over differing political 
perceptions. In 1968, the NORAD Agreement had been renewed 
for five years without debate, with the caveat that 
"this dgreement will not involve in any way a Canadian 
commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile 
defence. "2 
1 The priorities given were: 
(a) the surveillance of our own territory and 
coastlines, i. e. the protection of our 
sovereignty; 
(b) the defence of North America in co-operation 
with U. S. forces; 
(c) the fulfillment of such NATO commitments 
as may be agreed upon; and 
(d) the performance of such international 
peacekeeping roles as we may from time to 
time assume. 
2 Agreement to Extend for a Period of Five Years the 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United Statu Concerning the Organization and Operation 
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One reason why the NORAD Agreement had been renewed 
with no debate was that attention was focused on the Canadian 
contribution to NATO to a much greater extent than on 
NORAD. 3 This attention was reinforced by Mr. Trudeau's 
decision, in May 1968, to undertake a comprehensive 
review of Canadian foreign policy. For various reasons the 
government announced its NATO policy before the review 
was completed. Canadian adherence to NATO was reconfirmed 
but with a reduced military presence on the central front. 
4 
The announcement outlined the government's new "philosophy 
of defence. " Crucial to this philosophy was a new ordering 
of priorities for which resources would be allocated on 
the concentric-circle principle; " that is money would be 
provided for low priority activities only after those of high 
priority had been adequately financed. 
The priorities reflected the government's desire to 
establish a new balance between national interests and 
international commitments; between dome'stic, and foreign 
of the North American Air Defence Command, May 12,1968, 
Canada Treaty Series, 1968s No S. 
3 See John Saywell, ed., "The Renewal of. NORAD, " 
Canadian Annual Review, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
11 rese, pp 235-39 for the circumstances surrounding 
the renewal which took place in the last days of the 
Pearson government. 
4 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "A Defence Policy for 
Canada, " Statements and Speeches, No 69/7, April 3,1969. 
For a detailed examination of the decision making process 
leading up to the announcement and press conference of 
the same day, see Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign 
Policy: A Study in Decision-Making-, -(Toronto: Oxford 
nU ersity Press-. 1-972-)- ess, 1972) pp 121-62. 
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policies. Central to this balance was the government's 
0 
view that the threat to peace and security had greatly 
receded and therefore more resources could be allocated 
to other national aims such as economic growth and sovereignty 
and independence. The underlying theme was that Canadian 
"external activities should be directly related to national 
policies pursued within Canada, and serve the same 
objectives. "5 The most important national interest was 
the preservation of the political integrity and independence 
of Canada as a bilingual and multi-cultural state. Foreign 
and defence policies were instruments to achieve this 
paramount interest. An international role for Canada in 
terms of. Pearsonian internationalism with its faith in 
collective defence and peacekeeping was deprecated and 
replaced by Trudeauvian nationalism that was more introverted 
and continental in its basic tenets. 
On taking office in 1968, the government of. Hr: 
Trudeau was faced with possible defence capital expenditures 
of between $300 and $400 million to re-equip Canadian 
forces committed to NATO. 
6 It put a three year budgetary 
ceiling on Canadian defence expenditures of $1.8 million, 
or 2.4 percent of the GNP, in the spring of 1968. By 1971, 
only 1.8 per cent of the CUP wan being spent on defence. 
Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreiýgn 
Policy for Canadians, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) p 9. 
6 Bruce Thordar5on, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p 146. 
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But more important was the amount available for capital 
expenditures as a percentage of a total fixed defence 
budget. From 1962/63 to 1968/69 the percentage had dropped 
from 22.3 per cent to 18.2 per cent; but in the next 
three years it was to drop to less than 16 per cent or $245 
million. 
7 The government, therefore, had a strong aversion 
to the continuance of defence policies that could entail 
heavy capital expenditures. 
It is perhaps somewhat of an oversimplification to 
suggest that the new philosophy of defence and its priorities 
derived solely from financial expediency. But as one 
commentator had remarked: "It is one of the 'characteristics 
of the present Canadian Government that it seems to feel 
a curious compulsion to prove after-the-event rationalizations 
for perfectly justifiable " decisions that have already 
been taken on grounds of expediency. "8 
The government's 3 April 1969 announcement listed the 
priorities of Canadian defence, with motley to be allocated 
to the lower priorities only when higher priorities had 
been adequately financed. This, however, did not explain 
the extent to which, for example, the first priority 
7 John Gellner, "The Place of Defence in the Economic 
Life of Canada, " p 127. By 1973-74 it dropped to 10.7 
per cent. Between 1962 and 1972 salaries had doubled 
compared to other costs. See J. C. Arnell, "The Economics 
of Defence Part II: Inflation Strikes Hardest at Personnel 
Costs, " Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 3, No 1 (Summer 
1973) p 257 
8 "The Canadian White Paper: Summary and Commentary, " 
Survival, Vol XIIi, No 11, November 1971, p 380. 
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of protection of sovereignty had. to be satisfied before 
the requirements of continental defence, the second 
priority, were to be met. 
9 An attempt to answer this 
conundrum was made in the White Paper published in August 
1971 entitled Defence in the 70s. 
Defence in the 70s noted the increasing stability 
in the world and argued that "Canada's overriding defence 
objective must.... be the prevention of nuclear war 
by promoting political reconciliation to ease the 
underlying causes of tension, by working for arms control 
and disarmament agreements, and by contributing; to the 
system of stable mutual deterrence. "10 The only direct 
external military threat to Canada's national security 
was seen as a large scale nuclear attack on North America 
considered as one set of targets. Cooperation with the 
United States in North American defence would remain 
essential as long as joint security depended on stability 
of the strategic military balance. The Canadian objective 
would be to make an effective contribution (within the 
limits of resources) to continued stability by assisting in 
the surveillance and warning systems and in the protection 
of the United States "retaliatory capability as necessary. "11 
9 Ibid., p 381. 
10 Defence in the 70s, p G. 
11 Ibid., p 25. 
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Defence in the 70s confirmed that no projected 
United States ballistic warning and defence systems 
would require either extensive use of Canadian territory 
or Canadian participation. On continued bomber warning 
and defence systems, Defence in the 70s provided a number 
of strategic arguments which can be summarized As follows: 
1. If nuclear war occurred, Soviet nuclear forces 
would probably attack in a concerted programme with 
minimal warning tq achieve maximum surprise. 
2. Soviet bombors would be launched gimultaneously 
with missiles and have a follow-on role, striking t'rgets 
cahich did nrt require-immediate Attack, or which the 
missiles had not attacked Puccesnfully. 
3. Because Soviet bomhprs itsed in thin role 
woulvl considerably aurment follow-nn strikes, bomber 
defence would contribute to stability. 
4. The importance of up-to-date surveillance 
systems. 
S. The time had passed whin a full, active anti- 
bomber defence was essential for the protection of the 
United States deterrent capability. 
f. The Soviets might be tempted to re-build 
their lone range bomber force if they believed there would 
be absolutely no defences against them. 
The rovernment's policy was that "normal peacetime 
identification should be performed by Canadian aircraft. "12 
To implement this policy, CF-104c were given this role for 
12 Ibid., p 20. 
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the Prairies, the Goose Bay radar site was taken over, and 
the eastern based Voodoo squadrons took over the identification 
role for pastern Canada. These were simple arrangements, 
readily imolemented, and followed previous governments' 
policien for the Canadianization of continental air defence 
installations in Canada. 
Control for northern airspace, for which there wan 
no interceptor capability, was forecast as a future 
requirement: 
The (, ovArnment will keep under review the 
options available for using mobile surveillance 
radars, either airborne or air portable, so 
that airsp'ce control can be instituted where 
and wher needed. For evamnle, protection 
of Canadian intere'ts may, in the future, 
require air-traffic-controlled airsnace in 
cert. -+in harts of the North. 
13 
Defence in the 70s stated that sr me integration of 
military and civilian air control systems had taken place 
and that further studies were underway. Since then. the 
Ministry of Transport (MOT) has been made resoonnible for 
implementing a new Joint-En-Route Terminal system to 
control all air traffic over the southern part of Canada from 
coAst to coast. There is much commonality between the 
technoloricil require-ants of MOT and DND to control air 
traffic in Canadian airsvace. This has led to a 
proposal for a Canadian Air Stirveillanre S"ºstem (CASS) 
which would intAgrate and PxpAnd the rrenent tlOT and air 
defence cvstnms in order to bring about an overall 
1' Ibid. 
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reduction in costs and to avoid duplication. Such an 
"integrated system would provide national control in 
areas where control is now exercised by NORAD Regional 
l4 Control Centres located in the United States . 11 
The United States has a similar integrative policy 
and by 1978 all military search radars in'continental 
United States will be integrated with civilian ones. 
It is intended that some Canadian border radars will feed 
into the United States joint civilian-military centres. 
15 
Defence in the 70s did not give any clear indication 
about whether the government would renew NORAD again in 
May 1973. The policy of renewal "will depend on the strategic 
situation extant, including progress in SALT. "16 The 
government did lay down the principle that "unless the 
strategic situation changes, the Government intends to 
update its contribution to the active anti-bomber defences 
of North America only to the extent that this is required 
for the general control of Canadian airspace. 
17 
Just prior to the renewal of NORAD for a further 
14Major General N. L. ttagnusson, "Surveillance and 
Control of Canadian Airspace, " Canadian Defence Quarterly, 
Vol 3, No 1 (Summer 1973) pp 6-13. 
15United States, Department of Defense, Annual Defense 
Department Report for FY 1975, Report of the Secretary of 
Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 
Defense i3udcet and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 4, 
1974, p 69. 
16Defence in the 70s, p 30. 
17Ibid. 
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two ; 'cars on 12 rfay 1973, Mr. James Richardson, the new 
Minister of National Defence, before SCEAND gave further 
elaboration fir continued adherence to NORAD. 
... we now helieve that if the Soviet Union 
were to decide to launch a nur'lear attack on North America and to employ bombers in such an 
attack. the bombers would be launched at the 
same time as the ICBMs, or subsequently 
again^t targets '"+hich might have survived 
the initial missile attack. 
... We have to recognize that the bomber, if it could reach its target 'undetected and -"ý 
unopposed, would be a very effective weapon 
against the United States land-based missile 
forces and strateric. bomher forces and could 
seriously reduce United StatAs retaliatorv 
capabilities. We have concluded that effective 
early warning systems, able to detect the 
approach of bombers well away from their targets, 
are the miin requirement to dater the Soviet 
Union from using them Pffeetivel. y in a first 
strike attack on the United States retaliatory 
forces. 
We have also concluded that to rely at this 
time on warning alone to deter bomber attack 
would introduce an undesirable element of 
instability into the present strategic 
system .... Effective early warning requires 
not only a capability to detect such aircraft 
through radar, but to carry out positive 
identification as well. 
The stability of deterrence is ... rediiced if intruding, bombers cannot be compelled by 
interceptor aircraft to reveal clearly what 
their intentions are. 
It is important to recognize that this concept 
of stabilizing the deterrent does not require 
a capzb. i. lity to defeat an attacking bomber 
force, but merely to determine without ambiguity 
through the threat of significant losses, 
whether an attack on the continent is actually 
intended. 
We can make ... [our] contribution more 
effectively within the kind of integrated 
system for operational control of the 
1? 1 
air defence forces of both nations which the 140PAD Agreement has established. 18 
These statements provide more coherent arguments 
than had been made in Defence in the 70s. They clearly 
differentiate'between the requirements for early warning, 
determination of intentions, and bomber defence. The 
arguments for continued Canadian participation in continental 
air defence are based on the first two requirements. 
The question is whether there is any difference between 
the requirements to control airspace and to determine 
intentions. The general tone of Defence in the 70s 
would lead one to suspect that there is, whereas UUir. 
Richardson's statement would not. It is unlikely that 
i clarification will be, forthcoming until the government 
is faced with making a decision on a new interceptor. The 
present life of the Voodoos has been given as 1980. flow 
many more interceptors will be required to determine 
intentions than to control airspace in a question of cost 
and performance, both at present not known. 
The government's lack of enthusiasm for large 
capital expenditures for air defence is in part diplomatically 
counterbalanced by its preparedness to make special 
arrangements to enhance the protection of North America 
and contribute to the maintenance of stable mutual 
deterrcnne. SAC refueling tankers are to be allowed to 
continue using, Goose Ray and SAC bombers to overfly 
18Statemcnt 
on NORAfl by the Minister of National Defence, the finnourable James Rcchn rdson, SCFAND, Evidence, 29Th Parl., let snse., Nn 9, April 1.1,1g73, pp 78-9. 
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r, anida on airborne alert in times of crisis, as 
determined by the Canadian govornment. Training flights 
without nuclear weapons con continue in peacetime. 
The government is to begin negotiations to callow United 
States interceptors and SAC refueling tankers to disperse 
to nelected bases in Canada in times of crisis. These 
arrangements and negotiations reflect the United States 
desire to uce Canadian airspace and facilities and avoid 
the difficulties that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Mr. Richardson, when asked by a SCEAND member, "If 
we did not have NOPAD would we not have to have another 
program of co-operation between the two nations? " 
answered "Absolutely, in my opinion, yes. "la The political 
factor was overriding when SCEAND concluded "that one of 
the basic justifications for continued membership in 
NORAD i3 that it helps Canada avoid being faced with a 
request from the United States for facilities in Canada, 
the granting of which impinge (or at least be considered 
by some Canadians to impinge) on Canadian sovereignty. , 
20 
The New Air Defence Package 
During the period 1958 to 1963, NORAD reached its 
peak of strategic usefulness because its capabilities 
matched the threat. The Soviet Long Range Airforce did not 
have good electronic counter measures or aerial refueling 
19 SCEAND, Evidence, ibid., p 17. 
20 SCEAND, - rirst Re ort, 29th Parl.., 1st sess., No 10, April 16,1973, p 7. 
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capabilities. Penetration of NORAD defences, although 
possible by a high-low-high profile, was not the threat 
it was to become in the late sixties. 
In the sixties, the Soviets did not increase the 
size of their long range airforce (it declined from 200 
to about 145 long range bombers). 
1 However, they did 2 
improve its effectiveness by introducing 50 aerial refueling 
tankers, a sophisticated ECM capability, and air to 
surface missiles (ASM) with a 200 mile range. 
22 They 
have developed a new bomber, codename Backfire. It is in 
series production and operational deployment is expected 
shortly. Backfire is considered to be best suited 
for a peripheral role but "when deployed with a compatible 
tanker force, BACKFIRE constitutes a potential threat 
to the Continental United States. " 
23 
NORAD's capability was, and is, against the subsonic 
high flying bomber which it was designed to combat in 
the early 1950s. It has three principal weaknesses; 
vulnerability of its installations to destruction, poor 
capability for the detection of low level flights, 'and no 
capability to defend against bombers launching ASMs 
21The Military Balance 1961-62, (London: Institute 
of Strategic Stu dies, 1962) pp 3-4. 
22SCEAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., 1st seas., No 41, 
May 6,1969, Appendix XX, p 1414 and The Military Balance 
1972-1973, (London: International Institute of Strategic 
Stuu ies, 1972) pp 66-67. 
23United States, Department of Defense, United States 
Militar Posture for FY 1975, Statement by Admiral Thomas 11. 
oorcr, Chairman of tie Joint Chiets OL tall: e ore to 
Ouse Armed Services-Committee, n. ., p 24. 
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outside interception range. 
Its vulnerability derives from the capability 
of ICBMs to destroy most of NORAD's installations, such as 
radars and interceptor bases, before the Soviet bombers 
arrive. 
24 
Bombers with radar homing missiles could 
destroy the control radars. All present NORAD radars 
are line of sight radars and therefore detection and 
tracking of aircraft flying at low altitudes is severely 
limited. ASPis, for example the present Kangaroo, can be 
launched from outside the area covered by interceptor 
control radars. In 1967, the United States Airforce 
proposed a four component package to overcome these 
weaknesses by extending the air defence system outwards 
and downwards, and by making its components less vulnerable. 
The four new component were the OTII-ß radar, the AWAC system, 
IM, and SAM-D. 
25 
Research had begun in the late 1940s into a radar 
system that would overcome the limitation imposed by 
the curvature of the earth. By the early 1960s, an over- 
the-horizon radar had been developed. The signals are 
reflected downwards off the ionosphere at an angle many 
24 SCEAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., 1st seas., No 43, 
May 13,1969, Appendix ZZ, Dr. George Lindsey, Strategic 
Weapone, Stability and the Possible Contributions by Canada, 
p 1512. 
25 Descriptions of these systems are in the testimony 
of Dr. Lindsey, ibid., pp 1466-72 and Jane's Wea on Systems 
1972-73, pp 195-bnd 3G2-63. The Sur ace to Air- eve. opment 
( is designed for tactical and point defence of 
Washington. There is no intention of deploying it in Canada and it is not discussed here. 
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hundreds of miles beyond the horizon and the echoes of 
aircraft can be detected, regardless of altitude, up 
to the ionosphere. Because the energy detected in the 
receiver has been scattered back from the target, this 
type of radar is called over the horizon-backscatter. 
The original concept called for three 0TH-B 
radars looking north, east, and west with a coverage 
outwards of 2000 miles compared to a DEW line radar with 
200 miles. The northern OTII-R radar would replace the 
DEW line stations. Experiments-are being carried out 
by Canada and the United States to determine if the OTU-B 
2 
radar can be made to operate in the auroral belt zone. 
6 
The United States is continuing with the development of 
the 0TH-B radar with deployment planned for 1980. 
A southern site has been added and is presumably related 
to early warning against FOBS (fractional orbital 
bombardment system). 
The AWAC system was conceived as a means of 
controlling interceptor aircraft further north than the 
Pinetree line allows, to offset the use of ASMt, and provide, 
a platform invulnerable to missile attack. Its deployment 
was designed to allow for major reductions in the Pinetree 
linc. 
There have been a number of contenders for the IMI 
but the choice now appears to be between the United 
26 Jane's Wen on Systems 1972-73, p 196. There 
has been no info mationcn how successful the experiments 
have been, other than that they are continuing. 
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States Navy's F-14 and the United States Airforce's F-15 
with the latter the more likely choice. Both would 
require modifications for continental air defence and 
there are no plans for an IMI until 1980.27 
The new air defence package was conceived as a 
means of updating air defences against a full scale 
Soviet bomber attack in a general war. In 1972, the four 
objectives of the United States air defence system were 
stated to be: (1) to deter air attacks by defending 
strategic offensive forces and important urban/ 
industrial targets, (2) to defend the National Command 
Authority, (3) to limit damage from small air attacks, 
and (4) to prevent unauthorized overflights in United 
States airspace. 
28 The acquisition costs of the new 
air defence package were estimated to be $5 billion. 
In 1974, the United States Secretary of Defense 
James' Schlesinger, stated that air defence would be 
"structured primarily for peacetime surveillance. j, 
29 
The United States had continued "to keep open the 
27 United States, Department of Defense, United 
States Military Posture for FY 1974, Statement by Admiral 
Thomas if. Moorcr USW Chairman Joint Chief, of Staff Before 
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate 
23 Committee on ppropriations$ March 26,1973, pp 
28 United States, Department, Annual Defense 
Department Report for FY 1973, Statement of Secretary of 
Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the FY 1973 and FY 1973-1977 Program, February 
15,1972, pp6. 
29 Re ort of the Secretary of Defense James R. 
Schlesinger Y 1975, p 69. 
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option to deploy a complementary air defense" system as long 
as there was some chance it'might deploy at least a thin 
nationwide ABM defense ., 130 SALT 1 had foreclosed even a 
thin nationwide ABM defence. Tight budgetary restraints 
necessitated adjustments'in the United States air defence 
programme. 
The AWAC system was designed to provide a means 
to control air defence aircraft in a nuclear war. 
The emphasis on peacetime surveillance has resulted in the 
AWAC system being transferred to a tactical role and 
redesignated the E-3A. Thirty-three rather than 42 aircraft 
are to be purchased at a total estimated cost of $2.5 billion. 
It is due to be operational by 1978. There has been some 
resistance to the removal of the AWAC system from a strategic 
role, on the grounds that "we are going too far, too 
fast with this, and the fact that we cannot, by treaty, 
defend against a missile attack is, in my judgement, not 
adequate justification to not defend against manned 
aircraft attacks. "31 This view, by the then Chief of Staff 
of the United States Airforce, was given support by the 
Secretary of the United States Airforce when he stated that 
the AWAC system "does have that CONUS air defense role 
30 Ibid., p 66. 
31 United. States, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
Revision of Air Defense Posture, testimony of General 
George S., Brown, Chief o Staff, U. S. Airforce, 93 rd 
Congress, 2nd sess., S. 3000, Part 2, Authorizations, 
February 7,1974, p 351. General Brown has since been 
appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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it originally had. "32 Those AWAC systems deployed in the 
United States are likely to be given both tactical and 
strategic roles with the former being the primary role. 
For both strategic and budgetary reasons, the AWAC 
system is no longer considered to be an essential component 
for the updating of continental air defence. Unless there 
is a change in the strategic environment, there is likely 
to be little pressure to deploy any AWAC systems in 
Canada,, even if some are given a strategic role. During 
alerts, they could be deployed as required, but they are 
unlikely to be used for routine peacetime surveillance. 
Canada, then, is concerned primarily with the 0TH-B radar 
and the replacement of its present interceptors in the 
early 1980s. 
The Requirements br Airspace Control 
In peacetime, there is a requirement for most 
countries to be able to detect, identify and if necessary 
shoot down intruding aircraft; that is, to maintain 
control over national airspace. This requires an active 
air defence capability. 
To wintiin control over national airspace; a 
perimeter detection capability and interceptor aircraft 
are required. Quantitatively, the ideal is for radars 
to be sited to give at least complete perimeter coverage 
and also over as much of the internal airspace as possible. 
This is an immense task for continental size countries such 
32 Testimony of the lion. John L. McLucas, Secretary 
of the U. S. Airforce, AWACS Uses, ibid., p 348. 
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as Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union and China 
and relatively easier for countries in Europe. Probably 
no continental size country has complete radar coverage, 
although the Soviet Union has the most complete coverage. 
It has been estimated that two-thirds of Canadian airspace 
is not under radar coverage. 
33 
Continental size countries are unable, generally, 
to deploy enough interceptors to undertake rapid interception 
at all points of the national frontier (perimeter). 
Instead, interceptors are grouped for deployment on the main 
approaches, and a prime technical requirement becomes range. 
The Soviet Union maintains the largest air defence 
system designed both for control and for bomber defence. 
The Soviets have 2,650 interceptors and 10,000 SAM launchers 
at 1,600 sites. The United States has only 484 interceptors 
and its SAMS are to be withdrawn from service by mid-1975.34 
Canada has 44 interceptors. SAMS cannot be used as a 
means of maintaining surveillance that entails identification 
and therefore the number and deployment of interceptors 
determines the extent of identification/control coverage. 
The United Kingdom maintains 9 squadrons of interceptors, 
France 7, and Sweden 6. These countries maintain 
interceptors primarily to maintain control over national 
airspace. 
33 John Gellner, "The Neglect of Canada' Net-up, 'r 
The Globe and Mail, September 15,1972. 
34 The Military ßal nce 1972-1973, pp 4 and 7. 
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It is difficult to determine how much less is 
required to maintain control over national airspace than 
for bomber defence. For small European countries, complete 
radar coverage is possible. Interceptors can be grouped 
to cover all approaches and depending on the technical 
capability of the air defence system, reaction can be 
fast enough to satisfy the requirements for interception 
before intruders have penetrated into national airspace. 
A rough estimate is that about 100 interceptors at the 
most, are required for complete control of national 
airspace of geographically small countries. If one was 
to extrapolate to determine the interceptor requirements 
for continental size countries, the figure would run 
into many hundreds. The number of radars required, if 
line of sight radars are employed, considerably magnifies 
the problem. There could, therefore, be only a marginal 
difference between the quantitative requirements for 
control of a national airspace of a continental size 
country and for bomber defence against, for example, the 
present 145 Soviet long range bombers. 
The quantitative problems of maintaining control 
over national airspace are, however, secondary to the 
qualitative ones. Continental size countries have the 
advantage of depth to offset a large perimeter. The United 
States has used Canadian airspace to provide it with 
early warning. European countries have been forced to 
integrate, at least partially, their air defence systems 
to obtain sufficient early warning . To exploit fully 
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early warning, SAGE systems have now become nearly universal. 
35 
The NATO Air Defence Ground Environment System (NADGE) 
is now operational. The Swiss, Swedes, Iranians and 
Japanese all have similar systems in operation. 
For North American control of airspace, the prime 
requirements are for perimeter radar coverage with an 
interceptor control capability, and enough interceptors 
to cover the main approaches. The United States air defence 
system meets these requirements in part because of the 
use made of Canadian geography. The DEW line provides both 
Canada and the United States with early warning, but control 
radars and interceptor capabilities cover only the southern 
part of Canada or one third of Canadian airspace. 
The deployment of a northern OTIt-li radar will 
increase early warning times, but any northward extension 
of interceptor capability will require the northern 
deployment of control radars and interceptor bases. 
Manual control of interceptions might be sufficient and 
there would be no requirement to extend the SAGE system 
northward. There is no evidence that the United States 
would contribute to such a northern extension, 'nor 
presumably would it be desirable for it to do so, if 
protection of Canadian sovereignty is the objective. 
The present interceptors are capable of 
intercepting the present generation of Soviet bombers. 
35 For a description of the system see Jane's 
Weapon Systems 1972-1973, pp 184-187. 
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Unless Backfire with its Mach 2 capability is deployed in 
large numbers with an intercontinental mission, the 
present air defence system should meet air control requirements 
for the remainder of the 1970s. For the 1980s, the deployment 
of 0TH-B radar and a new interceptor should prove sufficient 
unless bomber defence once again becomes a strategic 
objective. 
Bomber Defence and the Strategic Balance 
Anti-bomber defences between 1958 and 1963 
were crucial to any overall United States damage limitation 
capability. Damage limitation became a doctrinal casualty 
to ICBPts and submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBPis) deployed in large numbers and largely invulnerable 
to a counterforce strike. In the 1960s, the United States 
settled upon an assured destruction capability that 
would destroy two thirds of the Soviet population. This 
would require United States second strike forces to be 
able to deliver about 400 megatons equivalent (MTE). 
Because of demographic differences, the Soviet second strike 
would require only 200 UTE to achieve the same level 
of destruction. 36 Today, Soviet bombers could deliver 
about 1700 MTE and Soviet ICBMs and SLDMs about 5600 ME 
(5100 MTE for ICBMs and 500 ME for SLIMs). Comparable 
United States figures are 7900 MTE for bombers and 2300 
MTE for ICBMs and SLBUs. 
37 
36 Ian Iellany, "The Essential Arithme 
Journi l of the, Royal United Services Institute 
Studies, Vol , No 118, arc 32. 
is 
of Deterrence s" 
or Defence 
37 The 11ilitar Balance 1972-1973, Appendix 1: SALT 
and the Strategic Balance, p 86 for American and Soviet figures. 
133 
It har been estimated that only 5 per cent of the 
United States ICBMs would survive a Soviet counterforce 
strike, although this figure may be too pessimistic. 
If for purposes of analysis, we accept that say 7 'per 
cent of the Soviet ICBM force would survive a United 
States counterforce strike, then the Soviet Union would 
have about, 360 MTE (0.07 X 5100) left excluding SLBMs 
and bombers'. Accepting that SLBtI reliability would be 
around 70 per cent, submarine availability about 40 
per cent, and 90 per cent of the available submarines 
would survive ASW operations, then the Soviets would 
have another 126 MTE (. 7"X .4x .9X 500) available. 
The total is about 486 MTC or over double the presumed 
required amount, excluding the figure for the Soviet bomber 
force. The comparable United States figures after the 
present MIRV programme is completed will be 91 MTE for 
ICBMs and 376 for SLBMs for a total of about 467 MTE. 
Assuming only 20 percent of the bombers of either 
side got through, the bomber figures would be only 340 
MTE for the Soviet compared to 1580 MTE for the United 
States bombers. If bombers have a free ride, the figures 
are 1700 MTE and 7900 MTE. These figures combined with the 
great accuracy that bombers can deliver their payloads 
demonstrate the advantages of bombers over ICBMS and SLBMs. 
The overriding disadvantage is, of course, their vulnerability 
to first-strike attack and anti-bomber defences. 
Today, bombers provide an overkill capability 
and serve as a form of insurance if either ICBMs or 
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nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines become highly 
vulnerable systems. Even if the Soviet Union used all 
of its ballistic missiles against United States strategic 
offensive forces and reserved its bombers for use against 
United States cities, the United States, according to 
Defense Secretary Schlesinger, "would have sufficient 
surviving forces to retaliate decisively against Soviet 
cities ... [and] that offers the best hope of deterring 
attack and thus protecting our cities, not our ability to 
defend them against bomber attack. " 
38 
It is probable that both the United States and the 
Soviet Union will maintain bombers for strategic use for 
the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union will continue 
probably to maintain a sizable and technologically updated 
air defence system. The United States is not likely 
to undertake a major updating of its air defence system 
unless ballistic missile defence (B1D) becomes a strategic 
objective. This could develop if the SALT 1 Agreement on 
ABM site limitations is not renewed in 1977, DMD becomes 
technologically feasible within reasonable economic cost, 
and defence supercedes assured destruction as the basis of 
United States strategy. 
There is developing concern in the United States 
over the increasing Soviet counterforce capability. 




However, there is nothing in Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's 
doctrine of equivalence that. suggests BMD is the answer. 
lie argues for "essential equivalence between the strategic 
forces of the United States and the USSR"39 and is primarily 
concerned with offensive capability. If deterrence 
should fail, the policy is flexibility of response 
entailing the limited and discriminating use of-nuclear 
weapons, 40 The United States is continuing work on the SITE 
programme which is specifically designed for. the defence 
of Minuteman. The programme for advanced BMD technology 
is being continued "to provide the Soviet leaders with 
strong incentives to negotiate additional strategic arms 
limitations agreements .... 
[and] to motivate them to keep 
the treaties and agreements already made. "41 The option 
for BIlD is being, kept open as an instrument of negotiation 
and not as a likely strategic objective. 
Canadian air defence policy since the 1964 White Paper 
has been predicated on the approaching end of bomber 
defence as a strategic objective. The rationalizations 
in both Canada and the United States for a continued 
requirement for bomber defence have been related to whether 
BMD would become a strategic objective. The apparent end 
of bomber defence as a strategic objective provides Canada 
with a wider set of options for air defence than it has 
had since the early 1950s. 
3'3 Ibid., p G. 
'40 Ibid. ,pS. 
41 I_., p 71. 
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Canadian "Independence" and NORAD 
There are United States requirements for the use of 
Canadian facilities and airspace, particularly for early 
warning and SAC operations. These requirements may not 
be absolutely essential, but as long as the Soviet Union 
and the United States employ bombers for nuclear deterrence, 
Canada needs to have very good reasons to refuse these 
requirements. The issue then of continental air defence 
arrangements is how to reconcile United States strategic 
requirements with Canadian independence and sovereignty. 
As John Holmes has written 
Problems between the United States and 
Canada should be regarded as permanent. 
They will not go away when we have "solved" 
them or found a formula. It is a question 
of "process" rather than "solution". 'l 
Canada in the third quarter of this century has 
found itself caught in a dilemma caused by the requirements 
for Canadian-United States military cooperation and the 
broader requirement to protect itself against "inadvertent 
United States hegemony. "43 There has been a loss of 
Canadian independence in the formulation of national 
security policies. This has not been caused by the designs 
of the United States but by geographical position, modern 
military technology and the superpower status of the 
United States. If this loss of independence had been 
42John Holmes, Canada and the United States, Behind the 
Headlines, Vol XXIX, Nos -2, arcs 1§70) Cana Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs p 1. For other recent material on 
Canadian-United States relations see Mitchell Sharp, "Canada- 
U. S. Relations, " International Perspectives, A Journal of the 
Department of External Affairs, Special Issue, (Autumn 1972); ' 
5yß mposium on Canadian-U. S. Relations, " International Per- 
spectives (January/February, 1973) pp 3-13; and Canadian- 
U. S. Relations: Options for the Future, American tea ion, 
Behind the ea lines, Vol XXXI1, No 1 (February 1973) Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs. 
43 Roger F. Swanson, The United States as a National 
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limited to defence policy, the effects would have been 
of temporary significance; but in Canada's case they 
have been only one aspect of a total loss embracing 
social, political, economic and cultural aspects. 
The NORAD Agreement was a natural strategic 
development, but it also symbolized a new defence 
relationship in which Canada accepted some loss of control 
over the measures for the defence of Canada in exchange 
for greater security against a common perceived threat 
to North America and as a contribution to the security of 
the western world. The Agreement did make arrangements 
for consultation and although not entirely satisfactory, 
they have been as good as could be expected considering 
the disparity of contributions and the relationship of 
NORAD to United States deterrent forces. The United 
States has not been overbearing and in fact has been 
willing to go a considerable distance to meet Canadian 
sensibilities., The arrangemetits for command are particularly 
favourable to Canada when one considers the responsibilities 
given to Canadian officers in the border regions and the 
deputy commander of 10RAD. This may be the price to pay 
for Canadian cooperation and for the use of Canadian 
territory, but the United States has not been reluctant 
to pay it and has done so honourably. If United States 
interceptors have undertaken interceptions on behalf of 
Security Threat to Canada, Behind the Headlines, Vol XXIX, 
os 5-6, (July Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, p 9. 
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Canada, this has resulted from a failure of Canada to 
purchase more interceptors. NORAD has provided Canada 
with the cheapest way to maintain control over the second 
largest airspace in the world. 
Canada has lost some military independence but 
Canadian air defence forces are far from being a passive 
appendage or in a satellite status to the United States 
military. 144 The present NORAD organization and command 
arrangements give Canada as much control of its airspace 
as technology and military efficiency will allow with the 
present level of Canadian contribution. If the need 
arises for greater Canadian control of northern airspace, 
then Canada has the option of undertaking this task 
independently, while using NORAD installations. NORAD 
has not foreclosed the taking up of such an option, and 
it could make it easier and cheaper. It is not NORAD that 
inhibits Canada from assuming full responsibilities for 
controlling Canadian air pace, but the lack of complete 
control radar coverage and insuffioient interceptors. 
It is quite possible to set up a command relationship 
based on mutual cooperation to control North American 
airspace as long as peacetime surveillance and control 
remains the primary objective. The United States has a 
strategic interest in retaining. the DEW line and Canada 
has a mutual interest in using it for peacetime control. 
1414 Colin S. Gray, Canada and NORAD, p 4. 
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The NORAD Agreement can be dissolved and Canadian-United States 
cooperation restricted to some form of mutual cooperation 
arrangement for the control of continental airspace. 
However, Canada must then expect to bear a heavier burden 
if it wants to exercise anywhere near the degree of control 
now exercised or expand it northwards. 
Canadian Options 
There is no strategic or political imperative for 
Canada to remain in NORAD today, but it could be in the 
national interest to do so. There would undoubtedly be 
some United States opposition to Canadian withdrawal. 
Refusal of Canada to grant the United States use of 
Canadian territory and airspace for any military purpose 
would most certainly precipitate a Canadian-United States 
confrontation. There are basically four options open 
to Canada. 
Option 1. Canada can remain in NORAD but limit its partici- 
pation to its present level regardless of the measures 
the United Staten takes to update the present air defence 
system. Canada could provide, under arrangements designed 
to protect its sovereignty to the greatest possible extent, 
the facilities the United States required in Canada. These 
could include one, site for an 0TIi-D radar and use of 
Canadian airspace for the A14AC and IiI systems. The 
advantages to Canada would be minimum financial outlay for 
air defence, no upsetting of Canadian-United States relations, 
and continued direct access to the information obtained by 
NORAD facilities. The disadvantages could be extensive. 
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The disparity of resources deployed could result in 
changed organizational and command arrangements that would 
give the United States greater responsibility for controlling 
Canadian airspace than it now has. Unless Canada replaced 
the present interceptors, it would have no air defence 
capability. There would be only a pretence to sovereign 
control of Canadian airspace. 
Canada could establish some form of air traffic 
control organization in northern Canada, probably centred 
at Frobisher Bay. Such an organization would have only 
internal regulatory functions unless interceptors were 
used andthere was access to the information provided by an 
0TH-B radar. 
Option 2. Canada could remain in NORAD and purchase only 
those systems that are most relevant to the control of 
Canadian airspace. Arrangements could be made for 
Canadian participation and control of those systems 
that Canada did not wish to purchase. The first priority 
would be to buy a successor for present interceptors. The 
aim would be to have enough interceptors to undertake all 
peacetime interceptions on the main approaches to Canada. 
There is no reason why Canada should contribute financially 
to the capital cost of an 0TII-B site but joint manning could 
be advisable. 
Northern airspace could be controlled by establishing 
a joint civilian-military air control system with the 
military portion being part of a northern UORAD interception 
capability. Other than an 0TH-B radar site, 
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there should be no reason for any United States participation. 
Whether or not an 0TH-B radar site is built, it would probably 
be in Canada's interest to take over the DEW line and 
improve some of the facilities so that the early warning 
function would be combined with that of control. 
The prinicpal advantage of this option is that there 
would be maximum Canadian control over Canadian airspace 
at reasonable cost. A northern extension would increase 
Canadian control to that of near complete perimeter, 
coverage. 
Option 3. Canada could withdraw from NORAD but continue 
continental air defence on a mutual cooperation basis 
with no Canadian participation in updated systems. If 
the United States wished to deploy updated systems 
requiring use of Canadian geography and airspace, 
then arrangements could be made for this. The main 
advantage would be the appearance, at least, of 
increased Canadian political and military independence. 
flow great would depend on the arrangements reached with 
the United States. The arrangements, however, could 
be extensive enough to prove counterproductive. 
Having withdrawn from NORAD, Canada could find it had 
less means of controlling United States military activity 
in Canada than it had under NORAD. If Canada did not 
purchase any new interceptors, then the resulting 
vacuum over the second largest airspace in the world would 
be filled only to the extent that suited United 
States interests. 
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Option 4. Canada could withdraw from NORAD but continue 
continental air defence on a mutual cooperation basis 
with participation in updated systems. The level of 
participation would be governed by the requirements for 
maximizing Canadian control of airspace and for providing 
for essential United States strategic requirements. ' 
It could be low or high depending on United States 
strategic objectives. If bomber defence does not again 
become a United States strategic objective, early 
warning and bomber overflights will be the only 
significant strategic requirements. An integrated 
continental air defence system is not essential to 
meet the requirements of either. The operation of one 
0TH-B radar site in northern Canada is not likely to 
inhibit the independent conduct of Canadian foreign 
and defence policies. As long as the United States 
maintains bombers as part of its deterrent triad, 
Canada will have to accept overflights. 
If bomber defence again becomes a strategic 
objective, then Canada could participate to a limited 
extent. It seems unlikely, however, that bomber defence 
could be conducted on a mutual cooperation/joint 
command arrangement. NORAD came into being because it 
was clear that mutual cooperation was too unsatisfactory 
as a command system for the conduct of bomber defence 
operations. Hence, Option 4 is only applicable if 
bomber defence does not again become a strategic objective. 
The maximizing of Canadian control of airspace will 
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require some equipment updating. Accepting. that early 
warning by either the DEW line or. its possible 
replacement, the 0TH-B radar site1will remain a United 
States responsibility, the main requirements will be a 
new interceptor by about 1980 and an extension 
of control radars to more northern areas. These 
requirements will exist whether or not Canada remains 
in NORAD. 
The principal advantage of a mutual cooperation 
command arrangement with an updated air control/defence 
system is political. It would remove any chance of 
a recurrence of the difficulties that arose during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Nixon Alert. It would 
probably result in the withdrawal of United States 
controlled nuclear weapons, although this may happen 
anyway once it is clear that bomber defence is a 
completely redundant strategic objective. It would mean 
that Canada had assumed complete responsibility for 
the active defence of its own airspace. The principal 
disadvantage is that for the same level of control, 
Option 4 could be more expensive and more difficult 
to implement than Option 2 which entails staying in NORAD. 
Political Choice and the Options 
If, as appears likely, bomber defence remains strategically 
redundant, there will not be any strategic imperative 
to maintain large active anti-bomber air defences. The 
extent to which Canadian air defence/control priorities 
will be met is a function of domestic choice. The 
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choice is primarily one of accepting or rejecting 
greater responsibility for the active control of Canadian 
airspace. The systems for air defence will have to be 
updated by the early 1980s as a normal replacement 
requirement. The greater the responsibility Canada 
decides to accept for the control of its own airspace, 
the greater the costs are likely to be. The decision 
over NORAD is a marginal one compared to that concerning 
the degree of responsibility Canada is prepared to 
assume for controlling its own airspace. Greater 
Canadian independence in the context of the continental 
imbalance is directly related to the assumption by 




CANADIAN MARITIME INTERESTS AND NAVAL POLICY 
1867-1974 
Geography has provided Canada with the nearest 
landfall on the great circle route from Europe to North 
America and a major waterway into the continental interior. 
Maritime Canada (The Atlantic Provinces) has the only 
natural deep water harbours for supertankers on the eastern 
seaboard of North America. The Atlantic coast continental 
shelf, which stretches out to 650 miles in one place, pro- 
vides the banks for one of the world's most lucrative cod 
fisheries and may contain considerable reserves of oil and 
gas. The St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway is the gateway 
to continental Canada. In the past, maritime Canada dominated 
the seaward approaches to continental Canada and the two were 
linked strategically. however, they were never linked comm- 
ercially. The result was the development of two separate 
commercial empires. 
The commercial empire of the St. Lawrence was based on the 
exportation of staples from the interior. Its transportation 
system was extended by canals and railways until it stretched 
across a continent. It served the needs of continental ex- 
146 
pansion but never developed a maritime extension. Not 
only were the demands on the resources for continental 
development demanding enough in themselves, but there was 
. 
never any economic need to develop a maritime extension. 
There was always sufficient cheap foreign shipping. For 
continental Canada, commercial maritime interests stopped at 
tidewater. 
In contrast, the commercial interests of maritime Canada 
began at tidewater. The commercial empire that developed 
was based on the fisheries, shipbuilding and international 
seaborne trading. The period of greatest expansion of the 
Canadian fishing industry was from the 1830s to 1880s after 
the European distant water fleets had largely withdrawn from 
the cod fishery. By 1878, the Canadian merchant marine numbered 
7,196 vessels and was the fourth largest in the world. The 
ships were built and sailed for international trading and not 
as an economic extension of Canadian continental expansion. 
The changeover from sail to steam destroyed the basis of 
this era of maritime expansion. The post-Confederation 
national policy laid the basis for a manufacturing economy, 
but its centre was the Great Lakes region and its orientation 
was towards western expansion. The national development 
strategy, was continental, not maritime, in direction. The 
fishing industry went into a decline that was only reversed 
in the 1960s. The merchant marine declined to almost nothing 
by the turn of the century. The Canadian response was to 
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adopt a completely laissez-faire policy towards maritime 
interests. 
Canadian maritime expansion in the 19th century, took 
place under the aegis of Pax Britannica. The British North 
American colonies made no contribution to the maintenance 
of British seapower. The development of a sedentary fishery 
in Newfoundland resulted in the withdrawal of the West country 
ports'distant water fishing fleets, and Newfoundland ceased 
to be regarded as a nursery of seamen. Ships of war were 
built almost entirely in British yards with Baltic timber. 
1 
Canadian timber, shipbuilding and shipping did augment British 
merchant shipping but the protected British market for 
Canadian exports was of commercial advantage primarily to the 
colonies. The benefits of Pax Britannica were accepted by the 
British North American colonies as being in the natural order 
of things befitting colonies of the British Empire. The 
maintenance of Pax Britannica was considered solely as an 
imperial responsibility and this view persisted after Confed- 
eration. 
Throughout most of the 19th century, there was no 
challenge to British naval supremacy and naval expenditures 
were relatively light. 
2 The Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 
empowered colonial legislatures to establish naval forces for 
local defence, but there was little pressure for Canada to do so. 
1 
Gerald Graham, The politics of Naval Su remac : Studies in 
British Maritime Ascendancy, Cambridge: University Press 
1958) pp 113-4. 
Ibid., p 110. 
2 
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The American Civil War and the crisis sourrounding the Russo- 
Turkish War of 1877-78 did produce a desire for the stationing 
of lightly armed auxiliary cruisers in the Bay of Fundy and 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence to protect trade. The upshot was 
the puchase of IIMS Charybdis as a training ship for a 
naval reserve. The ship was found to be so unsuitable that 
the Admiralty bought her back. 
Pax Britannica provided for the protection of trade, for 
coastal defence, and a deterrent to United States attack, but 
it proved less suitable as a means of protecting the fisheries. 
Throughout the 19th century, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland 
attempted to elude foreign fisherman, mainly New Englanders, 
from the inshore fisheries and the Gulf of St. Lawrence and 
Day of Fundy. 
3 The struggle for the"priceless fisheries was 
entwined with tarriff negotiations with the United States, 
Anglo-American relations and Canadian-United States relations. 
In the 1880s there developed sufficient dissatisfaction with 
the Royal Naval enforcement of Canadian fishery regulations 
against United States fishermen that Canada created its own 
fishery protection service. 
3 Sec Harold A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries, rev., ed., (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1954) pp 227-87 and 321-74. 
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The British Government was determined to maintain 
good Anglo-American relations and was not prepared to have 
the Royal Navy rigorously enforce fishery regulations. 
Canada therefore chose to do so and in 1886 some 700 vessels 
were boarded and 1,362 in 1887.4 This rigorous enforcement 
was primarily designed to harass the United States into re- 
vising its tariffs in favour of Canada. A compromise solution 
was reached in 1888 and enforcement of fishery regulations 
against foreigners ceased to be an issue until the late 1960s. 
Canada had been forced to accept responsibility for the 
protection of its own fisheries because of the British 
government's refusal to do so. Because Canada had no navy, 
it created a civilian fishery protection service. This did 
not deter Americans from accusing Canadian officials of 
brutality and inhumanity against defenceless United States 
fishermen. There was nothing moral about the creation of a 
civilian fishery protection service and the tradition that 
this is the Canadian way of doing things has little substance. 
When, in 1886, it was suggested to Canada that it should 
form a small Canadian navy to defend its coasts, the govern-' 
ment replied that the fishery protection service formed the 
nucleus of a naval force. In 1913 Sir Robert Borden, as 
5 
4 Ibid., pp 419-20 
5 
The then Minister of Militia, Sir A. Caron, was stalling on 
the question of Canadian contributions to imperial defence. 
See Richard A. Preston, Canadian Defence Polic and the Devel- 
opment of the Canadian Nation 1867-1917, Canadian Historical 
Association Booklet, No. 25, Ottawa 1970) p. 12. 
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part of his naval policy, intended to expand the fishery 
protection service by the addition of light cruisers. 
The cruisers were to be manned by men under naval discipline 
and serve in war and peace to protect the fisheries. 
6 
The creation of a civilian protection service was 
a practical necessity, and after a short period of rigorous 
enforcement in the 1880s, its task became primarily the 
enforcement of conservation regulations involving only 
Cahadian fishermen. This is its primary task today with any 
"difficult" situations with foreign fishermen being dealt 
with by Maritime Command. The fishery protection service 
of the 1880s always had the Royal Navy behind it, if foreign 
warships appeared, as the same service has Maritime Command 
behind it today. 
In 1887, there began a series of colonial conferences 
which each in turn was to consider the problem of imperial 
naval policy. European states were rapidly industrializing 
and embarking upon overseas expansion to ensure supplies of 
essential raw*matorials. Pax Britannica had been dependent 
on naval supremacy in two hemispheres. By the and of the 
century, "the principle of universal command pof the seas) 
had to be surrendered in favour of a strategy of local con- 
centration"7 as foreign naval expansion continued apace. 
6 
Gilbert Tucker, "The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 
1912-14", Canadian Historical Review, Vol XXVIII, No 1, 
(March 1947) p 26. 
7 
Gerald Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy, p 123. 
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Although prepared to continue to guarantee naval defence 
for the Umpire, there was an increasing desire by Britain 
for Empire contributions to offset foreign naval expansion. 
This desire came at a time when the new Dominions were 
developing in national autonomy and nation building was 
their principal concern. 
The most satisfactory form of contribution to imperial 
naval defence, from the Royal Navy's perspective, was cash 
contributions. The least satisfactory was local navies 
under local control. Until the naval scare of 1909, Canada 
steadfastly refused to consider any form of contribution to 
naval defence, local or imperial, although, at the 1902 
Imperial Conference, Canada stated it was prepared to con- 
sider setting up a naval reservo. 
8 The Canadian position 
was justified on the basis of colonial nationalism and the 
role the Canadian pacific Railway could play in imperial 
defence. It was with some reluctance that Canada was prepared 
to take over responsibility for the defence of Malifax 
and Esquimalt in 1906. 
The legislative initiative for a Canadian navy came 
from the Tory opposition to Sir Wilfred Laurier's Liberal 
government. Sir George roster introduced a resolution 
That in the opinion of this Clouse, in view of fier 
great and varied resources, of her geographical 
position and national environments, and of that 
8 
Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Its Official 
History, Vol 1, Origins and Lary Years, Ot awa: King's 
Pr ntor, 109. 
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spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone 
befits a strong and growing people, Canada should 
no longer delay in assuming her proper share of 
the responsibility and financial burden incident 
to the suitable protectin of her exposed coast- line and great seaports.? 
Foster did not go beyond the idea of coastal defence, 
but he emphasized that Canadians should be prepared to do 
more than to rely on the Monroe Doctrine. After some debate, 
Laurier introduced a resolution requesting approval of "a 
Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close 
relation to the Imperial navy, along the lines suggested by 
the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference (1907]'; 
10 
At that conference the Admiralty had adopted the policy of 
supporting colonial efforts to provide local squadrons of 
torpedo boats and submarines to operate against local raiders. 
The growing apprehension over German naval power res- 
ulted in another Imperial Conference in July/August 1909.11 
The Admiralty, now more sensitive to Dominion nationalism, 
proposed the concept of Dominion fleet units. These fleet 
units would operate in the Dominion's own sphere of influence 
in lieu of Royal Navy squadrons. The Admiralty's hope was 
9 
Canada, house of Commons, Debates, 1909, Vol II, p 3484. 
10 
Ibid., p 3511 
11 
For a dencription of this conference sea D. C. Gordon, The 
Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence 1070-1914, (BaltT- 
more, Maryland: John Hopkins Press r Chap X pp 215-41, 
and Richard Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defence": A 
Study of the Origins o the British Commonwealth's Derence 
Organ zat on 186-7-1919, (Durham, N. C.: Duke University, 
i9 O Chap 13 pp - 29. 
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that Canada would provide such a unit for the Pacific 
while the Royal Navy accepted responsibility for the Western 
Atlantic. This was unacceptable to the Canadian delegation 
because it would be politically impossible to concentrate 
on one coast and neglect the other. In the end, the Admiralty 
prepared two plans for fleet units based on the Bristol 
class cruiser and destroyers. It also outlined various 
training arrangements. The Canadian delegation returned home 
fully satisfied that the basis had been laid for a national 
navy that could be for direct defence of Canadian interests 
as well as for the defence of the Empire. 
A small inshore or local navy would provide some coastal 
defence against scattered raiders. However, if the Royal 
Navy lost naval supremacy as a result of defeat in the North 
Sea, then a small inshore navy would be helpless against 
a concentrated naval attack. A small inshore navy, as was 
the fishery protection service, would be dependent on British 
naval supremacy for any operational role in the defence of 
Canada and its maritime interests. British"naval supremacy 
was a sine c non for any Canadian navy. However, in the 
Western Atlantic, the area of vital interest to Canada, 
Britain no longer was prepared to challenge the United States. 
During the Venezuelan incident of 1895-96, the narrow margin 
of superiority over the Dual Alliance in European waters made 
it impossible to send reinforcements to the North Atlantic 
and West Indian Squadron. 12 
12 
Gerald Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy, p 123. 
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Any Canadian naval policy was contingent on British 
naval supremacy in European waters, United States benevo- 
lence and no threat'arising from the Pacific. Strategically, 
Canada had the options of no navy at all, a small inshore 
navy distributed on two coasts, or the development of a 
navy capable of contributing to British naval power as well 
as providing for the direct defence of Canada. The first 
option implied a continuation of colonial dependency in a 
period of developing Canadian autonomy. It was also the 
period when British naval power no longer could provide for 
complete Canadian naval defence as a consequence of the and 
of Pax Britannica. This option was only applicable if 
there was no foreseeable threat to Canada that would not 
be countered by other states in their own interests. 
The second option of a small inshore navy had the 
advantages of demonstrating Canadian desire to contribute 
to imperial naval power at least in a symbolic manner, and 
of being the basis for a "national" navy that could be ex- 
panded in war. Its disadvantage was that it might be too 
impotent to make any meaningful contribution to the defence 
of Canada or to British naval power. If never challenged, 
a small inshore navy had all the advantages; if challenged, 
it had none. The third option entailed Canada becoming a 
naval power in her own right and contributing to British naval 
power as an alliance partner rather than as a dependent colony. 
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In the ensuing debate, which lasted until 1914, and 
in many aspects continues to this day, the crucial question 
was not strategic, but hat the relationship of a Canadian 
navy to the imperial navy was to be and what this relation- 
ship meant in political terms. In contemporary language, 
it was a question, of alliance, relationships. Canada had 
decided to have a navy at a time when its maritime interests 
in fishing, shipping and shipbuilding were in drastic decline. 
Furthermore, there was no intention of revitalizing them. In 
contrast to other developing naval powers, Canada had adopted 
completely laissez-faire maritime policies. Canada was in- 
terested in continental, not maritime, expansion. It was 
railways, not ships, that Canada was building. It was the 
settlement of the west, not expansion overseas, that pre- 
occupied Canadians. However, Canada was as dependent as it 
had ever been on overseas trade. The right to trade freely 
overseas was the principal Canadian maritime interest and 
the maintenance of freedom of the seas in peace and war was 
a vital national interest. 
The strategic logic of imperial defence could not be 
separated from imperial political relationships any more 
than politics can be separated from war. For some Canadians, 
Canada had reached the stage when it had external interests 
and should have the means of protecting and furthering those 
interests. Those interests were to be pursued through the 
British Empire, in which Canada, in return for defence 




Any Canadian naval policy, therefore, 
should be based on the protection of both Canadian and. 
imperial maritime interests. 
The solution preferred, to meet this criterion was 
financial contributions to the Royal Navy to construct and 
operate fleet units that would eventually be returned as 
the basis of a permanent navy. The reasoning by Sir Robert 
Borden, whose proposal this was, was that the German naval 
threat was too immediate and menacing to await the develop- 
ment of a Canadian navy which would take years. Borden's 
policy was the separation of emergency contributions from 
his permanent naval policy. The latter would be directly 
related to the future form of the Canadian role in deter- 
mining the foreign policy of the Empire. 
14 It was an alliance 
oriented policy that saw Canadian interests being furthered 
through an alliance structure. 
There were other Canadians "who felt secure in the 
peaceful isolation of North America, hoped to escape entangle- 
ment in the incorrigible rivalries of Europe, and looked with 
suspicion and distrust on all schemes for armed co-operation 
inside the British Empire. "15 They saw no need for any navy 
at all, or at best would tolerate one for purely local defence. 
13 
See Harold A. Wilson, The Imperial Policy of Sir Robert 
Borden, University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 29, 
9966, for an analysis of Borden's imperial policy. 
14 
Gilbert Tucker, "The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 
1912-14ý, pp 24-30. 
15 
Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century 1867-1967, p 118. 
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The Monroe Doctrine provided all the defence required. 
It was a form of nationalism, but an inward looking nation- 
alism, isolationist and continentalist . In practice it 
was prepared to discard increasing Canadian independence 
in the context of the British Empire for an independence 
entirely dependent on United States goodwill. Opposition 
to a navy centred on the fear that its creation would drag 
Canada into unwanted wars. As Henri Bourassa expressed it: 
Au lieu dune marine canadionne sous l'authorita du 
gouvernement canadien, pour la dccfensc du Canada, 
il (Laurier] nous gratifiait do deux escadres, 
organisces, at payer{es par in pouple du Canada; 
mises an cas do guorro sous l'authoritd exclusive 'do 
1'amirautc anglaise, pur prendre part a toutes les 
guerres de l'Angleterre. 16 
The Naval Service Act was passed, but the debate con- 
tinued into the 1911 election, which saw Borden and his 
Conservatives elected. Borden's attempt to make a financial 
contribution was defeatedlin the Senate and he was unable to 
find an acceptable naval policy by 1914. At the beginning of 
the war, Canada had a Naval Service Act, two old cruisers, 
a skeleton naval service and a naval college; in reality, 
no navy.. Early in the war Canada wished to expand the naval 
service, but Churchill at the Admiralty recommended concentr- 
ation on the army build-up. 
0 
16 
Ilenri ßourassa, Le Project de Loi Navalo, PfC Pamphlet 
Cat. c II, no 3706. 
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Until 1917, Canadian maritime activity was minimal. 
British shipping losses resulted in contracts being let 
to Canadian shipyards for 40 steel cargo vessels ranging 
up to 8,000 DWT. This spurred the Canadian Government into 
reviving the Canadian merchant marine to replace wartime 
shipping losses, to have the recently formed Canadian National 
Railways compete with Canadian Pacific Steamships, and to 
lay the basis for a peacetime merchant marine. 
17 Its con- 
struction was primarily carried out in the post-war period 
from 1919 to 1924 when 63 ships were built. The war created 
the opportunity, but the motivation was nationalistic and 
commercial. 
By 1917, the submarine menace was at its peak and the 
Royal Navy was unable to provide sufficient forces for anti- 
submarine operations in Canadian coastal waters. The result 
was the formation of an Ang1o-Canadian anti-submarine 
flotilla for coastal operations. it numbered about 100 vessels 
of which 29 belonged to the Canadian Naval Service. As 
Tucker remarked: 
The flotilla was prolific of precendents; it was 
the first fleet to be commanded by, an officer of 
the Royal Canadian Navy; it contained the first ships 
built expressly for the Naval Service; and it faced 
the first direct naval attack in the history of the 
Dominion. The cast coast patrols and their organ- 
ization now seem like the first run of a play which was 
17 
A. W. Currie, Canadian Tran: ortntion Economics, (Toronto 
University of Toronto Press, 1959) p 616. 
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to be revived many years later in the same 
theatre during the Second World War. 
18 
As Canada had been forced to create a fishery pro- 
tection service, it was forced also to assume responsibility 
for its naval defence in coastal waters because the Royal 
Navy could no longer undertake the task. The failure, in the 
. pre-war years, to create more than a "tin pot" navy meant 
that Canada was entirely dependent on other states for even 
a modicum of naval protection in coastal waters. 
The navy began the peace with great expectations for 
expansion. The naval staff argued for strong local defence 
forces and additional forces to protect Canadian overseas 
trade interests. The ships of the new merchant marine were 
opening up. routes to Britain, the Mediterranean, the West 
Indies, Australia and New Zealand. However, Canada was 
in 
no mood for expensive naval expansion plans, and in 192L the 
new government under Mackenzie King cut naval expenditures. 
The result was the decommissioning of all warships, except 
two destroyers for purely training purposes, the retention 
of a small number of trawlers, and'the creation of a naval 
reserve which was to become the mainstay of the Second World 
War naval expansion. The Naval Service Minister in presenting 
this policy felt this "would be more in keeping with the 
protection of our coasts than it would be in harmony with 
18 
Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Vol. I pp 254-5. 
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highsea fighting, because the fleet as now constituted 
is for action on the sea, and not for the protection of 
our harbours and coasts as we understand that protection. "19 
The expectations that Canada would create even a credible 
naval force for local defence, let alone an ocean going 
fleet unit, were now completely dispelled. 
The ships of the new merchant marine wore profitable 
until 1921, but after that, losses increased. The ships 
were gradually sold off until 1936, when only six remained 
of the 63 built. 
20 The decline of the fishing industry was 
drastic. Government policy, at the request of inshore fish- 
ormen, restricted technological innovation to the point that 
by 1939 there were only three Canadian trawlers operating. 
By the mid 1920s the navy had "become a largely land-locked 
reserve establishment"21 notwithstanding the arguments of the 
Chief of Naval Staff, Commodore Walter Hose that: 
The most vulnerable point open to attack in 
Canada, the point whore the most vital damage 
could be effected to her national existence lies 
in her overseas trade... In addition ... there is 
a danger of Canada being drawn into a state of 
belligerency due to fier inability to undertake 
the obligations of neutrality through having in- 
sufficient force at hand to prevent the perpetuation 
of unneutral acts of belligerence in Canadian terr- 
itorial waters. 22 
19 Canada, house of Commons, Debates, 1922, Vol II p 1739. 
The Minister, Mr. George Graham, a so remarked "that Canada must 
maintain something of a naval service. " Ibid., p 1736. 
20 A. W. Currio, Canadian Transportation Economics, p 617. 
21 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol 1, p 270. 
22 Minutes of Defence Council, Aug. 29,1930 as quoted in 
ibid., p 273. 
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By 1935, there was sufficient concern about the 
international situation that the navy received increased 
appropriations, and this policy continued until the out- 
break of the war. The government's policy was to increase 
defence expenditures, but only for the direct defence of 
Canada, and was "utterly inadequate to the scale of the 
coming emergency. °23 
Naval policy in the inter-war years failed to create a 
credible autonomous inshore navy or an ocean going navy. 
The Naval Service was incapable of coastal defence or of 
making a contribution in an alliance structure to the main- 
tenance of freedom of the seas. The policy of Mackenzie King 
was no commitments and Dominion autonomy. This policy 
meant that any Canadian naval policy should stress autonomy; 
i. e. the creation of an independent naval capability designed 
at least to provide coastal protection. Yet the policy of 
reducing the navy to a land locked reserve and the disbanding 
of the Naval College meant that the Royal Naval influence 
was deepened and precluded the development of a Canadian 
naval tradition. 
24 The policy of no commitments meant that 
23 
C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p 6. 
24 
See paper presented by W. A. B. Douglas, Anglo-American Naval 
Tradition: The Canadian Experience, Conference of the North 
Atlantic Naval Historians at Orono, Maine in October 1973. The 
writer attended the conference and discussed the topic with 
Commander Douglas who is at present the Director of History for 
the Canadian Armed Forces. 
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no arrangements could be made for coastal defence and 
defence of trade in peacetime. Autonomy was meaningless 
unless the navy was large enough to sustain independent 
functions whether they were for local defence or defence of 
trade. Autonomy and Canadianization were directly related 
to the size of the navy and its role. 
The strategic conditions for the operation of a small 
inshore navy did not change in substance from the pre-war 
period. These were Anglo-American supremacy in the Atlantic, 
and any challenge in the Pacific being countered by the same 
powers. The same options as before were open to Canada. 
Canada chose to rely on geographical isolation, the Monroe 
Doctrine, and what protection the Royal Navy was prepared to 
provide. Under the policies of autonomy and no commitments, 
Canada was to enter the Second World War as dependent on 
British naval power as it had over been in colonial times. 
It was to finish the war as a world class scapower with maritime 
interests spanning the traditional spectrum of a revitalized 
fishing industry, a large ocean going merchant marine, and 
a massively expanded shipbuilding industry. 
The Rise of Canada to be a Maritime Power 
The RCN began the Second World War with 13 ships and 
1600 personnel. It ended the war with 939 vessels (of 
which 373'were considered fighting ships) and 93,000 personnel, 
making it the third or fourth largest navy in the world. -The 
Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command, created on 30 April, 
1943, was the only independent allied command hold by Canada 
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or by any other allied power, other than the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
Because of the no commitments policy, the RCN entered 
the war with no war plans other than the protection of harbours 
and trade in Canadian waters, and was not officially included 
in the plans of the RN. The Chief of Naval Staff had assumed 
that the RCN would be an integral part of the RN's arrange- 
ments for defence of the Empire's sea communications. His 
request that the RCN's six destroyers "be placed under Admir- 
alty orders" was refused on constitutional grounds and the 
destroyers were directed "to cooperate to the fullest extent 
with the forces of the Royal Navy. "25 This was changed to 
operational control in early 1940 when a more direct threat 
to Canada was perceived. The weakness of the-RCN was such 
that it could not alone protect the Canadian coast and shipping, 
but Admiralty assistance could not be expected unless the 
RCN gave the fullest co-operation. The policy followed 
was to transfer Canadian destroyers to Admiralty control for 
overseas service and build up an anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) capability at home. 
The ASW role appealed to the Canadian government because 
it was defensive and seemed the best role for the small 
Canadian navy. A further reason to specialize in ASW was 
the Canadian industrial capability to mass produce corvettes 
25 
Wilfred Courlay Lund, "Command Relationships in the North West 
Atlantic 1939-45: The Royal Canadian Navy's Perspective", 
unpublished thesis, (Kingston: Queen's University, 1972) p 8. 
Quoted from Privy Council order 2638 of 14 September 1939. 
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but not destroyers. The RN requested that the RCN in- 
crease its ASW force and extend its patrols to Newfoundland. 
The declared objective then became to create a "minimum 
Navy which will be of reasonable protection to trade in our 
harbours and in the focal areas in the vicinity of our 
Canadian coasts. "26 This committed Canada to operations 
outside the immediate coastal zone. 
The ABC-1 plan had divided the Atlantic ocean into 
eastern and western zones of responsibility. Once the United 
States entered the war, it was to assume responsibility for 
the strategic direction of British naval forces, and the RCN, 
in the Western Atlantic except for "the waters and terri- 
tories in which Canada assumes. responsibility for the strategic 
direction of military forces, as may be defined in United 
States-Canada joint agreements. "27 ABC-1 was agreed to by 
the United States and the United Kingdom in March 1941 with- 
out any Canadian participation. This was before the 
United States had failed, because of Canadian resistance, 
to bring Canadian territory and Newfoundland under United 
States strategic direction under ADC-22 (Basic Defence Plan-21 
ABC-l, with this "exception", and if the United States had 
achieved the command relationship it wanted, would have given 
26 
Ibid., p 11. Quoted from Chief of Naval Staff to Minister, 
Memorandum of 29 September 1939. N. S. 1650. 
27 
Ibid., p 21. Quoted from ABC-1 Agreement,. 
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it complete control over the entire Canadian eastern and 
western coastal areas. 
The United Kingdom seems to have abetted the United 
States in this endeavour and simply ignored Canadian pro- 
tests. Canadian protests had stated that Canada was not 
prepared to place the RCN under United States strategic 
direction. Ilowever, Canada acquiesced to United States 
control of Canadian ships to avoid damaging the war effort, 
when in September 1941, the United States assumed strategic 
direction in the Western Atlantic. This experience did 
generate a later desire within the RCN to establish 'a separate 
command, independent of direct interference from both the 
United States and the United Kingdon. 
In June 1941, Commodore L. W. Murray became Commodore 
Commanding Newfoundland with his headquarters in St. John's 
Newfoundland, and was given command of the newly established 
Newfoundland Escort Force. 'This resulted in extending 
Canadian operations out into the Western Atlantic and pro- 
vided a greater Canadian military presence in Newfoundland. 
After the United states assumed strategic direction in 
mid-September 1941 in the Western Atlantic, Admiral E. King, 
the United States CINCLANT, simply imposed a higher head- 
quarters, commanded by a United States Admiral. This was a 
somewhat galling arrangement because the United States Navy 
was largely ignorant of ASW, whereas the RCN had been en- 
gaged in it for two years. In addition, the United-States 
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contribution, because of the demands of other theatres, 
dwindled to two coast guard cutters by February 1942. 
Canada was soon providing 48 per cent of the total North 
Atlantic escorts. 
Various incidents occured which caused the Canadian 
naval headquarters to launch a campaign for a revised 
commend structure. This campaign, over considerable United 
States resistance and little help from the British, resulted 
in the calling of an Atlantic Convoy Conference in March 1943. 
There Canada secured operational control of all surface and 
air ASW escorts in the area west of 47 degrees West and north 
of 40 degrees North. Admiral Murray was designated Commander- 
in-Chief, Canadian North West Atlantic. The campaign had 
been won because of the RCN's large contribution to the 
winning of the Battle of the Atlantic. 
28 
The Canadian naval staff had undertaken and won their 
campaign without political support. The Cabinet War Comm- 
ittee was kept informed but chose to play no role. It was 
the strenth of the RCN and the extent of its contribution, 
that compelled a reluctant United States to concede to Canada, 
strategic direction of her own naval forces and in waters 
contiguous to Canada but of vital importance to both states. 
Canada had entered the war grossly unprepared oven to 
defend its contiguous waters. This meant that, however 
v 
politically desirable it was for the RCN to cooperate only 
with the RN, the requirement for RN assistance in defending 
28 
Ibid., p 60. 
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Canada resulted in RCN ships being placed under operat- 
ional control. A consequence of this weakness was that 
Canadian interests were ignored in the Anglo-American 
decision to transfer strategic direction of the RCN in the 
Western Atlantic to the United States. Although Canadian 
resistance to United States strategic direction under the 
ABC-22 had been successful, it was to prove a pyrrhic 
victory at sea. The vital significance of the North West 
Atlantic, its indivisibility for the purpose of naval oper- 
ations, and Canadian weakness preordained United States 
strategic direction. The political desirability of independ- 
ent command of Canadian ships in waters of vital significance 
to Canada could only be obtained when Canadian naval strength 
compelled it to be acknowledged. 
The expansion of the RCN had been a remarkable feat of 
organization but it had had its teething troubles; princ- 
ipally in the equipment field. Nevertheless, the war ended 
with the RCN having two light fleet aircraft carriers, two 
cruisers, 14 destroyers and hundreds of smaller ships. Canada, 
by 1945, had become the third or fourth largest naval power 
in the world, but a naval power whose capability was largely 
limited to the North Atlantic and ASW operations. 
Complementing the expansion of the RCN, was the creation 
of a government owned merchant marine. Its creation resulted, 
as had happened in the First World War, from the expansion 
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of the Canadian shipbuilding industry. The opportunity 
was used to create a merchant marine which could be turned 
over to private shippers at the peace. 
29 
By 1946, Canadian 
shipyards, which had not built an ocean going vessel between 
1924 and 1939, had produced 1,000 vessels including 398 
merchant vessels. The government retained 150 of these 
merchant vessels as the basis for the new merchant marine. 
The shortage of food caused the government to revitalize 
the fishing industry by encouraging technological innovation. 
Canada, under the exigencies of war, had been forced 
into becoming a major seapower and had used the opportunity 
to create a merchant marine, to expand shipbuilding capacity 
and to revitalize its fishing industry. A maritime dim- 
ension to continental and industrial development had thus 
been created from almost nothing. For the first time since 
the end of the age of sail, Canadian maritime activity was 
underlaid by a modern technological base.. Yet within a 
few years, the Canadian merchant marine had been disbanded, 
the shipbuilding industry only sustained in skeleton form 
by susidies and government orders, and the fishing industry 
allowed to decline. 
The RCN was maintained in the form of a small balanced 
fleet unit concentrated in the North West Atlantic. Royal 
Naval presence in Canadian waters came to an end and Pax 
Dritannica and the Anglo-Canadian alliance ceased to be a 
factor in Canadian naval development. It was replaced by 
29 
Second Report of the Canadian Maritime Commission, 1949, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949) pp 17-8. 
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Pax Americana and continental defence. Presumably the 
"colonial" attitude to naval defence would no longer 
pertain. 
Balanced Fleet to Specialization 
Naval post-war planning was begun in 1943, with the 
intention of having a post-war fleet designed as a task 
force rather. than an escort force. The initial hope of the 
naval staff was for a fleet consisting of "at least five 
cruisers, two light fleet carriers, and three destroyer 
flotillas. "30 This ambition was to be somewhat diluted in 
size but not in concept. In 1945, the main purposes of the 
peacetime RCN were stated to be: to repel all but heavy task 
forces in waters adjacent to Canada, to protect trade routes 
and maintain sea communications, to cooperate in hemispheric 
defence, to prevent unneutral acts in territorial and coastal 
waters, and in general to support national policies and in- 
terests. 31The concept and tasks were those of a balanced 
fleet unit or task force for which the proponents of a Canadian 
navy had been arguing for half a century. 
The tasks and fleet requirements were well within what 
Canada, as an industrial-power could support. The policy 
was strategically sound as it meant that Canada had virtual 
command of the seas in its contiguous waters, barring the 
30 
Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: 
Activities on Shore During tie Secon World War, Vo II, (Ottawa: 
King's Printer, 1952 p 484. 
31 
Ibid., p 489. 
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collapse of United States naval power in the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans. It was politically beneficial because 
it removed Canadian dependence on foreign naval powers for 
defence in vital contiguous waters. It allowed Canada to 
project power overseas, either independently for limited 
tasks, or as part of a multi-national operation. It had 
the structure and flexibility of a small independent fleet 
which could operate in defence of Canadian interests either 
in waters contiguous to Canada or overseas. 
After the war, the government set manpower ceilings 
that reduced the size of the post-war'navy,, but by 1950 the 
RCN had one light fleet aircraft carrier, two cruisers, 11 
destroyers, eight escorts and nine mine sweepers. The Cold 
War rearmament programme resulted in an extensive shipbuilding, 
modernization, and conversion programme. This programme was 
not complemented by any other form of maritime expansion, 
rather the reverse. There was considerable debate over the 
disbanding of the merchant marine. The arguments were summ- 
arized in the Second Report of the Canadian Maritime Commission 
in 1949. The case for disbandment rested "on the thesis 
that the nation or nations which can give the best service at 
the lowest cost should conduct the carrying trades". 
32 The 
cost of operating Canadian shipping was then the second highest 
in the world, and there was strong opposition to discriminating 
32, 
Second Report of the Canadian Maritime Commission, p 44. 
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against foreign shipping as the United states was doing . 
The Commission argued that "the justification of the Canadian 
shipping and shipbuilding industries must finally rest upon 
the grounds of national security" as "Canada has reached 
a stage in her development when she should no longer be en- 
tirely dependent upon others for her security". 
33 
The Commission recommended that a nucleus fleet be main- 
tained on security grounds. The government initially accepted 
the nucleus argument, but after the Korean War, when the 
question of subsidies arose, the government was not prepared 
to engage in a subsidy war with the United States. Transfers 
to British registry were permitted and by the end of the 1950s 
Canada had only ten deep sea ships, with 78 on foreign registers. 
In 1946, Canada was the fourth largest shipbuilder in the 
world. By 1950, Canadian yards had orders for only three 
ships and in 1961 a subsidy programme was introduced primarily 
to support Great Lakes shipbuilding. 
34 Canada, by the early 
1950s had reverted to its traditional laissez-faire policy 
towards maritime activities. Aside from coastal defence, pro- 
tection of Canadian overseas trade, which was entirely carried 
in foreign shipping, was the only maritime interest requiring 
protection. 
33 
Ibid., p 46. 
34 
For an analysis of shipbuilding subsidies see the Committee 
on Shipbuilding in Canada, Report 1970, Forward and Summary, 
privately prihted, pp 3-14. 
172 
Canadian naval expansionýof the 1950s was related to 
the Soviet threat to sea communications and not to any Canadian 
maritime expansion programme. Naval capital expenditures 
rose from $50 million in 1950-51 to a high of $261 million in 
1953-54 but fell below $200 million in 1957-58 and to slightly 
over $100 million by 1967-68.35 This fleet expansion pro- 
gramme resulted, by 1960, in a fleet consisting of one aircraft 
carrier, nine destroyers, 34 escorts and nine minesweepers. 
The RCAF maintained squadrons for ASW operations. The aircraft 
carrier ßonaventure carried Banshees, which Swore 
capable of 
air defence and attack roles, in addition to fixed wing and 
rotary wing aircraft. These capabilities allowed it to operate 
in both anti-submarine and fighter operational roles. 
36 This 
now fleet had the capability for ASW operations in contiguous 
waters, convoy escorting, mine-counter measures, seaward 
defence of Canadian ports, support of the army in its defence 
of Canada and United Nations roles, and of operatincj as an 
integral fleet unit of a larger force. In the period of the 
late fifties and early sixties, the RCN had a more balanced 
and powerful fleet than Canada has over had, except perhaps 
for the very last years of the Second World War. 
The RCN became an integral part of NATO's naval forces 
35 
For an examination of naval capital expenditures sec G. M. 
Dill, jpn, Canadian Naval Forces Since World War II: A Decision 
Maki T Analysis, occasional paper ot he Centre o Foreign 
Policy Analysis, (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1972) p 16., 
36 
J. D. F. Kealy and R. C. Russel, A History of Canadian Naval 
Aviation, 1918-1962, (Ottawa: Queens printer, 1965) p 104. 
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in the North Atlantic when SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic) was formed in 1952. The RCN was given command of 
the CANLANT (Canadian Atlantic) zone whose boundaries were the 
same as those of the Canadian North West Atlantic zone of the 
Second World War. The command arrangements were and are that 
"Canadian maritime-forces ... earmarked for assignment to NATO... 
are placed under SACLANT's command and control by a decision 
of the Canadian government when the appropriate alert measure 
is declared by the Defence Planning Committee of NATO". 
37 
These forces are then assigned to various commands such as the 
Commander-in-Chief Western Area (CINCWESTLANT) and the Comm- 
ander-Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area (COMCANLANT). Today, 
COMCANLANT is also the Commander. Maritime Command (CANMARCOM). 
The majority of Maritime Command's ships are deployed in the 
Atlantic. The details of the decisions that led to Canada 
committing the RCN to NATO command and specializing in ASW 
are not known, but there is no evidence that it was not per- 
ceived as natural and logical. 
The dominant experience of the RCN in the war had been 
in ASW operations in the North West Atlantic under Anglo- 
American command. The Mahanian tradition of seapowor with its 
concept of indivisible command of the sea was as fundamental 
to the thinking of Canadian naval officers as it was-to 
British and United States officers. 
3B It had been accepted in 
37 
Statement by the Department of National Defence in Colin S. 
Gray, Canadian Maritime Forces Wellesly Paper, (Jan. 1973) 
Canadian Institute of Internat onal Affairs, Appendix A, p 64. 
38 
Discussions with Commander Douglas. 
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1944, as the basis for future expansion of the RCN, that 
Canada could not defend itself alone against a strong enemy 
fleet attempting to dominate Canadian coasts. The requirement 
to depend on allies against this threat was acknowledged, 
and post-war statements by naval officers have, reiterated 
this dependency. Under NATO Canada obtained, apparently with- 
out question, the independence of command and the protection 
it required. 
Once the Canadian government committed forces to Europe 
and made Europe the strategic frontier of Canadian defence, 
then the maintenance of secure sea communications across the 
Atlantic was a sine qua non. There was no sovereignty issue 
over the commitment of the RCN to NATO as there was over air 
defence. The fleet was still in Canadian waters, and the 
naval tasks of national, continental, and NATO defence were 
in practice the same. There was not the problem of requiring 
different ships for the two tasks as there was for aircraft 
for North American and European air defence. A predominately 
ASW navy was superimposed on the small fleet unit concept 
of the immediate post-war period as a natural and logical con- 
tribution. The NATO strategic doctrine of the 1950s was for 
a protracted European conflict and therefore SACLANT's main 
task was to secure the sea communications of the North Atlantic. 
The threat came from the increasing size of the Soviet sub- 
marine force which was assumed to be designed for guerre do 
course operations. In the 1950s, Canadian naval policy and 
0 
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experience meshed into the NATO strategy with an ease not 
". 
present in other areas of defence activity. 
The period 1958-63 marked a turning point in NATO 
strategy and Canadian defence policy. Because sufficient 
conventional forces were not available in Europe, the NATO 
strategy was to reply to Soviet aggression with nuclear 
weapons very early after any fighting began. A prolonged 
campaign was seen as highly unlikely, and therefore North 
American resupply of Europe on a large scale would not be 
possible in time to influence the result. ' Defence of shipping 
against Soviet ug erre de course operations became a much lower 
priority, than before. The new rationale for ASW9 operations 
became defence against the Soviet missile launching sub- 
marines, which began to slowly make their appearance during 
this period. Canadian naval operations became directly linked 
to the nuclear balance in a damage limitation role. 
Initially, Soviet missile launching submarines were few 
in number, carried few missiles (often of the cruise type) 
with short ranges, and were diesel powered. It was not until 
the middle sixties that ballistic missile nuclear powered 
submarines (SSIINs) made their appearance, and not until the 
late sixties that they were deployed in appreciable numbers 
with submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLDM) of rangen ax- 
ceedinq 1,000 miles. In fact, even by the late 1960s there 
may have been no more than two or three deployed off the cast 
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coast of North America at any one time. 
39 
The role and composition of the RCN was little questioned 
in this period. Few questions 'were raised when, in 1960, 
the Minister of National Defence, Major General G. R. Pearkes, 
V. C. (when referring to Soviet missile launching submarines) 
testified to the House of Commons Committee on Defence Ex- 
penditures: 6 
Whereas the original concept of war at sea was 
a requirement to convoy large numbers of ships 
from the North American continent to Europe, 
the outlook is now changed... One of the most 
important tasks of the supreme allied commander 
Atlantic, therefore, is to make provision for 
the detecting, hunting, and killing of hostile 
submarines in th NATO area on the outbreak of 
any hostilities. 
ý0 
In 1963, a Special Committee on Defence was created to 
examine the whole Canadian defence effort. It undertook a 
study of the role and organization of the RCN. The Chief 
of Naval Staff, Admiral INS. Rayner, appeared with Mr. bellyer, 
the now Minister of National Defence, before the Committee 
to present a brief on the RCN and for questioning. Admiral 
Rayner saw the Soviet submarine force as the dominant maritime 
threat to Canada, with Soviet long range aviation and fishing 
fleet activities as lesser threats. Ile defined the purpose 
of the RCN in traditional terms as "To ensure that Canada in 
co-operation with allied and friendly nations will have un- 
restricted use, of the seas in peace and war. "1 On the 
4 
39 
Interviews, Ottawa, October 1973. 
40 
Canada, House of Conunons, ä ecial Committee on Defence 
Expenditures, 24th Parl., 3rd sess., June 3,1960, pp 230-1. 
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assumption that some form of collective defence was ess- 
ential for Canada, the role of the RCN was to support 
Canada's external and defence policies through the provision 
of versatile naval forces. 
By the time Admiral Rayner gave his testimony, the 
Banshee fighters had been retired and not replaced because of 
the difficulties of operating an advanced jet aircraft from 
the Bonaventure. The Second World War Tribal class destroyers 
had been retired or converted to ASW ships. The projected 
replacement for the Tribal class destroyers had been eight 
general purpose frigates which were to carry a dual purpose 
gun and missile armament for use in surface-to-surface and 
surface-to-air engagements. Mr. Itellyer cancelled this project 
almost immediately on becoming Minister in 1963. However, he 
did not cancel the three Oberon class submarines then on 
order. 
Much of Admiral Rayner'n testimony derived from the 
Report of an Ad floc Committee On Naval Objectives which had 
reported in 1962.42 The committee apparently had been directed 
to define the purposes of the navy and make recommendations 
for the future. The report derived its conclusions from its 
appreciation of likely future political, economic and strategic 
conditions. The committee was much concQrned with the con- 
41 
Canada, House of commons, Special Committee on Defence, 
Evidence, 26th Parl., 1st sess., No 4, July 9,1963, p 89. 
42 
The Re ort of the Ad floc committee has never been published 
but the writer was given information on its contents. 
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sequences of the nuclear impasse. It apparently considered 
that general nuclear war was highly unlikely, but that 
limited nuclear or non-nuclear war was quite possible. It 
laid stress oy its forecast that non-nuclear forces would be 
the only kind of military forces that could be rationally 
employed to support policy. It saw the continued need for 
Canada to participate in collective defence arrangements. 
Seaborne trade was considered to be Canada's primary maritime 
interest but the importance of the "maintenance of sovereignty 
in the Arctic" from the maritime aspect was stressed. 
Although ASW was considered to remain of paramount 
future importance, the committee laid considerable emphasis 
on the need for more general purpose forces to preserve 
peace outside the NATO context. The significance of this 
report, presented in 1962, is that it would seem to hate had 
an appreciable influence on the formulation of Mr. tiellyer's 
defence policy. It seems reasonably apparent that the basic 
thinking, certainly on naval policy, had been done by the 
military staffs in the very early 1960s and it was upon this 
analysis that the 1964 White Paper on Defence was based. 
The 1964 White Paper on Defence reiterated, the primacy 
of the A5W role for the RCN or Maritime Command as the RCN 
became in 1964. aß The paper said that the relevancy of dovel- 
oping a capability against missile launching submarines would 
43 
The 1964 White Paper on Defence, pp 14 and 23. 
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be determined largely by the deployment or non-deplyment 
of ABM missile systems. Consideration was being given to 
the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines. The Report of 
the Special Committee was presented three months after the 
1964 White Paper on Defence was published, and it argued 
that Canada could not afford a naval force capable of all 
functions, and therefore must continue to specialize. The 
first priority should be the modernization of ASW ships 
and the second should be the acquisition of ships to provide 
logistic support for naval operations and for the. transport 
of ground forces. 44 This recommendation was in line with 
the general philosophy of the 1964 White Paper on Defence, 
which was to develop a more versatile and mobile capability 
for the Canadian Armed Forces. 
The primacy of ASW operations was reiterated by Admiral 
Landymore, who, appearing before the Standing Committee on 
National Defence in 1966, was relatively confident that the 
threat of the nuclear powered submarine could be met. tie 
saw the best strategy as attacking Soviet submarines when 
they were in transit to their deployment areas. lie considered 
it unwise to commit too many forces to close-in defence of 
North America and suggested that SACLANT should adopt a 
forward strategy and concentrate on the transit routes, rather 
than having forces tied down to small divisions of the oceans. 
44 
Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, ' 
Fourth Report, 26th Parl., 2nd sass., No. 17, October 1,1964 
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His strategic rationale was a somewhat more protracted. 
war at sea than perhaps the NATO European strategy envisaged, 
but'he made it clear that large scale convoying would not be 
a primary task. He saw that in "the earlier stages of an 
emergency our first role would be to clear the high seas of 
shipping, temporarily, so that we could devote ourselves 
to a purely offensive operation, with little or no inter- 
ference from merchant shipping. "45 Once the submarine menaco 
was under control, then the shipping could begin again and 
be given some naval protection. 
For twenty years after the Second World War, Canadian 
naval policy was predicated on maintaining command of the 
sea in contiguous waters with the capability for overseas 
operations in the furtherance of Canadian interests. The 
underlying assumption was that Canadian maritime interests 
and defence requirements were coincidental with those of the 
United States and the NATO alliance. The fundamental interest 
was the continuation of Western naval supremacy to ensure 
command of the seas in war, and to derive the commercial 
benefits from the right to trade freely over-seas in peace- 
time. Canada continued to be a beneficiary of Anglo-American 
naval supremacy. 
What drew Canada into making a substantial contribution 
to the continuation of this supremacy was the acceptance that 
45 
Canada, house of Commons, the testimony of Admiral Landymore, 
Standing Committee on National Defence, Evidence, 27th Parl., Ist sess., No. 12, June 23,1966, p 346. 
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neither a no navy policy nor a small, inshore navy policy 
was applicable to the strategic position of Canada. Canada 
was a terminus of the most vital and vulnerable trade route 
in the world. It was a supplier of vital raw materials and 
had a modern industrial base. What had isolated Canada in 
the past was not geography, but British and United States 
naval supremacy. Any challenge to that supremacy removed 
that isolation and forced Canada to become a naval power. 
But it had to become a naval power in an alliance context, 
because the task of protecting shipping was beyond the re- 
sources of even the greatest naval power operating independ- 
ently after the and of Pax Britannica. The naval expansion 
of two world wars had made it clear that Canada did not have 
the option of allowing another power to provide for Canadian 
naval defence in its own interests. Canada had to do it or 
it would not be done, and the nature of the submarine threat 
made a cooperative effort a strategic imperative. 
The maritime geography of the North Atlantic and the 
development of ocean going submarines precluded an inshore 
naval capability making any practical contribution to ASW 
operations. Canadian naval operations were forced out to the 
extent of the CANLANT Zone-to ensure continuous convoy control 
across the Atlantic. Thin meant warships had to have an ocean 
going capability and a seaworthiness that an inshore navy 
would not require. Because the most likely threat was Soviet 
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submarines and not Soviet surface task forces, ASW operations 
received priority. This led to the construction of a highly 
specialized fleet which replaced the balanced fleet concept 
of the immediate post-Second World War period. 
Although Canada has employed limited naval power more 
often than is generally recognized, the cost of maintaining 
a balanced fleet unit could not be justified. The oceanic 
capability inherent for CANLANT Zone operations did provide 
Canada with means of projecting power overseas, either in- 
dependently on a very limited scale, or by participating in 
a joint operation. 
It was not SACLINT or NATO that determined Canadian 
naval policy, but strategic acceptance of the threat. If the 
threat had been perceived as less, then Canada would have 
retained a more balanced or general purpose fleet. However, 
even if NATO had not been formed, SACLANT would have existed 
informally because of the indivisibility of the North Atlantic, 
and Canadian and European dependence on continued United 
States naval supremacy. Canadian naval policy would have been 
predicated on the likely challenges to United States seapower 
whether or not NATO or continental defence arrangements 
existed., 
The Reopening of the Inshore Navy Debate 
The RCN reached a peacetime peak in number of ships and 
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manpower during the period 1954-1966. This period also 
witnessed a steady trend in ship procurement for ASW operations 
and a decrease in shipholdings for more general purpose 
operations. In 1962, it was decided to build eight general 
purpose frigates to provide a more balanced fleet. This 
programme was cancelled in 1963. A new programme, which 
called for 
four "280" class deroyer escorts equipped with helicopters 
(DDIIs) fitted as "leaders" and capable of point air defence, 
shore bombardment, transportation and helicopter embarkation 
of 200 troops, and ASI1 operations. The construction costs 
of these ships exceeded original estimates because of the 
sophisticated systems that came to be incorporated into the 
design, but they are today probably superior to anything in 
their class. 
The reversion in Canadian' naval policy in the mid 1960s 
to a more balanced and general purpose fleet resulted from the 
belief that non-nuclear and limited naval operations should 
receive more emphasis. Such operations were seen as likely 
to be outside the NATO area and related to peace-keeping 
and peace enforcement operations. The policy was to build 
greater flexibility into the fleet structure, while retaining 
ASW operations as the primary function. The emphasis on a 
naval role in peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations 
was simply the traditional naval role of being able to pro- 
tect naval power over a greater spectrum of conflict situations. 
Peacekeeping provided the rationalization for thc'continuance 
A 
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of a role inherent in the balanced fleet concept. 
The reversion to a more general purpose fleet did not 
moan a weaker navy, but a more flexible one. The additions 
to the fleet, the four 280 DDI[s and three Oberon submarines, 
were war fighting additions. It was a fleet whose primary 
task was the destruction, in war, of Soviet submarines in 
Canadian contiguous waters whatever their mission. It was 
this task which came under criticism in the late 1960s. 
Coupled with the presumed new requirement for sovereignty 
protection, this resulted in the reopening of the inshore 
navy debate which had been dormant since the inter-war years. 
In 1969, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
National Defence had noted that it had not obtained sufficient 
information on Canada's maritime forces. The result was 
the formation of a Subcommittee on Maritime Forces (SCMF) 
in October 1969, which interpreted its terms of reference 
to include "all maritime forces maintained by the Canadian 
Government insofar as these have relevance, or potential 
relevance, for the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in all 
its manifestations and the furtherance of Canadian foreign 
policy with respect to national security and other national 
interests". 4G The immediate political impetus given to the 
Subcommittee was Prime Minister Trudeau's policy of reviewing 
all aspects of foreign and defence policy, and the increasing 
0N 
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attention being paid to the protection of sovereignty, 
particularly Arctic sovereignty. 
The Subcommittee heard considerable evidence about 
the changing nature of undersea warfare and ASW, and paid 
particular attention to the increasing deployment of SLIIM 
submarines, to the development of hunter-killer submarines, 
bottom detection systems, and to the application of under- 
water technologies for military and non-military exploitation 
of the seabed. It concluded that ASW operations against SLI3H 
submarines and anti-shipping submarines were clearly 
differentiated operations. The former were a component 
of an overall defence system involving non-maritime components. 
Witnesses, such as Prof. L. W. Martin, Dr. G. R. Lindsey 
and Rear Admiral J. A. Charles, argued that the priority to 
be given to ASW operations against SLUM submarines was de- 
pendent upon the priority given to AM missile defence. 
47 
The overall priority was related to whether AIM missile 
defence was for damage limitation or for defence of the 
deterrent. If the latter, than the capability of SLBris for 
counterforce first strike operations was the significant 
question. It was stressed by Dr. Lindsay that a capability 
for surveillance to determine extent and pattern of deployment 
was the minimum activity necessary. The Subcommittee was of 
the opinion that it was in Canada's interest "to make a limited 
contribution to the co-operative defence arrangements for 
47 
See also G. R. Lindsay, Canadian maritime Strategy: Should 
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Board, My 1969, in particular Chop 3. 
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surveillance and control off the cast and west coasts of 
Canada. " 48 It considered that Canadian security depended 
upon the preservation of a nuclear balance and the United 
States would probably take over the "policing" of the CANLANT 
zone if Canada did not do it. This was not conbidered to 
be in the national interest. 
The Subcommittee discounted the strategic considerations 
of convoying, limited nuclear war at sea, support of UN 
peacekeeping, and surface operations of a military nature in 
the Arctic archipelago. The primary strategic consideration 
was the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. It concluded that: 
In essence the police function to be exercised is 
a manifestation of national sovereignty. Since the 
countries likely to challenge such assertions for 
commercial or other reasons include the USA and 
other NATO countries, the Subcommittee considers 
that Canadian maritime forces must be capable, un- 
ilaterally of carrying out any increased police 
functions. 49 
For the Canadian contribution to collective defence, 
it concluded that a limited contribution was in Canadian 
interests, but the protection of the U. S. Fleet Ballistic 
Missile Submarines and other Western maritime strike forces 
were not suitable roles for Canada. A combination of forces 
with subsurface capabilities was an appropriate and effective 
48 




contribution of maritime forces to collective defence. 
It was also a means of ensuring that, Canada's allies rec- 
ognize that the responsibility for protecting the maritime 
approaches to Canada lies with Canada. These roles, it was 
considered, should employ similar forces to those required 




The emphasis in Defence in the 70s was on restruct 
Canada's maritime forces "with the long term objective of 
providing a more versatile general purpose capability. "50 
The degree of emphasis on ASW operations against SLBM sub- 
marines was to be reduced. Naval forces would continue 
to be earmarked for assignment to NATO and contribute to 
the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SThNAVFORLANT). Con- 
sideration was being given to the development of a subsurface 
perimeter-surveillance system, particularly to cover the 
channel connecting the Arctic Ocean to Baffin Bay and Baffin 
Bay to the Atlantic Ocean. An under-sea programme of national 
benefit was being developed. 
In 1972, the major functions of Maritime Command were 
spelt out in the*ncw annual review of defence, called Defence 
71. These were: 
51 
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1. to provide surveillance and to maintain sovereignty 
over territorial waters and contiguous seas areas; 
2. to contribute maritime forces and facilities for 
assignment to collective alliances in the defence of North 
America; 
3. to contribute to the maritime defence of the NATO 
North Atlantic ocean areas as well as those areas adjacent 
to North'America to be defended jointly with the United States; 
4. to contribute to international peacekeeping op- 
orations; 
5. to provide emergency communications, quick reacting 
transportation, and engineering and scientific knowledge re- 
quired in the event of disasters or emergencies, including 
those resulting from oil spills or other forms of pollution ; 
and 
6. to command and control Naval Reserves (2,200 all 
ranks) stationed in 16 naval reserve divisions from coast to 
coast. 
The now functions made no mention of defence of shipping, 
but in the annual review Defence 72, the following statement 
on maritime defence appeared under the defence activities 
for North America: 
Virtually all of Canada's trade with its major 
trading partners on other continents is carried 




national interest in ensuring that the oceans 
remain open to this commerce and that, in 
times of international tension or war, control 
of the sea lines of communications and of the 
maritime approaches to Canada do not fall into 
hostile hands. 
In addition to the capabilities required for 
the protection of Canada's maritime interests, 
Canada'. s maritime forces should provide, in con- 
junction with U. S. forces, open ocean surveillance 
of the approaches to North America, and a task 
group for the protection of shipping the Atlantic 
or in the Pacific. They should also provide sur- 
face and subsurface surveillance in those waters 
off the Canadian coasts for which the Canadian 
Maritime Commander is reponsible under existing 
Canada-U. S. and NATO arrangements. 52 
Because of the naval construction time lag, the full 
effects of the new policy will not be felt for some years. 
It does presage a navy with a much lower capability for even 
inshore naval operations in contiguous waters. In the past, 
the policy of an "autonomous" inshore navy has proved in- 
sufficient to meet even minimal naval defence tasks when 
challenged. To what extent a "colonial" attitude has come 
again to dominate Canadian naval policy will notýbe known 
until new ships are provided. The proof will be in the 
eating, not the menu. 
52 




The recent debate over the future Canadian naval policy 
has concentrated on the requirement to protect Canadian 
sovereignty and has downgraded other threats to Canadian 
maritime interests and security. The underlying assumption 
is that these two are not related. The threat to Canadian 
sovereignty comes not from Soviet naval activity, but pri- 
marily from the United States. It assumes that the continued 
maintenance of Western naval supremacy is either not suff- 
iciently threatened or is not sufficiently relevant to 
Canadian security to warrant a continued substantial Canadian 
contribution. It denies the historical tenet that Western 
naval superiority is the sine quo non for Canadian naval 
policy. Some have gone much further and argued that Canada 
can again adopt with impunity tho no navy option. 
53 
Throughout the recent debate, there has been no compre- 
hensive attempt to analyze and define contemporary Canadian 
maritime interests and relate them to naval tasks. "Protection 
of Sovereignty" has been used as an umbrella term to cover 
the unanalyzed and the undefined. The SCMF simply accepted 
53 
Two proponents of this view are Michael Brecher and 
James 
Nayrs. See Michael Brecher, Non-Ali nment, Behind the Headlines, 
Vol XXVIII, Nos 3-4, (Mfay 1969) Cana an Institute of Internationt 
Affairs, and James Eayrs Future Roles for The Armed Forces of 
Canada, Behind the ileadline Vo XXVIII, Nos 1-2, Apr 969) 
Canaan Institute of International Affairs. 
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that Canada "has great maritime interests and obligations 
now and in the foreseeable future there can remain no 
doubt (sic] ý,. 54 
The shift from the traditional naval tasks in the con- 
text of an alliance structure to national surveillance and 
policing tasks has created a vagueness about future naval 
tasks'. The problem is to define the new tasks and design 
the maritime forces to implement them, while still carrying 
out collective defence tasks, which in turn are becoming 
just as difficult to define. 
This apparent dichotomy is more fundamental than that 
between an ocean going navy and an inshore navy, because for 
the first time in its peacetime history, since the 1880s, 
Canada has become conscious of having maritime interests that 
are purely national rather than of collective defence im- 
portance. However, these interests are of a coastal state 
that wishes to bury Grotius, not praise him. 
55 They are in- 
terests of the second largest state in geography with the 
N 
second largest continental margi he world around which flows 
the waters of three oceans. Canada no longer adheres to the 
54 
SCEAND, Tenth Report, p 1. 
5 5 
The theme "'I come not to praise Grotius, but to bury him" 
is a favourite of Mr. Allan Beesley of the Department of External 
Affairs. lie has been the senior Canadian civil servant at the 
LOS III Conferences. 
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Anglo-American tradition of maximum freedom of the seas 
and of viewing the ocean as a common property. Today, the 
Canadian policy is one of creating nationally and inter- 
nationally managed property rights over coastal waters and 
over the oceans. On the conceptual level, it is a turning away 
from the traditional freedom of the seas to a new concept 




COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND CANADIAN NAVAL POLICY 
Now Technologies and Seapower 
In the preceding 'chapter it was noted that professional 
Canadian naval thinking was deeply rooted in the 
British or Anglo-American concepts of seapower. However, 
professional naval thinking found little political 
resonance except in war. A Canadian navy was never 
perceived as an instrument of foreign policy. It was, 
for co ny Canadians, a political liability likely to 
draw Canada into unwanted wars while serving no credible 
defence function. Canada became a naval power in the 
Second World War and afterwards by strategic imperative 
and not by political choice based on any classical 
concepts of seapower of the Mahanian mould. When the 
strategic conditions allowed, Canada opted, by political 
choice, for no navy or at best a small inshore navy. In 
war, Canada accepted that command of the sea was indivisible. 
This view prevailed as the basis of the Canadian contribution 
to NATO supremacy in the North Atlantic. The contribution 
reached its peak at a time when the introduction of new 
technologies was resulting in the questioning of the 
classical concepts of scapower upon which Canadian naval 
policy was based. 
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The classical or Anglo-American concepts of seapower 
derived from experience and historical analyses of 
the uses of seapower during the era of European overseas 
expansion. The primary emphasis was the overriding 
importance of secure sea communications. 
1 
Command of 
the sea and freedom of the seas became equated with the 
ability to use the sea as a highway and to deny this 
ability to your enemy. The underlying assumption was 
"that the sea was indivisible and hence also command of 
the sea. Only one power or alliance could attain world 
wide command; it was not divisible. In peace, all 
states could use the sea, and therefore command of the 
sea did not exist except in war when the seapowor of the 
enemy had been destroyed or neutralized. In the past, 
command of the sea became a fact'only in war, but today, 
"in an era of cold war, limited war, and undeclared war, 
1 Mahan's emphasis on secure sea communications 
is well known. lie went so far as to state that "the 
necessity of a navy ... springs ... 
from the existence 
of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it ... " 
A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon Itistor 1660- 
1783, (Boston: Little Brown, 1911 p 26. Sir Julian 
Cor ett stated that "The object of naval warfare must 
always be directly or indirectly either to secure the 
command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing 
it. " Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strata , 
(London: Longmans Gree i, 1911) p 07. Sir Herbert Richmond 
defined seapower as "that form of national strength which 
enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce 
across those stretches of water, sea and oceans which 
lie between his country or countries of his allies, and 
those territories to which he needs access in war ..., " 
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Sower in the Modern 
World, (, London: G. Boll and Sons, 1934) p 252. 
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the simple and straightforward concept of indivisibilo 
command of the sea loses much of its validity. "2 
Even before the development of nuclear weapons, 
the gaining of command of the hydrospace and the air 
were necessary before command of the sea in its complete 
sense could be achieved. 
3 The land and the sea became 
linked for naval operations. This has allowed coastal 
states, which do not have or do not need an ocean going 
fleet, to develop substantial inshore navies in 
contiguous waters. The development of tactical missiles 
has further supported the efficacy of inshore navies 
backed by land based airpower. Soviet naval policy in 
the immediate post-war period was based on this concept. 
4 
2 
Commander James A. Barber, U. S. Navy, "Mahan and 
Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age, " Naval War College 
Review, Vol XXIV, No 7, (March 1972) p 82. Commander 
har or argues that "in modern naval strategy command of 
the sea is divisible. " p 85. 
3 See Bernard Brodie, A Layman's Guido to Naval 
Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1942) 
pp 148-63 and 175-214 for an early realization of the 
effects of airpowor on naval strategy. Brodie is a 
classicist on sea power defining it as the means which 
enables a nation "to control transportation over the seas 
during wartime. " The airplane was seen as an "instrument 
of seapowor, " p 4. 
4 
See Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty 
Yearn of Theory and Practice, (Annapolis: U. S. Naval 
institute, 1968) and Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval 
Capabilities and Intentions" in The Soviet Union in Euro i 
and the Naar East: Her Ca pabilit as and Intent ans 
Lon on: Roya United Services Institution, 1970). 
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Less powerful coastal states have developed inshore ' 
navies that can at least act as a deterrent to foreign 
naval operations in contiguous waters. 
5 
The technologies of the nuclear age have been 
primarily responsible for lessening the validity of the 
concept of the indivisible command of the sea. It is 
possible today to destroy whole groups of ships by 
using land based and sea and air launched tactical 
nuclear weapons. Clearing the seas of enemy ships will 
not allow use of the seas if land based missiles can be 
targeted continuously on ships at sea by satellite. 
Superimposed on the influence of tactical nuclear 
weapons have been the effects of strategic nuclear weapons. 
The inhibitions on any naval activity likely to cause 
escalation into general war have led to the theoretical 
of the uses of seapower in the nuclear ago. 
6 
The crucial question is whether in the nuclear ago, 
short of general war, it is possible both to use the sea 
There is no study of medium and small navies but 
even a cursory examination of Jane's Fighting Ships over 
the last twenty years demonstrates the expansion omedium 
and small navies. The increasing costs of navies may 
result in a levelling off of this expansion and greater 
emphasis on relatively cheap systems such as missile 
armed gunboats. 
6 
See Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern 
Strategy, The Institute of Strategic Stu es, London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1967) for the use of categories as 
a framework to discuss the relevancy of senpower in the 
nuclear age. See also Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, 
Maritime Strati :A study of British Defence Problems 
London: Cassell, 1965) for an analysis of the influence 
of nuclear weapons on naval tasks. 
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and to deny its use to your enemy; in essence, whether 
command is indivisible or divisible. Certainly, 
contemporary experience, particularly the Vietnam War, 
has demonstrated that the superior naval power, the 
United States, was not prepared to exercise its superiority 
to deny other states use of the sea when it was at war. 
Naval operations in the Middle Eastern and Indo-Pakistani 
wars suggest that command of the sea is divisible. 
7 
This divisibility has arisen at a time when commercial 
and militiary dependence on the sea has increased dramatically 
because of increased seaborne trading, the increased 
demand for the products of the sea, and the development 
of the SSDN as a crucial component of the nuclear balance. 
The SSDN has made dependence upon the sea for 
nuclear powers oven greater. The apparent strategic 
imperative to counter United States SSDNs has probably 
been the primary reason for Soviet naval expansion in 
7 
In the Arab-Israeli wars, the Israelis have 
gained command of the sea against the Arab naval forces 
in contiguous waters but have been unable or unwilling 
to challenge the operations of the Soviet naval forces 
or stop resupply of the the Arabs by sea. In the last 
Indo-Pakistani War, the Indians gained command of the 
sen against the Pakistani Navy but were unable or 
unwilling to do anything about the operations of the 
United Staten, Soviet and British naval forces, which 
were all attempting to influence the outcome. 'See James 
M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly, ýSu orpownr Naval 
Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crites, Professional 
Paper No 8, (February 1973 Center for Naval Analysis, 
Arlington, Virgina. 
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the last fifteen years. 
8 
This expansion has generated 
fears that the Soviets are building a blue water navy 
to challenge Western naval power. The wider the 
deployment of SSBNs, the more extensive have become 
naval operations and base requirements both to protect 
and to attack SSBNs. 
Although the SSBN can be targeted to destroy naval 
formations and bases, it is not designed to play a role 
in any struggle for command of the sea. In practice, 
its role has been restricted to that of an essential 
component of the nuclear balance. However, it is 
extremely difficult to separate naval activity related 
to SSIN operations from other naval activities. The 
continuing debate over Soviet and United States naval 
operations in the Indian Ocean is a prima example of 
this difficulty. 9 Coastal states, whether or not they 
8 
The principal proponents of this thesis are 
Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy and Michael 
MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Capabilities and Intentions. " 
Their thesis appears to be accepted for the period up 
to the late 1960s. The present debate is whether it 
still remains the basis of Soviet naval policy. For 
pro and con argument, sec published papers given at the 
Soviet Naval Developments Conference hold at Dalhousie 
University in 1972,1973 and 1974. In particular see 
Michael MccGwiro, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy 
1960-74. " paper for the 1974 conference. 
9 
The United Staten is constructing a naval base 
on Diego Garcia, presumably related to SSIN operations. 
The Soviets appear to be searching for bases and have 
initiated regular deployments. Determining intentions 
is complicated by the importance of the Indian Ocean 
for other uses. See Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian Ocean 
in Soviet Naval Policy, The International Institute of 
Strategic Stud es, Adelphi Paper No 07, London, May 1972. 
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are involved in alliances with naval functions related to 
the nuclear balance, cannot ignore naval activity in con- 0 
tiguous waters presumably related to the nuclear balance. 
The issue is further complicated by the questions of 
whether operations against SSDUs are possible or advisible, 
in the context of the mutual assured destruction doctrine. 
If a coastal state considers'such operations neither possible 
nor advisable, but a superpower continues them in watersof 
vital interest to that state, what should be its naval 
policy? 
Today the problem is to reconcile the many undoubted 
uses of scapower with the restraints of the nuclear ago. 
This reconciliation is not confined to states that have, 
or aspire to have, large navies, but also to all coastal 
states in and out of alliances. The classical concepts 
of seapower no longer provide (if they over did) a univer- 
sally accepted criterion for naval policy. Because the 
clear division between peace and war no longer obtains, 
naval policies must be adapted to a wide range of tasks 
across a wide spectrum of possible conflicts. The 
requirement is to develop naval policies based on national 
interests and requirements which differ from state to 
state, fron ocean to ocean and from alliance to alliance. 
As long as Canadian naval policy was prcdicatcd on 
contributing to the capability of the U TO alliance to 
gain command of the sea in general war, there was 
little difficulty in defining its tasks. The difficulties 
began once command of the sea became strategically 
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irrelevant and perhaps impossible. The difficulties 
were somewhat disguised by the shift to operations 
against Soviet'SSBNs using the same forces in'the same 
area of operations as before. This task is dependent 
on the Soviets continuing to use contiguous waters for 
transit of SSINs and how, if at all, the United States 
intends to counter Soviet SSBNs. Both of these are 
variables over which Canada has little influence. 
Furthermore, Canada may disagree with the strategic 
correctness of United States policy, but it can only 
opt out of anti-SSBN operations at the risk of losing 
control over contiguous waters. 
The Nuclear Balance and Canadian Naval Policy 
The difficulties of providing credible strategic 
rationales for ASW operations has complemented the 
similar difficulties for air defence. The basic reason 
for this has been the apparent acceptance that active 
defences against Soviet strategic nuclear forces are both 
technologically impossible and destabilizing. The 
United States decision not to construct a nationwide 
I3MD system has relegated the argument over ASW operations 
against Soviet SSINs to whether they have a surprise 
first strike capability. 
Until 1969, when the Yankee c1Ann SSDN with 16 
launchers and with a SLBM range of 1500 nm was introduced, 
the Soviets had difficulty in maintaing a credible seaborne 
nuclear force of much more than three SSBNs at a time 
6 
201 
off the coast of caster 
considerable confidence 
The introduction of the 
4200nm (SS-N-8) and the 
a ceiling on the number 
n North America. 
that these could 
Delta class with 
SALT 1 Agreement 
of SSBNs and SLBI 
There was 
be destroyed. 10 
its SLBM of 
allowing for 
GMs each superpower 
may have, means that'a form of parity in deterrent 
seaborne forces may be reached soon. 
11 
If the ceiling on SL! Ms holds over tho next decades,, 
it is quite possible that there will be fewer SSINs, 
but ones carrying more SLUMs in the pattern of the Trident 
system. 
12 This in itself will not bring any major 
change, but-what is likely to change are the deployment 
areas of SSBNs and new developments in ASW operations 
emphasizing hunter-killer submarines and static bottom 
detection and destruction systems. The combining of 
sonar and new developments in computer technology may 
produce significant advances in ASW operations. 
10 The testimony of Admiral Landymore, SCTAND, 
Evidence, 27th Parl., 1st soss., No 12, June 23,1966, 
pp 339-40. 
11 For the SALT 1 Agreement and analysis see 
The Military 13aßlance 3.972-,, j_9 Dr International Institute 
of Strategic Studies London, 1972, Appendix 1, pp 83-6. 
The Soviet Union appears to be building to its limit of 
62 SSI3Ns and 950 launchers. See United States, Department 
of Defense, United States Militnr Posture for FY 1975, 
Statement by Admiral T comas II. Mooren USN, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Stn Before the House Armed Serv ces 
Committee, n. d., pp 20-2. 
12 
The Trident is to have 24 SLfMs (the Polaris 
class have 16) with a projected total of 10 SSBNs. 
The Trident SSINs are to replace 10 Polaris class and 
by the early 1980s the U. S. will have 26 more SLfMs than 
SALT permits. If the SALT total is to be adhered to, 
then the United States will have to reduce its SSBN total. 
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The deployment of United States SSBNs in waters 
contiguous to the Soviet Union led to the Soviet Navy 
embarking on a forward deployment strategy designed to' 
pose a permanent counter to United States SSDNs and 
carrier force $. This strategy, coupled with the deployment 
of SSßNs, would ensure "that the post-exchange nuclear 
balance was preserved., 
13 This insurance was, and 
apparently remains essential to Soviet doctrine, which 
is primarilya war-winning, rather than a purely deterrence, 
doctrine. 14 
It seems only logical for the Soviet Union and the 
United States to maintain SSBN invulnerability by deploying 
their SSBNs in areas where ASW operations are the least 
possible. In the Soviet case, this would be the Barents 
Sea and mid-ocean wrens. The United States has decided 
to base all ten of its Trident SSBNs at Bangor in 
Washington State to outflank Soviet ASW operations. 
15 
If'those deployments take place, than the requirements 
. for Soviet. SSBNs to use the C1NLANT zone for transiting 
and deployment will decrease over the next decades. But 
13 Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Capabilities 
and Intentions, " p 38. 
14 
It is generally accepted that Soviet doctrine 
has been a war winning doctrine in the sense that the 
objective is to ensure that Soviet society would survive 
a general nuclear war in better shape than United States society. 
15 
See United States, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
Research and Developmenti, 
-April 
Trident Basing, 93rd Congress, 
2nd sass., 5.3000, Part 2,1974, pp 3769-71. The 
basing decision appears to be a precautionary measure to 




the decision to base the Tridents on the west coast may 
have already drawn Soviet naval activity to that coast. 
In August/September 1971, ýa Pacific Fleet detachment 
may have been conducting a reconnaissanceýin force. 
They were intercepted by Canadian naval units. This 
has been considered as presaging a gradual Soviet build- 
16 
up to counter the Trident SSBNs. 
Considerable publicity has been given to under 
the ice operations by nuclear powered submarines, but 
there is no evidence that either the Soviet, Union or 
the United States has used the Arctic ocean as a patrol 
area or transit route. The Arctic Ocean proper consists 
of a series of relatively shallow basins divided by 
ridges and surrounded by broad continental shelves. 
Navigation for SSINs is hazardous and SLAM ranges of 2500nm 
or more are required if the Soviets were to use the Arctic 
Ocean as a deployment area. 
17 
As long as the Soviets consider it necessary to deploy 
SSBNs off the coasts of North Amorica, they have available, 
16 Malifax Chronic]e Itr. rntrl, November 6,1971 and 
Michael MccGwirc "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy, " 
p 15. 
17 
The Soviet Sawfly (SS-N-6) with a range 1500- 
1750 nm mounted on the Yankee class boats could reach 
SACIHQ near Omaha, Nebraska from Hudson Bay or the general 
area of the Northwest Passage. For the difficulties of 
SSDN operations in Arctic waters see the testimony of 
G. R. Lindsey, SCEAND, evidence, 28th Parl., 2nd soss., 
No 34, January 27,1970, pp 192-70. Hubert Scoville, Jr., 
"Missle Submarines and National Security" in Arms Control: 
Readings from the Scientific American, (San Francisco, W. U. 
Freeman, 1973) pp 235-47 contains, with good polar 
projections, an excellent discussion of changing United 
States and Soviet SSBN capabilities. Rccent hydrographic work 
has confirmed that submarines can operate in almost all the 
Canadian Arctic archipelagic waters. 
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in Canadian Arctic waters, an alternative transit route 
to the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdon (GIUK) gap. 
This route is via Canadian Arctic archipelagic waters 
or the Nares Strait (between Canada and Greenland), 
Baffin Day and into the Atlantic or Hudson Bay. The 
Arctic route has had, and continues to have, the advantage 
that Soviet SSBNs could operate totally undetected until 
entering the Atlantic unless trailed by nuclear powered 
attack submarines (SSNs). The disadvantages of hazardous 
under the ice navigation and greater distance seem to 
have caused the Soviets to use the GIUK gap route. 
Canada has been giving consideration to the 
establishment of a limited subsurface perimeter detection 
system in Canadian Arctic waters. 
is Defence in the 70s 
is somewhat vague over the areas to be covered and the 
reason for the system. It suggests that such a system 
would cover the channels connecting the Arctic Ocean 
to Baffin Bay and Baffin Bay to the Atlantic. This 
system would detect both Soviet and United States 
nuclear powered submarines entering the eastern Canadian 
Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. There is no published 
information on the extent of United States involvement. 
There is a joint Canadian-United States bottom detection 
system on the east coast continental shelf, apparently 
called NUTMEG and similar to the United States CEASAR/ 
COLOSSUS system. Canada probably has the necessary 
18 Defence in the 70s, p 18. The subject is mentioned 
under the section on the Protection of Canada. 
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technology to develop a bottom based passive system of 
either real or historical time capability. 
19 
If Canada is moving to develop independently an 
Arctic waters bottom detection system, than such a system 
would be designed presumably for the protection of 
sovereignty. The gaining and passing of information 
about Soviet SSBNs, as a contribution to collective 
defence, would be secondary. If the United States 
is involved to any extent, then this would be a sign 
of its determination to pursue new ASW technolgios in 
an area of great Canadian sensitivity. The thrust of 
Defence in the 70s was the downgrading of ASW operations 
for collective defence., If Defence in the 70s is to be 
believed, and if the United States is involved in the 
sub-surface perimeter project, then again there must 
be differing Canadian and United States threat perceptions. 
Presumably, Canada is adopting its traditional policy 
of making-a sufficient contribution in resources and 
geography to ensure that vital Canadian interests are 
19 For an optimistic assessment of barrier systems 
see John P. Craven, Ocean Tochnoloc in the 1970s, Adelphi 
Paper, No 46, March MB-#--(-London: 1nst tute o Strategic 
Studios, 1960) p 42. There has boon no discussion of 
barrier systems in Canadian defence literature; yet Canada 
has been involved in them for some years. Information on 
these systems is highly classified. See for example, 
United States, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Research 
and Development Subcommittee, Briefings on Undersea Surveillance 
Program for pY 1974,93rd Congress, Ist Bess., 5.1263, 
Part 4, February 1973. The Stockholm International Peace 
Research Yearbook of Wor Armaments anti Disarmament 1969/70 
Chap ap 3, discusses and sts bottom detection systems In 
operation or projected. 
206 
protected. Canada may be getting out of ASW operations 
as traditionally conducted in the CANLANT zone, only to 
continue them with new technologies in Arctic waters. 
Hard evidence on NATO operations in the GIUK gap 
is lacking, but there is evidence that thought is 
being given to new systems. The United States has 61 
nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines, one of whose 
tasks is to track Soviet SSBNs. There are apparently 
many difficulties and "an effort to carry out passive 
acoustic tracking reliably at a range of 10 kilometers 
or more in the face of changing sea conditions, normal 
variations in sound velocity, sea noise and the evasive 
measures readily available ... seems doomed ... to 
failure. "20 There is, however, the alternative of 
active acoustic tracking by sub-surface, surface and 
above surface means in conjunction with detection barriers. 
To carry out successfully a counter SSBN task would require 
the assignment of tracking forces to each Soviet SSBN 
which would "escort" them. 
Another system which may be finding favour is the 
concept of an anti-submarine minefield across the GIUK 
gap. Mines, which have the capability to drive themselves 
either upwards or downwards when they detect a submarine, 
are probably under development in the United States and 
20 
Richard L. Garwin, "Antisubmarine Warfare and 
National Security" in Arms Control, Readings from the 




in the Soviet Union. It may be possible to create"a barrier 
across the 1,000 kilometer strait between Greenland and the 
British Islas., 21 Such a system, until activated, would not 
prevent Soviet, SSBNs from entering the, Atlantic, but on activation 
would preclude further deployment. Some Soviet SSBNs would al- 
ways be at sea, and if the aim was to destroy them before laun- 
ching their missiles, these would have to be tracked continuously 
and destroyed on command. Increased ranges of Soviet SLBMs could 
mean deployment could be restricted to north of the GIUK gap. 
To establish such a system or systems with the clear aim, of 
destroying the presumed invulnerability of Soviet SSIINs would 
be a departure from present United States strategic doctrine. 
It would not be logical to do this unless it was accompanied 
by other measures, such as extensive IMD systems, and accept- 
ance of a doctrine that emphasized defence over deterrence. It 
might be logical if the Soviet SSINS were perceived to have 
a significant first strike capability against United States 
assured destruction forces. 
Both the United States and the Soviets have the strategic 
option of deploying SLIMS with depressed trajectories. The Uni- 
ted States maintains coastal radars to provide early warning of 
SLI3Ms. The greater the range at which 
Soviet SLBMs are detected, 
the greater the time for United States assured destruction forces 
to react. The further away from United States coasts Soviet SSI3Ns 
are deployed, the longer the missile flight and the greater the 
degree of warning. If, however, Soviet SLBMs were fired close 
to United States coasts on depressed trajectories, then 
21 Ibid., p 256 
208 
they would pose a counterforce threat. There has 
been no evidence so far that the Soviets are testing 
depressed trajectories for either the SS-N-6 (fitted on 
the Yankee class) or the SS-N-8 (fitted on the Delta, 
class). However, the SS-9 modification 3(ICBM) has 
been tested in the depressed trajectory role. 
22 Depressed 
trajectories systems would be excellent counters to BMD 
systems. If the Soviet Union should deploy depressed 
trajectory SLDMs, Canadian contiguous waters would 
assume a strategic significance equivalent to Canadian 
air space in the era of the manned bomber. The political 
and military pressures and choices facing Canada would 
be very similar. 
The arguments over the efficacy of counter SSDN 
operations are part of the debate between the minimal 
deterrence school and those who believe there is a 
"delicate balance" which requires constant adjustment. 
If the United States adopts a comprehensive counter 
SSDN strategy, then there would be increased demands on 
Canadian resources and geography. Any barrier system 
across the GIUK gap would have to be continued across 
the Greenland-Canada gap. 
23 Soviet SSflNs operating in 
22 
__ United States, Dcpirt r. nt of II 
fence , Un i tcd S to tas 
Military Posture For FY 1975, Statetnent by Am ra 
Thomas H. Moorer, n. 12. 
23 Present United States ASW policy is to conduct 
attrition operations in the GIUK gap to reduce the enemy 
Hubmarine threat before the submarines reach their 
operational deployment areas. See United States, Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services, Research and Development, 
ASW Operations, 93rd Congress, 2nd sass., S. 3000 
Part 7, April 1974, pp 3551-67. 
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the CANLANT zone would-have to be tracked continuously. 
However, the performance gap between Soviet SSINs and 
Canadian ASW capability could widen if improvements 
are not made in this capability. There could arise the 
paradoxical or ironical situation of Canada becoming more 
involved in highly sophisticated ASW operations for 
continental defence than ever before. Canada would 
be faced with the now traditional question of how 
much Arctic geography should be put at the disposal 
of the United States and how much effort should be 
allocated to ensure that contiguous waters remain 
under Canadian control. 
The above may not come to pass and there are strong 
reasons against the adoption of such strategies. However, 
it does seem that a change in the method of conducting 
)iSW operations is taking place rather than a downgrading 
of ASW operations. This is being caused by technological 
advances that favour the submarine and bottom detection 
and destruction systems over the more traditional systems 
for countering SSBNs. Tho first and continuing priority 
to counter the SS1N will require the maintenance of 
a sophisticated surveillance capability. The Trudeau 
government has accepted this priority by its apparent 
decision to buy a replacement for the Angus long range 
patrol aircraft. 
Canada is already involved with the United States 
in coastal bottom based detection systems. The question 
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of such a system in the Arctic is more complicated. The 
Canadian Antic is losing its strategic significance, but 
there could develop strong United States pressures to 
"close off" the Arctic as an alternative route for 
Soviet SSfNs if the United States decides upon a comprehensive 
counter SSDN policy. The United States motives could 
include national ones that would have little relation to 
continental defence and be inimical to Canadian interests. 
If the changes in NORAD are instituted, as earlier suggested 
are likely, United States involvement in the Canadian 
Arctic will be reduced to a minimum. If the United States 
becomes involved to any great degree in the maritime defence 
of the Arctic, Canada will be faced with a permanent 
United States military presence in the Arctic. This, 
coupled with United states economic involvement in the 
Arctic,, could result in do facto loss of control over the 
destiny of the Canadian Arctic. Whether or not Canada has 
legal sovereignty would be of little importance. 
24 
If Canada wishes to continue to exercise control over 
contiguous waters, then Canada must retain an ASW capability 
to monitor and destroy Soviet SSDNs in these waters for 
the foreseeable future. If few Soviet SSDNs use these 
waters, then less overall effort will be required, but not 
less sophi'scated effort. Canada can never opt out of 
sophiscated ASW operations without accepting United States 
do facto control over Canadian contiguous waters. 
24 For a discussion of do facto and do Jura sovereignty 
see Colin S. ?ý Gray, Canadian Defence Priorit es, pp 126-7. 
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Defence of Shipping and Canadian Naval Policy 
It was the strategic necessity to defend shipping 
that forced Canada to become a naval power. It was the 
influence of new technologies on seapower that destroyed 
the main rationale for Canadian naval policy. Yet there 
remains a degree of uncertainty about eliminating this task. 
This derives from continued Canadian dependence on overseas 
trade and a vague recognition that today's strategic logic 
may not be tomorrow's strategic reality. 
Canadian waterborne trade and shipping is one of 
disparate patterns. Canadian flag shipping with no ocean 
going merchant marine carries nearly 30 par cent of Canadian 
international, watorborne trade. 
25 This derives from the 
extent of Great Lakes and Pacific coastal trading which is 
dominated by Canadian flag shipping. The carriage of the 
remaining 70 per cent is dominated by the flags of Liberia, 
United Kingdom, Norway, Greece, Japan and test Germany. 
Canadian trading within the Western Hemisphere is generally 
over 50 per cent of total Canadian waterborno tonnage and 
is nearly all with the United States, but it does include 
essential bulk imports of oil and bauxite from central and 
South America. 
26 Western Europa accounts for about 23 per 
cent and Japan for about 11 per cent. In terms of value 
of exports and imports, the extent of hemispheric trading 
is even more marked with generally each amountinq to over 
70 por cent of the total value of Canadian exports and 
imports. 
25 
Figures derived from statistics Canada, Shipping 
Report, Part I, annual, Cat. No 54-202. 
26 Ibid. 
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Overseas, as opposed to hemispheric, exports generally 
account for over a quarter of Canada's exports and over 
5 per cent of its GNP. 
The disparity in trading patterns is most marked in 
the export/import tonnage imbalance. Canada traditionally 
has been a bulk exporting state, and today Canada's exports 
to Western Europe and the Mediterranean area are nine times 
the tonnage of its imports and to Japan, 14 times its 
imports. The bulk exports of coal, iron ore and grain 
account for over 65 per cent of overseas exports. 
27 The 
production of these exports is very regionally based; grain 
from the Prairies, coal from Alberta and British Columbia, 
and iron ore from Quebec and Labrador. The main bulk 
imports are oil and bauxite, and if Canada becomes sulf- 
sufficient in oil, the tonnage imbalance will be even 
greater. Canada is not dependent on any vital overseas 
imports other than oil and to a lesser extent bauxite for 
survival. Canada is dependent on overseas bulk exports for 
its high level of prosperity. The recent emphasis on 
increasing overseas trading to lessen dependence on continental 
trading will increase dependence on overseas trading. 
The dependence on overseas bulk exports is most marked 
for the Western Canadian economy. This has become related 
to the growth of Pacific Rim trading in the last two decades. 
By 1972, nearly double the tonnage of Canadian overseas 
27 
Figures derived from Statistics Canada, Shipping 
Report, Part V, annual, Cat. No 54-207. 
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exports went to Pacific Rim countries than elsewhere over- 
seas. 
28 
Japan has become Canada's second most important 
customer after the United States, and 80 per cent of the 
exports to Japan come from the Western Canadian economy. 
The massive exports of, wheat to China and the Soviet union 
have contributed to this new trading pattern. Australia 
has become the largest market for Canadian manufactured 
goods after the United States. The Pacific Rim has become 
a trading area as important to Canada as Western Europe. 
Canada is one of the world's primary sources of 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Any interference 
in seaborne trading that affected Canadian exports would 
have serious implications for Canada, but for some importing 
countries it could be disasterous. Probably Canada'could 
survive economically a serious interruption of seaborne 
trading, but for many states, it could mean economic disaster 
if not starvation. The dependence of other states on 
Canadian exports would make it impossible for Canada to 
avoid being drawn into measures to restore normal seaborne 
trading. 
The question remains whether the contemporary threats to 
seaborne trading arc of sufficient magnitude to require 
Canada to retain a naval capability for the defence of 
28 For an expansion of Pacific Rim trading sec The 
Pacific Rim: An Evaluation of British Columbia Trade 
Opportunities, Government of British Columbia, August, 1972. 
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shipping. 29 Are the threats so minimal that Canada can leave 
any responsibility to the major maritime states? If Canadian 
exports are vital to some states, should they not assume 
complete responsibility for the defence of shipping in their 
own interests? Canada has no ocean going merchant marine, so 
why should Canada maintain a naval capability to defend British, 
German and Japanese shipping? Present Canadian naval policy 
would appear to accept that the threats are not of sufficient 
magnitude to require a defence of shipping capability in the 
future, other than as a very secondary task. 
Canada is concerned with shipping in the North Atlantic, 
and the North Pacific. It is also concerned with shipping for 
military operations in support of NATO and for peacekeeping. 
In the past, Anglo-American naval doctrine had a clear answer 
for the defence of shipping; gain command of the sea. Today, 
analyses of threat and solutions proffered for the defence of 
shipping vary from ocean to ocean, from the scenarios, of 
general war to those of terrorism and piracy. 
In the North Atlantic, the threat is the capability of 
the Soviet ocean going submarine float. The debate has been 
over how the Soviet submarine capability is related to 
strategic intentions and requirements. In essence, has 
the Soviet submarine fleet been primarily designed for 
u9 girre do course operations against Western shipping or 
29 Sir Julian Corbett argued that there was no direct 
relationship between the amount of trade and the force 
requirements for its protection. Rather, the "effective 
vulnerability of seaborne trade is not in direct but in 
inverse proportion to its volume. ' Julian Corbett, Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy, p 280. Whether the second 
statement-holds-true may be debatable, but the volume of trade 
in itself is not a valid premise for basing naval protection 
requirements. 
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for other tasks such as defence of contiguous waters and 
countering United States seaborne deterrent forces. 
30 
The 
fact remains that if the Soviets chose to disregard all 
other tasks they could deploy from the Northern fleet 130 
submarines and from the Baltic Fleet another 67 for ucorre 
do course operations. 
31 Accepting a one in four ratio on 
patrol, the Soviets, at a maximum, could have 50 submarines 
(10 nuclear and 40 diesel) on patrol at any one time. 
32 
It is this potentiality coupled with the dependence of the 
NATO states on overseas shipping that maintains the continuing 
30 
The official United States view is that "Their long 
term objective apparently is to weaken our ties with our 
overseas allies and prevent us from coming to their assistance 
in time of war " and "the Soviet Navy general purpose forces 
have been designed primarily to disrupt our son lines of 
communications and obstruct the projection of our seapower 
across the oceans.  United States, Department of Defense, 
projection of ourseapower across the oceans. United States 
Military Posture for FY 1974, Statement b Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm ral Thomas II. Moorer USN, Before 
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations-, March 26,1973, p 43. 
31 The figures were derived by an analysis of Soviet 
submarine numbers and capabilities as given in Jane's 
righting Shies, 1971-1972. Mr. Elliot Richardson In 1973 stated 
that the Soviets had 275 cruise missile and attack submarines 
to challenge United States sea linen of communication. By 
the late 1970s or early 1980s a large percentage will be 
nuclear powered. United States, Department of Defense, 
Annual Defense Report CY 1974, Statement of by Secretary of 
Defense Elliot L. Richardson Before the Senate Armed services 
Committee on I'Y 1974 Defense Du cat and FY 1974-1878 Program 
March 28,1973, p 36. 
32 
J. L. Moulton, British Maritime Strategy in tho 1970s, 
Royal United Sorvicot Institution for De ence Studies, London, 
July 1969, )\PPx VII, Russian Capability for Submarine War on 
Commerco provides the data for this calculation. 
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concern, even though the political and strategic inhibitions 
against Soviet guerre de course operations would appear 
to be very strong. 
33 
The scenarios are almost endless about how the 
Soviets would conduct a guerre de course campaign, and 
how NATO should react. The crucial question is whether a 
guerre do course operation could be conducted without 
escalation into general war. Because the question is 
unanswerable, the threat will remain as long as a Soviet 
ocean going attack submarine fleet exists. The vital 
significance of the North Atlantic to North America and 
Europe means that as long as oven a minimal threat exists, 
there will also have to be a naval capability to impose 
at least a "maritime pause" to provide time for finding an 
option between surrender and escalation. 
34 
The naval means employed for the defence of shipping 
may change, but any system must be complete across the Atlantic. 
If Canada should withdraw from all responsibility for the 
defence of shipping, then the resulting vacuum will be filled 
in an emergency by the United States as best it can. The 
inability to defend shipping in contiguous waters would moan 
that Canada would not only lose control over its contiguous 
33 
See ibid. For the opposite view see Sir Arthur 
Ilezlit/, "The submarine in Naval Warfare, " NATO's Fifteen 
Nations, Oct-Nov 1971, Vol. 16, No 5, pp 42-46. 
34 See Lawrence 11. Martin, "The Defence of Merchant 
Shipping, " NATO's Fifteen Nations Oct-Nov 1971, Vol. 16, No 5, 
p 31 for the concept of the maritime "pause" . 
0 
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waters but also over its ovurseas trade. 
35 Canada would 
have minimal influence over what Canadian exports were 
shipped and where. The United States would be in position 
to direct Canadian exports through United States ports to 
United States determined destinations. Even if the interruption 
to normal shipping was short, the damage to Canadian trading 
patterns could be extensive. Even an overt threat could 
make Canadian overseas trade an appendage to that of the 
United States. 
The means to ensure the safe passage of shipping may 
change from the historically successful convoy system. 
If the anti-submarine minefield meets performance expectations, 
then it could prove a key system in limiting any Soviet 
quarre do course operations. Again, if such a system was 
deployed across the GIUK gap, an equi, nlent system would 
presumably he necessary to block Arctic gateways. The 
inability of surface ships to support this system could 
result in the need for nuclear powered submarines. Also, 
again, if Canada wants to maintain control in waters of vital 
ij-)ortanco, then it musst be prepared to maintain the necessary capability. 
A sopliiscated un r the ice capability is not one that can be acquired quickly, 
The perceived threat of Soviet ug erro do course operations 
may not increase above the present level, but it cannot be 
dismissed in the foreseeable future. Canada has a clear 
and permanent interest in the maintenance of an ASW capability 
. 35 In the Second World War, the United States assumed 
extensive control over shipping from North America. See 
Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Vol II, Activities 
on Shore During The Second World War, pp 382-3. 
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that can ensure the defence of shipping in waters contiguous 
to Canada. In the Canadian Arctic waters this may 
require bottom detection systems and an under the ice 
capability. In the CANLANT zone, the more traditional 
surface and air capability may suffice. 
Although the Soviets maintain an attack submarine force 
in their Pacific Fleet, an overt challenge in the form of 
guerr do course operations seems highly unlikely. Rather, 
the threat lies in the interruption of international 
shipping because of localized conflicts. Increased coastal 
state jurisdictional claims by states such as Indonesia 
and the Philippines may pose a threat to shipping. However, 
the vast bulk of Canadian trade does not pass through the 
commercially and strategically significant water passages 
in South East Asian waters. 
36 In fact, very little Canadian 
trade today passes through waters that are likely to be 
in jurisdictional dispute. Thera is no conflict of interest 
between Canadian coastal waters jurisdictional claims and 
Canadian overseas trading patterns. For Canada, the 
"freedom of the seas" principle applies only in the oceanic 
areas of the North Atlantic and North Pacific where there 
are no jurisdictional disputes and none are foreseen. 
The threat to Canadian scaborno trading in the Pacific 
lies outside the context of cold war scenarios. The threat 
36 In 1972, just under a million tons passed through 
South East Asian waters that originated from Vancouver, 
and just over one million tons from the Atlantic coast 
ports, compared to the total Canadian overseas export tonnage 
of 80 million tons. 
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is in the possibility of serious disputes involving China, 
the Soviet Union and Japan. A confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and China could be extended to interference with 
the importation of vital commodities such as wheat by 
China. Japan could be involved in disputes that would have 
maritime extensions. The traditional principle of the right 
to trade freely for non-belligerants would be the main 
issue, and its resolution could require some form of 
joint naval action. A failure by Canada to make a naval 
contribution would mean that Canadian commercial interests 
would be sacrificed to those states that did so. China and 
Japan would be beholden to purchase United States and 
Australian wheat rather than Canadian. Whether or not 
Canada decided to make a naval contribution, the lack 
of a suitable naval capability would leave Canada with no 
option but to sacrifice its commercial interests by default. 
Oversons Commitments and Canadian Naval Policy 
As long as Canada maintains ground forces for overseas, 
there will be a requirement for the defence of military 
related shipping. The Canadian air lift capacity is insuf- 
ficient to supply even a battalion group 
in operations, for 
example, in northern Norway. 
37 The majority of supplies will 
have to come by sea and these will require protection. 
This also applies to any peacekeeping/peace enforcing 
37 The writer was an air trans-shipment officer for 
Exercise Winter Express in 1966. For this exercise much 
cargo had to come by sea, even with the largest airlift 
in Canada's military history. 
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operations. A number of commentators have ruled out the 
naval requirement as "inconceivable given today's political 
climate. "38 The difficulty with this assessment is two- 
fold. First, Canadian governments have a habit of accepting 
commitments which declaratory policy and logic suggest are 
more than unlikely. The Canadian expeditionary forces sent 
to South Africa in the Doer War, Russia in 1918, ! tong Kong 
in 1941, Korea in 1951 and more recently peacekeeping 
forces for the Middle East, Vietnam and Cyprus are prime 
examples. Canada in 1974 had more troops on peacekeeping. 
duties in the most volatile situations since Canada first 
went into peacekeeping, and after peacekeeping had been 
relegated to the lowest defence priority. 
The second difficulty is the assumption that if anything 
goes wrong, the presumed coincidence of superpower interest 
will save the day. In 1967, when Egypt ordered the United 
Nations Emergency Force'(UNEF) out, the Canadian contingent 
only just got out because Canada had the necessary air lift 
and put on a naval demonstration that apparently was instrumental 
in the Egyptian decision to allow the Canadians to be flown out39 
38 Colin S. Gray, Canada's Maritime Forces, p 25. 
39 Interviews, Ottawa, October 1973. There is no mention 
of this use naval power by Canada in James Cable, . 
(unboat 
Diplomacy: Political 11 lications of Limited Naval Force, 
Studies in International security, No 16, The Institute of 
Strategic Studies, (London: Chatto & Windur, 1971). ! 1e does 
note the Anglo-Canadian task force deployed off Lgypt after a 
coup d'etat in 1952. Canada provided one of the two aircraft 
carriers, p 211. Commander W. A. B. Dougles in his "Canada and 
the Withdrawal of th^ United Nations Emergency Force, " Canadian 
Defence Quartnry, Vol 2, No 3, (Winter 1972/73) states ate" n 
soon as the crisis began to deepen, three Canadian warships 
had been despatched towards the Mediterranean in case withdrawal 
would have to bd carried out by sea. " p 50. 
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The other contingents did not have this recourse and suffered 
in the ensuing fighting. A serious deterioration in the 
position of the Canadian Cyprus contingent in 1974 could 
have required a naval demonstration. In fact, it could have 
been the only option open to Canada to protect the Canadian 
troops. The presumed coincidence of superpower interests 
presaged by detente appears to have some limitations. 
The protection of Canadian peacekeepers may or may not be a 
high priority with the superpowers*in the era of detente. 
It is possible to construct numerous scenarios demonstra- 
ting the use of Canadian naval power in support of overseas 
commitments and it equally possible to rule them out. Yet 
the fact remains that overseas commitments and operations 
are apparently here to stay for the foreseeable future. As 
long as this situation continues, there will be a naval 
requirement to support such operations; the form being 
decided by events unlikely to be under Canadian control. 
The requirement to maintain naval forces for independent 
use overseas is the most difficult requirement to justify. 
There is the requirement'to evacuate Canadian nationals. A 
destroyer was sent to stand off South Vietnam in 1973 while 
Canadian truce supervisors were operating, though this 
activity hardly falls under the heading of gunboat diplomacy. 
Scenarios can be developed to envisage Canadian warships 
engaging in gunboat diplomacy to protect Canadian nationals, 
to escort Canadian ships in areas of dispute, and to provide 
limited protection to Canadian overseas interests. Such 
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scenarios may*have increasing merit because of the expansion 
of Canadian overseas interests' and the growing intra- 
state and inter-state conflicts in the developing world. 
Canada, for example, has large interests in the West 
Indies and in some islands it is the dominant foreign 
(imperial) economic power. In the tourist season the 
islands suffer a large influx of Canadians. ' In today's 
climate of terrorist activity, it is quite possible that 
serious disturbances could threaten the lives of a relatively 
large number of Canadians marooned on an island. The 
pressure on the Canadian government to use the "navy" 
would be considerable. Canadian governments, when pressed, 
find little difficulty in disregarding previous declaratory 
policies. 
40 The retention of a naval capability to intervene 
on a limited scale in areas where Canadian nationals and 
interests arc threatened will remain a naval requirement 
for the foreseeable future, however difficult it may be 
to construct supporting scenarios to justify it. The 
40 
Canadian naval activity in the Caribbean has been 
"redolent of gun-boat diplomacy" on five occasions between 
1915 and 1963 see Richard A. Preston, "The R. C. N. and Gun- 
Boat Diplomacy in the Caribbean", Military Affairs, Vol XXXVI 
No 2, (April 1972) pp 41-3. The recent Nigerian Civil War 
is an example of Canadian involvement against the wishes of 
the government. Basically the government supported the 
Nigerian "Federal" government but humanitarian motivated 
pressures resulted in using the armed forces transport 
aircraft to airlift supplies into Biafra. In another 
similar situation, the government could decide to use 
naval vessels because they would be more suitable. It 
is unwise to have too rigid scenarios about what Canadian 
governments would do or not do when faced with real 
situations. 
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requirement can be met from normal naval forces as long 
as an oceanic capability is retained which is capable of 
operations in a limited hostile environment. 
Options and Collective Defence 
Canadian security is ultimately dependent upon the 
avoidance of nuclear war between the United States and the 
Soviet Union41 and hence the importance to Canada of the 
nuclear capabilities and strategies of both states. ICBMs 
have reduced the requirements for air defence, but neither 
superpower has ceased in its efforts to develop the necessary 
technologies and strategies to counter the SSDN. Nor is 
there any evidence that either intends to do so in the 
foreseeable fut-e. 42 The technologies and strategies to 
counter the SSIN are likely to continue to emphasize 
underwater operations over surface operations against the 
SSBN, but not necessarily for other ASW requirements 
such as the defence of shipping. This has resulted in a 
growing incompatibility between naval forces required for 
SSDN counter operations and other naval tasks. 
For Canada, the structual reconciliation of a more 
general purpose naval capability with a continued operational 
41 Defence in the 70s, p 6. 
42 The United States effort remains extensive particularly 
in research and development; see United States, Senate, 
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, 93rd 
Congress, 2nd sass., in S. 3000, Part 7, Research and Develop- 
mentI ASW Operations April 15,1974 pp 3551-3617. The 
Soviets are building the new "Kuril" class carriers apparently 
for ASW operations. if the "Kuril" class develops into a 
strike carrier class, this would be a clear indication 
that loss emphasis is being placed on ASW operations. 
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requirement to counter SSIINs may prove more difficult 
that is presently foreseen. The present policy of emphasizing 
surveillance is based on the assumption that the requirement 
for operations to counter SSDNs is lessening and perhaps 
will become non-existent. The main weakness is that a 
change in Soviet naval strategy could result in Canadian 
waters becoming of even greater importance than in the past. 
This change could result from the development of a 
United States MID system and a successful system to counter 
the SSI3N that would force Soviet SSINs to use Canadian 
waters. Canada would be in the same political and military 
predicament as it was in the Second World War and in the 
1950s over air defence. 
The passive surveillance option is only viable if there 
is very minimal or no use of Canadian waters by Soviet SSONs: 
If. there is more than minimal use, the surveillance capability 
would have to be upgraded and include a credible destruction 
capability.. This could only be done through collective 
defence arrangements and the greater the Canadian participation, 
the less united States involvement in Canadian waters. 
The task of maritime defence in contiguous waters can 
no more be dissociated from the naval strategies of the 
superpowers today, than it could be dissociated from 
contributing to Western naval capability to gain command of 
the seas in the past. In the past, there were basically 
two options for Canadian naval policy: no navy, or a navy 
that could make a substantial contribution in war to gaining 
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command of the seas. Today, the options are still two: 
Canada can opt out of any maritime defence related to the 
nuclear balance, or make a credible contribution as part of 
a collective defence arrangement. 
The adoption of a. passive surveillance policy has blurred 
the choice between the options as did the inshore naval 
policy in the past. The inshore naval policy was in fact 
the adoption of a no navy policy and it failed when tested. 
The passive surveillance policy can serve only as a credible 
option if the naval strategies of the superpowers do not 
require use of Canadian contiguous waters. If they do 
so require, then Canada has chosen, by default, a no navy 
policy. 
The price for a no navy policy will be paid for in 
peacetime. It will take, the form of the loss of any means 
of controlling Soviet and United States activity in 
contiguous waters and greater pressure for United States 
involvement in Canadian defence. Canada, by default, 
will have lost its principal means of control: a naval 
capability to ensure a reasonable degree of control over 
foreign naval operations in contiguous waters. 
The loss of control will take place in peacetime and 
will be for an indefinite period. It will severely restrict 
the ability of Canada to undertake naval tasks which should 
be 
purely national responsibilities. The emergence of new 
Canadian maritime interests in contiguous waters has produced 
a requirement to protect these interests. Their protection 
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cannot be an alliance responsibility. The naval requirements 
for operations in contiguous waters, independent of any 
alliance arrangements, are at the core of the debate for 




NATIONAL MARITIME INTERESTS AND CANADIAN NAVAL POLICY 
New Technologies and the Emergence of New Maritime Interests 
The influence that new technologies have had on 
soapower-has been complemented by their influence on the 
maritime interests of coastal states. Canadian maritime 
interests before the 1960s were one-dimensional, that 
is, predominantly concerned with oceanic surface shipping 
in peace and its protection in war. In the 1960s 
new maritime interests emerged, which were both coastal 
and multi-dimensional, encompassing large areas of contiguous 
waters and the continental margin. The emergence of new 
maritime interests in offshore fishing, offshore oil and 
gas potential, and in the Arctic has led Canada to adopt 
the policy of functional national control over coastal 
waters and sovereignty over the continental margin. 
These new maritime interests are not divorced from 
Canadian continental developments, but part of them. For 
the first time in Canadian history, `there is a common= 
ality of maritime interests between maritime Canada 
and continental Canada. It is this commonality of interest 
that has changed Canadian maritime perceptions. For the 
first time, it is possible to speak of national maritime 
interests that can be readily perceived as such by Canadians 
in peacetime. 
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Canada, in accordance with many other coastal 
states of the world, has adopted the policy of claiming 
as national property the renewable and non-renewable. 
resources of its coastal waters and continental margin. 
Canada has found a new frontier, a maritime frontier, 
to exploit using the traditional instruments of Canadian 
continental expansion: occupation from a. contiguous and 
firm base; military/police/civil presence; diplomatic 
efforts to obtain recognition of Canadian sovereignty; 
and national legislation that supports Canadian claims, 
but is often less than explicit in affirmations of 
sovereignty. 
Offshore Fishing 
It was the Canadian fishing industry which first 
felt the impact of new marine technologies. The arrival 
in the 1960s off both coasts of high technology foreign. 
fishing fleets has dramatically increased fishing in 
contiguous waters. The overfishing on the Atlantic coast 
has reached serious proportions. rishing catches in the 
International Convention for the North Ilest Atlantic 
Fisheries (ICN! F) area, stretching from Greenland to 
off the American cast coast, reached a peak in 1968 of 
4.5 million metric tons but declined by 1972 to 4.2 million 
metric tons. In 1964, the Canadian percentage of the total 
ICNAF catch was 22.7 par cent and by 1970 had risen to 28 
per cent as the direct result of increased Canadian offshore 
fishing. However, by 1972, Canada had dropped back to 
11 1 
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the 1964 level while the Soviet Union had increased 
its percentages, ' rising from 17.7. per cent in 1964 to a 
high of 27 per cent in 1972.1 Similar increases have been 
recorded for Poland and East Germany. These percentage 
increases resulted from overfishing of the maximum 
sustainable yield of many stocks. The Atlantic coast 
herring fishery collapsed completely, and the cod 
fishery. may be in balance. 
The depletion of stocks has become a world wide 
phenomenon. It is now estimated that the total global 
catch cannot go any higher than 100 million tons . 
from the 
present 70 million tons. 
2 
This has produced growing 
demands for coastal state control over coastal fisheries. 
In Canada's case, 'the demand is for fisheries jurisdiction, 
to be extended to 200 miles or to the edge of the continental 
margin, whichever is greater. 
3 
Furthermore, Canada wants 
to take all the fish it needs (or can market), but would 
be prepared to make any excess available to 
1 
Percentages derived from Annual Statistical Review 
of Canadian Fisheries, Vol 5,1957-72, Ottawa, 1973, 
Table 3, p 20. 
2 
Address by Ken Lucas, Senior Assistant to Deputy 
Minister, Fisheries and Marine Serivice, Government/Industry 
Seminar with Atlantic Coast Fishermen, Lor Nelson Hotel, 
Halifax, N. S., 4/5 April 1973. For the implications of 
this natural ceiling see Lester R. Brown, "The Next Crisis? 
Food, " Foreign Policy, No 13, (Winter 1973-74) pp 3-33. 
3, See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1973 
p 8. This document was used as the basis of SCEAND's 
hearings into Canada's position at the Law of the Sea 
Conference III. SCEAND, Evidence, 29th Parl., 1st sess., 
No 22, November 6,1973, Appendix ii, pp 30-46. 
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other countries under suitable Canadian control provisions. 
A 200 mile limit encompasses all the Pacific continental 
shelf fisheries and about ninety per cent of, the Atlantic 
coast fisheries. It is unlikely for some years that 
Canadian fishermen could utilize all the fish now being caught 
in the ICNAF sub-areas off the Canadian east coast. Some 
foreign fishing is likely to continue for some time even if. 
Canadian coastal management is attained. 
The potential for expansion of the Canadian fishing 
industry is appreciable if foreign fishing is excluded or 
restricted. On the Atlantic coast alone, the potential is 
probably two or three times the 1972 Canadian catch of 
854,000 metric tons. 
4 It has been estimated that by 1980 
the market value of Canadian fish caught could double to one 
billion dollars. ' Canada certainly would become the largest 
fish exporting state in the world. 
6 
4 The potential is based upon the estimated maximum 
sustainable yield. One entimato based on the rood and 
Agriculture Organization and the Canadian Department of 
Fisheries is 2.8 million metric tons for cod, small flatfish, 
haddock, red rish and herring, the main species fished 
internationally in the ICNAF zone. The margin of error may 
range from plus 45 to minus 45. See John M. A. McKay, The 
Furture for Man ower in the Canadian Sea Fisheries: A 
Framework for Strategic Planning, Department o Manpower 
and Immigration, January 1972, pp 9-10. 
For the billion dollar estimate see Fishing Limits 
and the nigh Sons, Noten for a speech by the Honourable Jack 
Davies, Minister of II' eher es, Car eton-C iar otte L era 
Assoc ration, Annual Meeting, St. Andrews, 
N. B., May 26,1973, 
p 9. The figure for 1972 wan $519.2 million. 
6 Canada exports generally over 70 per cent of its 
catch and ranks fourth in the world with $282.1 million 
(1971) compared to first ranking Japan with $367.4 million. 
Because of the small Canadian market any increase would be 
largely exported. 
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This potential is in balance because of depleting stocks 
caused by extensive high technology Canadian and inter- 
national fishing. 
Offshore Oil and the Continental Margin 
Drilling for offshore oil and gas began off Canadian 
coasts in . 1965 and by 1973,80 wells had been drilled.? 
There have been no commercially significant finds but 
some interesting ones on Sable Island, in the Gulf of 
St. Lawrence and off the Labrador coast. The estimate 
of ultimate recoverable potential on the cast and west 
coasts is 51.1 billion barrels of oil (B. bbls) and 
328.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas. 
8 
This is about 
50 per cent of the total Canadian potential excluding 
the 300.2 B. bbls from the Alberta Tar Sands. Canada 
imports all its oil needs for the areas cast of the Ottawa 
Valley with the remainder of the country supplied from 
Western Canadian sources. Western Canadian oil reserves 
are due to run out by the early 1980s. The search for 
national self-sufficiency in energy has become a national 
imperative in which offshore oil is a significant factor. 
7 Statement of the Minister of Energy, Mines and 
Resources, Mr. Donald Macdonald, SCEAND, Evidenen, 29th 
Parl., 1st sess., No 27, December 12,1973, Appendix N, 
p 39. In the North Sea it took 400 exploratory wells to 
find six commercial gas fields and about 10 exploitable 
oil fields, for an overall success ratio of 1 in 25. 
This is considered to be an extremely high success ratio 
compared to most sedimentary basins. 
8 
Ibid., Appendix 0, p 82. For a recant study on 
east coast offshore oil and its potential consequences 
for Atlantic Canada see M. D. Gibbons and R. Voyar, A 
Technological Assessment System: A Case Study of East 
Coast o fs ore Petroleum Exploration, Science Council of 
Cana a Background study, No 30, Information Canada, 
(March 1974). 
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The development of offshore oil potential solely 
or mainly for Canadian use may be complemented by the 
adoption of policies designed to maximize Canadian benefits. 
Crucial to such policies will be the decision to restrict 
the participation of offshore support fleets to the 
Canadian flag. 9 This, of course, is United States policy 
and it will probably be essential if the Canadian maritime- 
oriented industries are to benefit substantially from 
offshore oil. Such a decision would be a clear indication 
that Canada was adopting a protectionist policy towards 
its maritime interests rather than a continuance of 
laissez-faire policies. The more protectionist Canadian 
maritime policies become, the less favourably received will 
be the extensive Canadian claims to sovereignty over the 
continental margin. 
The continental margin of Canada is the second 
largest in the world. Excluding the continental rise, 
which Canada claims as part of the margin but is not 
easily delineated, the Canadian shelf and slope comprise 
a total area of about 2.3 million square miles,. which is 
9 
See H. J. Darling, Report of Inquiry on the Coasting 
Trade of Canada and Related Marine Activity, Canadian 
Transport Commission, Ottawa, 1970. The Darling Report 
has been one of the most influential factors in changing 
government thinking. It argued very forcefully for 
the restriction of coastwise shipping, and in particular 
offshore oil support shipping, to the Canadian flag. The 
government has decided to withdraw from the Commonwealth 
Merchant Shipping Act (1931) so as to restrict coastwise 
shipping to the Canadian flag, but as yet has not im- 
plemented the recommendation for offshore oil support 
shipping. 
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about half as large as Canada's' entire land area. 
The continental shelf on the Pacific coast is narrow, 
ranging from 50 to 100 miles. However, the maximum 
width off Nova Scotia is about 150 miles; off the south 
coast of Newfoundland it is about 300 miles; off the 
east coast of Labrador about 125 miles; and off the 
Arctic it varies from 50 to 300 miles. The continental 
margin off Newfoundland goes out to about 650 miles in 
the Flemish Cap area. 
The distances have significance if international 
agreement should be reached in limiting national juris- 
diction of the continental shelf to an economic zone of 
200 miles or to the 200 metre isobath and eliminating 
any further exploitability distance clause-10 If a limit 
of 200 miles wore agreed to, Canada would gain 117,000 
square miles on the west coast but lose 320,000 on the 
east coast, where over one half the total permits for 
petroleum exploration have been issued and cover an area 
11 
of 500,000 square miles. It is on the oast coast, in 
10 This is more than a possibility. See Douglas M. 
Johnson and Edgar Gold, The Economic Zone in the Law of 
the Sea: Survey, Analysis and Appraisal of Current Trends, 
Occas onal Paper No 17, (June 1973)* Law of the Sea 
Institute, University of Rhode Island. They estimated 
in 1973 there were 70 states favouring an economic zone 
but with a limit of 200 miles. p 16. See also SCEAND, 
Evidence, 29th Parl., 1st sass., No 22, November 6,1973, 
tcsti mony of Mr. Sharp, Minister of External Affairs, pp 22-5. 
11 
D. G. Crosby, Authorization and Control of Offshore 
Oil and Gas Activities, Speech to the International Assoc- 
iation for Pollution Control, Montreal, June 5,1973) p 2. 
Mr. Crosby was Director, Resource Management and Conservation 
Branch, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. 
2 3.4 
an arc of 2,000 miles stretching from the Gulf of Mexico 
in the south to Baffin Bay in the north, where the geolo- 
gical conditions appear to favour the finding of petroleum. 
Canada "claims and exercises rights over the whole 
of the continental margin comprising not only the 
physical continental shelf but the continental slope and 
12 
rise as well. " The Canadian position is based on three 
legal foundations. First, there is the 1958 Convention 
on the Seabed, which is the only convention of the 1958 
and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences that Canada has 
ratified, and only then in 1970. The Convention defined 
the limits of the continental shelf in very elastic 
terms; the limit being either to a depth of 200 metres 
or beyond that depth that will admit of exploitability. 
The second legal foundation is the 1969 legal decision 
of the International Court of Justice which divided up the 
North Sea continental shelf among the bordering states. 
The third legal foundation is state practice. The 
present Canadian position on the law of the sea emphasizes 
the role of state practice because "Unilateral solutions 
are perhaps the oldest means of developing inter- 
national law; state practice often develops into 
custom and eventually into norms of international 
12 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, p 15. See also Statement o the Min-inter o 
Energy, Mines and nosources, SCEANU, pp 36-7. 
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law, l3 
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention, which defined the 
limits of exploitation, was incorporated into the Oil 
and Gas Production and Conservation Act, 1972 (RSC, C. 30). 
This states that the Act applies to those 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada 
to a water depth of two hundred metros or beyond 
that 1 mit to where theo th of the superadjace 
waters adm_is of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the seabed and subsoil thereof. 
(Chapter 0-4,3(b), emphasis added). 
The Canadian position on the use of the shelf for 
military purposes was made clear by the Canadian delegate 
to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in May 
1969. Mr. Ignatieff, when discussing reserving the sea 
and seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
exclusively for peaceful uses, stated the Canadian 
position was that: 
... we cannot accept the proposition that Canada 
should be prohibited from placing in coastal 
waterways, straits and the ocean depths at far 
greater distances than twelve miles surveillance 
devices which can detect the approach to our shores 
of ships, submarines or weapons, so long as 
those military vehicles have freedom to navigate 
in the approaches to our shores. 
13 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
The e , a. 7, Fo ra defence o Canadian actions see A. L. Gotlieb, Deputy Minister of Communications and C. M. Dalfen, 
Professor of Law, University of Toronto, National Juris- 
diction and International Responsibility: New Canadian 
Approaches to International Law, Speech at the First 
Annual Conference of the Cnnndinn Caunc 1 fln Internntionsal 
L`w, October 13,1972. The authors argue that Canadian 
anti-pollution legislation is functional, preventative 
and non-acquisitive, p 31; but the Canadian position on 
"ultra-territorial resources is virtually acquisitive. " 
p 40. 
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Moreover... it is difficult to reconcile the 
coastal State's sovereign rights with freedom 
of military activity of any sort by foreign 
states on its continental shelf: Certainly Canada could not ajýept such activity on its 
continental shelf. 
Arctic Waters 
The new offshore oil technologies combined with the 
national imperative for self-sufficiency in energy 
has resulted in an explicit Canadian sovereignty claim 
to the second largest continental margin in the world. 
But, it was the Manhattan voyages of 1969 and 1970 that 
produced the greatest impact upon Canadian policy. 
is The 
voyages amplified for Canada the interrelationship 
between new maritime technologies, national resource 
policies, and Arctic waters sovereignty. The Manhattan 
voyages were predicated on using advanced surface shipping 
technology to transport Alaskan oil to the cast coast of 
the United States through the Northwest Passage. Canada 
was concerned primarily for three reasons; sovereignty, 
the ecology, and the effects on national planning for 
the exploitation of Arctic resources. 
The question of sovereignty in both polar regions 
still continues to exercise the skills of politician and 
jurist alike. In the Arctic, the issue of sovereignty 
14 
United Nations, ENDC/PV 410, (May 13,1969) pp 6-7. 
15 
For Canadian and United States descriptions of 
the voyages see T. C. Pullen and A. N. G. Stors, "SS Manhattan 
in Arctic Waters, " Canadian Geographical Journal, Vol LXXV, 
No 5, (May 1970) pp 166-81 and Bern Keating and Thomas 
Sonnet, "Through the Northwest Passage for Oil, " The 
National Geographic, Vol 137, No 3, (March 1970) pp 374-91. 
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over readily definable land has been settled, but 
the contiguous water and ice covered areas remain 
areas of dispute. 
16 
The uniqueness of the Arctic en- 
vironment complicated the issue of sovereignty in 
the past and does so even more today when related to 
territorial waters, ice islands, undersurface navigation, 
and the use of airspace. 
Todiy, the issue of Arctic sovereignty has become 
entwined with the disputes over the law of the sea. 
It is the maritime aspect of the Arctic region as a 
quasioceanic area and the application of the traditional 
legal principle of "freedom of the seas" to the region 
that has caused the present disputes to arise. Both 
Canada and the Soviet Union have adopted policies 
of restricting the principle of the freedom of the 
seas in Arctic waters in opposition to the United 
States which supports the principle. 
17 
16See Gordon W. Smith, "Sovereignty in the North: 
The Canadian Aspect of an international Problem, " 
Arctic Frontier, ed., R: St. MacDonald, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1965) pp 226-50. 
17For 
the Soviet position see William E. ßulter, 
The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, (Baltimore and 
Laic i: The John-Hopkins Press, pp 113-4. For 
United States attempts, using icebreakers, to challenge 
Soviet sovereignty/control sec Capt. Gerald C. Synhorst, 
"Soviet Strategic Interest in the Maritime Arctic, " 
Naval Review Issue, Proceedings, United States Naval 
Institute, Vol 99, No. 843 (May 1973) pp 98-101. 
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The United States has been concerned about the right 
of passage through the Northwest Passage because of its 
possible economic and strategic significance. The two 
voyages of the SS Manhattan only highlighted the problem 
of jurisdiction for surface traffic. In 1960, the United 
States submarine Seadragon had sailed through the waters 
of the archipelago from cast to west with a Canadian 
representative on board. Similarly, the SS Manhattan 
was escorted by a Canadian icebreaker and had Canadian 
representatives on board. At the time of these voyages, 
Canada still adhered to the three mile limit. 
After a national debate, two acts were passed 
by 
Parliament in 1970 designed to increase Canadian sovereignty 
and jurisdiction over contiguous waters. The Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 1970 defined Arctic 
waters as frozen or liquid waters"adjacent to the main- 
land and islands of the Canadian arctic within the 
area enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of the north 
latitude, the one hundred and fort}Lfirst meridian of longi- 
tude and a line measured seaward from the nearest Canadian 
land a distance of one hundred nautical miles... "18 An 
exception is that a line equidistant between the Canadian 
Arctic islands and Greenland is substituted for the 
100 
mile line where the equidistance in less than 100 miles 
18 Revised Statutes of Canada 1970,1st Supplement, 
Chap 2,3(l). See a so Ma n Features of the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Act, " External Affairs Bulletin, Vol XXII, No 15, 
(May 1970) p 134. 
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from the Canadian coast. In addition, "Arctic waters" 
includes waters adjacent to the above areas, waters above 
the continental shelf in so far as the act applies to 
exploring for, developing or exploiting natural resources 
in submarine areas. The act extends Canadian functional 
jurisdiction, but not sovereignty, over these Arctic 
waters. It is designed to regulate shipping that would 
be a threat to the environment. Mr. Mitchell Sharp, 
the then Minister of External Affairs, stated in the 
House that the approach evolved was "a constructive and 
functional approach that distinguished between jurisdiction 
and sovereignty... ". lie also stated that "Canada has 
always regarded the waters between the islands of the 
Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters. The present 
government maintains that position. "19 The principal 
justification used in support of this unilateral action 
was that existing international law was either inadequate 
or non-existent on the rights of a state to protect 
itself against marine pollution. 
20 
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act was 
complemented by amendments to the Territorial and Fishinq 
Zones Act of 1964. These amendments had two main provisions. 
19 
Canada, liouse of Commons, Debates, 1970,2nd Bess, 
Vol VI, p 5948. 
20 rotlieb and Dalfen argue in National Jurisdiction and 
International Res ponsiblity that by excluding International 
Court of Justice jurisdiction over disputes arising from 
the Act, the government avoided "the necessity of seeking 
compromise agreements, " p 15. 
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First, 12 miles was substituted for the three mile limit 
and the nine mile fishing zone was incorporated into'the 
new 12 mile limit. Second,, the government was authorized 
to create exclusive fishing zones comprising areas of 
the sea adjao nt to the coast of Canada. The first provision 
meant that both Barrow Strait between Somerset and Corn- 
wallis Islands, and Prince of Wales Strait between 
Banks and Victoria Islands were now declared Canadian 
waters. Thus the Northwest Passage is protected as 
Canadian waters as well as supporting the Canadian position 
that the Passage is not an international strait under 
customary or conventional internation law. 
21 
The United States Department of State issued a 
press release rejecting the unilateral action by Canada. 
22 
The United States was prepared to accept the 12 mile limit 
but only as part of an agreed international treaty 
also providing for freedom of passage through and over 
international straits. The Canadian government replied 
that the waters of the Arctic Archipelago had always been 
regarded as Canadian and that it could not accept 
the internationalization of Canadian waters. 
23 This 
means that the Northwest Passage is hold to be "historic 
21 Speech by Mr. Sharp on April 17,1970 reprinted 
in "Ammendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Act, " 
External Affairs Bulletin, (May 1970) p 151. 
22 Reprinted in ibid., pp 154-6'0 
23 Summary of Canadian reply to the United States 
press release is in ibid., pp 154-6. 
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internal waters. " There is therefore, no right of 
"innocent passage. " To justify the right-of innocent 
passage, it must be demonstrated that the internal 
waters in question previously had the. status of high 
seas, which is what the United States claims. The 
Northwest Passage has never been a viable or commercially 
used route, and Baffin Day and the Beaufort Sea are ice 
covered for most of the year. 
24 
The two legislative enactments can be interpreted 
as part of gradualist policy of securing sovereignty 
over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and 
limited jurisdiction over extensive areas of Arctic 
waters. 
25 The Soviet Union has never officially dolintated 
a 12 mile limit around its Arctic islands. If it should 
do so and also claim limited jurisdiction beyond them 
for whatever reason, an even more extensive area of 
Arctic waters will come under national jurisdiction. 
If Denmark' (Greenland) should duplicate Canadian legislation, 
then the whole of Nares Strait, Baffin Day and Davis Strait 
will come under limited national control. 
24 
For the legal arguments over whether the waters 
of the Canadian Archipelago arc internal, territorial or 
high seas see Gordon W. Smith, "Soveroignty in the North, " 
pp 242-8; Margaret W. Morris, "Boundaries Problems Relating 
to the Sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic, " William Wonder, 
ed., Canada's Changing North The Carleton Library, No 25, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971) pp 318-24; and 
Douglas M. Johnson, Canada's Arctic Marine Environment: 
Problems of Legal Protect on, Behind t He Hea nes, Vol 
XXlX, Nos 5-6, (July 1970 Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, pp 2-4. 
25 See Ibid., p2 for the "gradualist" interpretation. 
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The issue of maritime sovereignty has somewhat 
declined in importance because of the United States 
decision to move all Alaskan oil'to the west coast of 
the United States. The United States has therefore no 
immediate requirement to use Canadian Arctic waters. The 
issue will arise again when major exploitation of 
Canadian Arctic resources begins. If Canada adopts an 
open door policy to foreign shipping, using, as a 
means of control, the Arctic Shipping Pollution 
Prevention Regulations (P. C. 1972-2443,5 October, 1972), 
the opposition is likely to be muted. If, however, 
Canada decides on a policy of flag preference or complete 
exclusion of foreign shipping, opposition could be con- 
siderable. 
26 Whatever policy develops, it is clear 
that who uses Canadian Arctic waters and for what purposes 
has become a national maritime interest. 
A Maritime Frontier 
Now technologies and their consequent effect on the 
strategic environment appear to have ended the era when 
the indivisible command of the sea was a possible strategic 
objective. For many coastal states, the new technologies 
26 In 1970, the government directed that all 
government cargo for the Arctic be carried by Canadian 
flag vessels. Canadian coastwise shipping restriction to 
the Canadian flag is to apply to the Arctic but foreign 
shipping for international routes is to be allowed in. 
The Darling Report argued that: "These pioneer large- 
Ocala industries in the Arctic underline the need for a 
comprehensive shipping policy, both on the Arctic and on 
the Coast, " p 134. A comprehensive policy could include 
exclusion of all foreign shipping, cargo preferences and/ 
or indirect government support. The options are still open. 
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have ended the era when the seas could be considered 
as indivisible for economic use in peace. The new 
marine technologies have linked the continental 
margins, and to a lesser extent, the waters above 
the margin to their land masses. This has resulted 
not just from the capabilities to explore and exploit 
the potential wealth on and above the margin, but 
also from the realization that coastal states have 
a clear-national interest in controlling contiguous 
sea areas. Control provides them with the unilateral 
right to exploit their wealth, to keep the activities 
of strong maritime powers at a greater distance, 
and to use their control to gain concessions from 
maritime states who want to use their contiguous 
waters. This new consciousness of coastal states, 
many of which do not have traditional maritime 
interests, 
has resulted in the traditional doctrine of freedom 
of the seas losing much of its comprehensiveness 
and its universal applicability. The wide divergence 
of view between the traditional maritime states and 
the coastal states at the Law of the Sea Conference III (LOS III) 
demonstrates the change in perceptions that argues 
for the divisibility of the seas. 
27 
27Seo Douglas M. Johnson and Edgar Gold, The 
Economic Zone in the Law of tho Son, pp 1-14. 
I 
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By unilateral actions and at the United Nations, 
Canada has been, both in its claims and in its diplomacy, 
one of the strongest adherents to the cause of coastal 
state management and ownership of offshore resources. 
The Canadian action in 1970 of establishing a 12 mile 
territorial sea was generally accepted, except by the 
United States because of the Northwest Passage issue. 
However, the declaration of exclusive fishing zones in 
1970 in the Day of Fundy, Gulf of St. Lawrence, Queen 
Charlotte Sound, [locate Strait and Dixon Entrance did 
not meet with approval with states having distant water 
fishing fleets. Their opposition has been lessened 
by phasing out agreements which will see all foreign 
fisherman out of these waters, by the end of the decade. 
Canada did not declare sovereignty over these areas, 
although a strong argument could be made that, for 
example, the Gulf of St. Lawrence is internal waters. 
The Arctic Prevention pollution Act mat with far stronger 
diplomatic protest from most of the states with traditional 
maritime interests. 
28 
Canada, which has not been noted for its diplomatic 
aggressiveness, has embarked on an aggressive legislative 
and diplomatic campaign. The objectives are to gain 
28 Nearly all the NATO states and other maritime 
states such as Japan protested the Canadian action. 
Interview, Department of External Affairs, October 1973. 
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confirmation of its acquired sovereign jurisdiction 
over, the seabed of the second largest continental margin 
in the world; to secure exclusive management over the 
fisheries of one of the world's most lucative fishing 
areas; to control shipping in contiguous waters for 
pollution preventive purposes; and to restrict marine 
research to ensure that the results of research are 
used for the benefit of Canada. Canada, in fact, has 
discovered a now frontier. 
The Canadian policy of gaining international 
acceptance for increased coastal state control has met 
with considerable, resistance. Landlocked and shelf- 
locked states favour a very restricted area of coastal 
state jurisdiction in order to derive maximum benefits 
for themselves from international management of ocean 
resources. Some of the developing states that have 
shipping interests are opposed to higher shipbuilding 
standards caused by national pollution prevention laws. 
The traditional maritime states are opposed to national 
control over free navigation through straits and other 
coastal waters. The distant water fishing states 
stand to lose their right to free fishing in the most 
lucrative areas. For offshore oil and fishing, what 
Canada as a coastal state gains, others will lose. Even 
if the concept of an economic zone is accepted at LOS 
III, 
there are likely to be many restrictions placed on national 
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control. Many of these will be aimed directly at Canada 
which has more to gain from increased coastal state 
control than perhaps any other state. The working out 
in the next decades of the limits of coastal state 
control shows every evidence of being far more difficult 
than had been anticipated by its advocates. Canada 
has staked its claim to its maritime frontier, but 
its gaining will be difficult, expensive and demanding. 
The Canadian diplomatic campaign has been supported 
by a reasonably 
ý Lr" 
government and industrial 
program. The allocation of resources for marine science 
and technology has much increased and Canada has been 
spending over $50 million annually, placing it third 
behind the United States and the Soviet Union. it has 
been estimated that there are more than 30 federal 
agencies, five universities and about 100 companies 
significantly engaged in marine science and technology 
activities. 29 Government spending is estimated to rise 
to $112 million by 1980, with private spending to $1 billion. 
This level of spending is estimated to be able to support 
60,000 jobs by 1990.30 The Minister of State for Science 
29 R. W. Stewart and L. M. Dickic, Ad Marc: Canada 
Looks to the Sea, Background Study for te Science Council 
of Canada, Spec al Study, No 16, (Information Canada, 1971) 
p 108. 
30 
Maritime Affairs Bulletin, The Navy League of 
Canada, No 2, p 7. 
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and Technology has issued a paper called Canada's Ocean 
Policy in which. the underlying theme is that "Canada 
must develop and control within her own borders the 
essential elements needed to exploit off-shore resources. "31 
One writer has argued that: 
It is just possible that for Canada to become a 
great ocean research power would yield security benefits no less substantial than those claimed 
to flow from the provision of up-to-date fight- 
ing forces... 
... if the priorities outlined in Foreign Policy for Canadians and reflected in Defence in the 70s 
are to be taken seriously, then a much more sub- 
stantial programme of hydrographic and oceanographic 
research ought to be considered, in competition 
(if neceg6ary) with the present duties of Maritime 
command. 
This comment has its appealing features, and puts 
forward the argument that in the allocation of resources 
for maritime interests, it is naval forces that should 
have a relatively low priority. It raises the question 
of what roles naval forces should have in protecting 
the acquired maritime interests and what should be their 
structure. The first point that should be made is that 
Canada does not plan to become a "great ocean research 
power", rather it plans largely to confine its activities 
31 Office of the Minister of State, Science and 
Technology, News Release, July 12,1973. 
32 Colin S. Gray, Canada's Maritime Forces, p 52. 
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to contiguous waters with the clear aim of exploiting 
their wealth. Canadian activities are protective and 
acquisitive. And because they are protective and acqui- 
sitive, there is a security problem. There is a problem, 
to quote iD'r. - Lindsey, that: 
If a country claimed ownership over a substantial 
area of the sea bed [which Canada har: done)... 
it may still be unable to prevent prospecting or 
even removal of minerals by foreign submarines, 
unless it is able to detect and identify them 
while engaged in illegal activity. It might even 
be neg3ssary to drive them off, capture or destroy 
them. 
This may seem a somewhat far-fetched view but "the 
projection of deep-ocean technology is such that in 
the period beyond 1980, we may expect a socially- 
significant proliUereation of non-military submersibles 
and equipment of low-cost, capable of operating throughout 
the water column at/or on the bottom and capable of 
exploiting the sea bed or the resources of the sea bed. "34 
If Canadian claims are in doubt or go against prevailing 
international law, then no amount of research will sustain 
the claims. The claims can only be sustained by civilian 
and military presence in a form that maintains sufficient 
surveillance and enforcement capability to counter any 
challenges. 
Once a state embarks on a territorial acquisitive 
33 G. R. Lindsay, Canndinn Maritime Strntogy_, p 15. 
34 
John P. Craven, "Technology and the Law of the 
sea, " Conferences on Law, Organization and Security 
in the use of the Ocean, Ohio State University, (March 18, 
1967) pp 20-1. 
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programme, and that is what Canada is doing today, 
the security or protective problem cannot be avoided 
by diplomatic argument or assumptions that political 
logic precludes challenges. The law of the sea is in 
a highly unstable state and the stakes for many powers 
are high. To assume, because the Canadian claims are 
on the side of the gods of pollution control and conser- 
vation, that overt challenges are so improbable that 
research and naval power can be equated for security 
purposes, underestimates the potential security problem. 
Pollution control and conservation are strong 
ethical, legal and diplomatic arguments, but they cannot 
discount the obvious acquisitive motive of contemporary 
Canadian maritime policy. In the past Canada has been 
fortunate, considering its weakness, in its territorial 
acquisitions. The Canadian Northwest frontier, was 
acquired without much opposition by a railroad and two 
military expeditions. The land frontier of the Canadian 
Arctic was acquired by civilian and military presence 
and diplomatic activity. There was the advantage that 
no other state seriously wanted the Arctic. Once 
the potential wealth of the Arctic was realized, state 
perceptions changed and disputes with the United States 
and, to a lesser extent, with other maritime states have 
arisen over Arctic waters. 
Today, Canada hau embarked on another acquisitive 
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frontier venture and the same integral combination of 
civilian presence, low-level military activity and 
diplomatic activity is being employed. In the past, 
this combination was sufficient to offset Canadian 
military and demographic weakness. It may well suffice 
again, but'the importance of naval presence and activity 
may prove, in the long term, to be highly significant. 
The reason lies in the extent of the-surveillance and 
enforcement requirement and the high technological 
requirement to institute even a reasonable level of 
activity. 35 The problem could be immense, as the 
continental margin is over half the size of the land 
space of Canada and the hydrospace runs into millions 
of cubic miles. An insight into the problem can be 
gained from Dr. John Craven's assessment that: "The 
maximum we can project now in hunting for an object is 
a search rate for a given vehicle of about one square 
mile a day and there are 273 million square miles in 
the sea. , 
36 
Fisheries Protection and Naval Policy 
Canada is almost unique among the foremost fishing 
35 There is apparently a major DND study underway 
on the requirements for surveillance and enforcement for 
Canadian contiguous waters. For enforcement problems 
Sea Captain J. R. ! till, RN, "Tho Rule of Law at Seas The 
Capability and Suitability of Maritime Forces for the 
Enforcement of International Law at Sea, " a thesis written 
at King's College, London, for the Ministry of Defence, 
London, 1972 
r 
36 As quoted in Elizabeth Young, "Arms Control and 
U sarmament in the Ocean, "Pacem in Maribus, ed., Elizabeth 
Mann ßorgese, (New York: Do 3d, Mead and Company, 1972) p 281. 
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states in that it has a fisheries protection service 
completely separated from its naval forces or coast guard. 
The protection of fisheries is the responsibility of the 
Department of the Environment. Conservation and protection 
are seen as integrally related. The fisheries branch 
of the Department operates a fleet of 82 fishery protection 
vessels ranging in size from 30 feet to 180 feet. Only 
six of these vessels are capable of extended offshore 
work and the present plan is for only a three vessel 
increase. 37 The Canadian fishery protection service 
has been, and still is, primarily concerned with the 
inshore fisheries and with Canadian fishermen. Even 
today "Canada has 23,374 vessels under 25 tons each and 
the majority of these will likely be found within the 
12 mile limit, and in exclusively Canadian fishing areas. 
The above figures are somewhat misleading because 
the number of boats bears little resemblance to catch 
quantities. In the 1960s, there took place a rapid expan- 
sion and modernization of the Canadian Atlantic offshore 
37 Colin S. Gray, Canada's Maritime Forces, Appendix 
Cr pp 67-71. For a projection see Presentation by D. R. 
Saxon, Director, Ship Branch, Marine Services Directorate, 
Department of Environment, Canadian Marino Requirements 
in the 70's at the Marine/Industry Mooting, Ottawa, Nov. 
23,1972. pp 2-7. 
38 D. A. Grant and Lieutenant P. R. Rygh, Surveillance 
of Fishing Activities in the ICNAF Arens-of Canada's East 
Coast, Operational Research Branch, Maritimo Command, 
llal fax, N. S., (June 1973) p 7. 
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fleet which paralleled the arrival of large distant 
water fishing fleets. By 1972, vessels of 70 feet or 
over, or just over 1 per cent of the total Canadian, 
Atlantic fleet, accounted for 53 per cent of the total 
Canadian groundfish landings. 
39 
The present and projected 
capability of the fishery protection service is inadequate 
to meet any extensive offshore surveillance and regulatory 
requirements. It is this fact that has brought Maritime 
Corned into a larger role for fishery surveillance and regulaticz. 
Maritime Command has always been available 
for fishery protection and has been used on occasion. 
In 1966, a destroyer sent a boarding party aboard a 
Russian fishing vessel on the Pacific coast, and destroyers have 
made an appearance when foreign trawlers have been slow 
to leave Canadian waters. Generally, relations with 
foreign fisherman have been acceptable and a naval presence 
now and then has been all that has boon required. Ilow- 
ever in late 1974, the government used one destroyer 
as a full time fishery protection vessel as an experiment. 
Present indications are that the policy, will be continued 
with 2 to 6 on patrol at a time. 
40 Until recently, 
39 Canadian Fisheries in 1972, Fisheries Fact Shoot, 
Fisheries and Marine Service, Environment Canada, p 1. 
40 Thera have been rumours that other states may deploy 
destroyers in the ICN11C Zone as fishery protection vessels. 
This may in part explain the Canadian action. If this 
happens, operational cost differentials between naval ships 
and fishery protection service vessels will become of much 
less importance. For the cost differential arguments see 
Colin S. Gray, Canada's Maritime Forces, pp 45-6. 
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increased involvement by Maritime Command was limited 
mainly to conducting aerial and surface surveillance of 
offshore fishing activity to gather information. How- 
ever, the emphasis has been shifting to enforcement 
with a greater commitment of resources. 
The present situation is that out of the 50,000 
fishing vessels registered with ICNAF, less than 2,000 
are foreign and these are nearly all over 25 tons, and 
the vast majority are over 50 tons and easily identifiable. 
41 
Generally, only 32 per cent, or 248,000 square miles, 
of the ICNAC area is fished where Canada would have 
responsibility for regulation. It appears "that the 
seemingly overwhelming number of fishing vessels can be 
arranged in categories of manageable proportions, and 
that a significant degree of expectancy can be assumed 
with respect to their location at a particular time. "42 
If there-is internationally accepted Canadian management 
control, the Fisheries Protection Service will be involved 
primarily in management rather than enforcement. The 
structure of the service will be dependent on the management 
system chosen. For example, the restriction of the 
number of vessels allowed to fish would reduce the enforce- 
mont requirement. Such a restrictive licensing system 
41 
D. A. Grant and Lieutenant P. R. Rygh, Surveillance 
of Fishing Activities in the ICNAu areas of Canada s East 
Coast, p 7. 
42 Ibid., p 34. 
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could be complemented by more complete freedom to fish. 
The smaller the number of vessels allowed to fish, the 
less the difficulty in exercising control and hence 
less the need for naval involvement. 
There is the possibility of Canada becoming involved 
in a naval confrontation over the fisheries. This 
could arise-from Canada enforcing unilateral control 
over the fisheries within a 200 mile zone because of the 
fear of further depletion of the stocks. Much will 
depend on the final outcome of LOS III . An unfavourable 
outcome could force Canada into the position of acting 
unilaterally and accepting the consequent risks or 
acquiescing in the collapse of the Canadian fishing 
industry. 
The response to any unilateral Canadian action 
is unlikely to take the form of an overt foreign naval 
presence designed to challenge directly Canadian juris- 
diction. Rather, intense diplomatic pressure complemented 
by some naval activity is more likely. The Soviet 
Union is the only naval power presently fishing in 
Canadian offshore waters that is likely to challenge 
Canada. It has the most to lose from extended Canadian 
jurisdiction but other states might wall provide 
diplomatic support. 
Canada could expect considerable activity by Soviet 
trawlors to disrupt Canadian fishing using tactics of 
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ramming and destroying nets and lobster pots, etc. 
43 
A Soviet naval task force could deploy outside a 200 
mile limit, or legitimately sail up to territorial 
waters to signify Soviet opposition. The weaker the 
Canadian naval capability, the more vulnerable Canada 
would be to Soviet pressure. If the Soviets consider 
that they could operate in contiguous waters with 
impunity, then Canadian protestations would not be 
likely to have much effect. If, however, Canadian naval 
capability was strong enough so that the Soviets would 
have to intervene actively to stop the arrest of 
Soviet fishing vessels, while unsure of the outcome, the 
Canadian position would be immeasurably stronger. 
Canada is certainly capable of having a naval 
capability that could pose a credible counter to a 
fairly strong Soviet task force lacking integral air. 
support. Even if the Soviets deployed a substantial 
fleet, the problems of sustaining this operation would 
militate against :a protracted deployment. Generally, a 
strong Canadian naval capability operating in contiguous 
waters would provide the necessary counter to Soviet 
naval intervention unless the confrontation went beyond 
43 
Soviet ramming of the smaller Canadian vessels 
has taken place on a number of occasions on the west coast. 
In September 1974, Soviet trawlers destroyed $100,000 
worth of east coast lobster pots. The motivation behind 
these acts is unclear but it appears to be a combination 
of accident and deliberate acts of individual captains. 
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the bounds of the use of limited naval power for a 
limited objective. 
Fisheries protection is clearly a national or indep- 
endent task which is outside any alliance structure. 
A Canadian quarrel with a foreign fishing state over 
unilateral Canadian claims to extended maritime jurisdiction 
is hardly likely to be perceived as a United states 
quarrel. In. fact, United States pressure to abandon 
the claim with suitable diplomatic facesaving, as being 
in the United States national interest, is more likely. 
Also it would not necessarily be desirable to rely on 
the United Stites because the price exacted for support 
could well be inimical to the very interests presumably 
being protected. Canada could well find itself forced 
into an agreement that would preclude effective jurisdiction 
over contiguous waters for the foreseeable future. Great 
powers have a propensity for neutralizing the interests 
of smaller powers. A Canadian naval capability not strong 
enough to protect a maritime interest in contiguous waters 
would leave Canada vulnerable to both overt and subtle 
pressures, and would severely restrict policy options. 
It would be a clear indication that Canada was prepared 
to allow the collapse of the Canadian fishing industry 
to the benefit of foreign fishing states. 
Sea Control and Naval Policy 
The traditional or classic answer to the requirements 
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for the protection of Canadian maritime interests in 
contiguous waters is the naval capability to gain and 
maintain command of the seas when faced with challenges. 
This is also the most satisfactory answer, but one that 
is only in part obtainable, because indivisible command 
of the seas even in the local sense is no longer completely 
possible. It is possible to have the naval capability 
to pose a reasonable counter to foreign naval intervention 
in the pursuit of limited objectives. This, for fishery 
protection, is highly desirable, if not essential. How- 
ever, supplementing, and integral to such a capability, 
is the requirement to be able to exercise sea control 
over contiguous waters. For Canada, sea control moans 
the ability to enforce national policy in sea areas under 
Canadian sovereignty or functional jurisdiction. 
44 Sea 
control requirements are most applicable to the continental 
margin and Arctic waters. 
A Canadian naval capability designed to pose a 
reasonable counter to. foreign naval intervention will 
not necessarily have the integral capability to enforce 
national policy on a coptinuing basis. The challenges 
to Canadian control, except when backed by foreign naval 
intervention, are likely to be of the surveillance and 
policing typo. Presumably the more Canadian jurisdiction 
44 This definition of sea control comes from 
a working paper of the Dalhousie University Conference 
on Canada's Maritime Torces, Halifax, N. S., April 19,1972. 
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is internationally accepted, the more. routine and 
civilian can be the control exercised. If the converse, 
then the requirement for naval "policing" will become 
more extensive. The extent and technological sophisti- 
cation of a Canadian requirement to exercise sea control 
cannot at present he determined with any degree of 
accuracy other than to state that there is a requirement. 
% 
The variables that will affect this requirement will 
depend upon technological advances, acceptance or non- 
acceptance of Canadian jurisdiction, and the uses to 
which the continental margin, its waters, and Arctic 
waters are eventually put. 
To meet this requirement, balances will have to be 
struck for the naval capability necessary between 
technological sophistication and numbers of systems 
employed; between systems for ice covered waters and ice 
free waters; between maritime defence and maritime 
surveillance/enforcement tasks; and between naval and 
civilian responsibilities. Certainly a prime future 
requirement will be for submersibles to supplement 
surface ships and aircraft. There is a clear need for a. 
civilian and naval submersible capability and it is likely 
to be of sufficient extent to require an inter-departmental 
government programme. This would allow for the rational 
allocation for research, reconnaissance, inspection and 
other tasks which will arise as new technologies are devised 
to use the seabed and hydrospace above for commercial and 
military operations. 
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Another requirement will probably be for helicopter 
platforms that will allow the extensive and flexible use 
of helicopters for both civilian and military tasks. 
Patrol frigates may also prove useful. 
45 
All these 
capabilities should be able to undertake or to assist 
numerous civilian and naval tasks such as research, 
repair, inspection, and policing. Their multi-purpose 
character will probable preclude a high level of techno- 
logical sophistication but their availability in sufficient 
numbers could offset this disadvantage. 
One of the most difficult decisions will be over 
Arctic waters requirements. The key question will be 
whether Canada should have some or all the capabilities 
necessary for going under the ice, through the ice and 
over the ice. In the early 1950x, the RCN built an 
armed icebreaker, IIMCS Labrador, but it was shortly after 
turned over to the Marine Service of the Department of 
Transport which, in 1962, became the Canadian Coast 
Guard. 
The Canadian Coast Guard, which is an unarmed civilian 
agency of government, has seven heavy icebreakers suitable 
for use in Arctic waters. 
46 The most powerful is the 
45 For an analysis of the characteristics required 
of maritime units in the enforcement role see Captain J. R. 
I! ill, "The Rule of Law at Sea, "pp 111-22. During interviews 
at Ottawa the importance of helicopters and submersibles 
was emphasized to the writer. 
46 For a list of coast guard ships see Colin S. Gray, 
Canada's Maritime Forces, Appendix ß, pp 65-7. 
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St. Laurent of 13,000 tons with 27,000 shaft horse power 
(shp) and cost $22 million. In 1972, the government 
announced the decision to construct four 15,000 shp 
deisel elctric icebreakers for use primarily in the 
St. Lawrence, but in 1975 reduced the number to two. 
Some Canadians have urged the building of a 120,000 
slip super icebreaker for all year round operations in 
the Arctic. 47 The government has allocated $100 million 
for the construction of a polar class icebreaker, but 
no announcement for its construction has been forth- 
coming. 
48 
In contrast to normal seaborne trade patterns where 
sovereignty at best is a minor factor, in the Arctic, 
shipping and sovereignty have become entwined. And 
because any Arctic shipping pattern is dependent on 
icebreakers, these have become means of establishing 
sovereignty and sovereignty symbols in themselves. 
The United States has made use of icebreakers to 
challenge Soviet claims. 
49 
The United States wanted 
one of its icebreakers to accompany the Manhattan, but 
no United States icebreaker was powerful enough. The 
47 
Richard Rohmor, The Arctic Im orativo An Over- 
view of the Energy Crisis Torontos McClelland and Stewart, 
1973) pp 173-88. Mr. Romer has been an unpaid adviser 
to Mr. Trudeau. 
48 
Halifax Mail Star, January 10,1974. 
49 See Ctpt. Gerald E. Synhorst, "Soviet Strategic 
Interest in the Maritime Arctic. " pp 101-04. 
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task was left to the Sir A. Macdonald. Over the last 
two decades, Canadian icebreakers have followed a pattern 
of sovereignty voyages, culminating in the St. Laurent's 
voyage into the Lincoln Sea, north of Ellesmere Island 
in 1971. This was the furthest north ever reached by 
a surface ship from the Western World. Icebreakers 
are an essential means for the Soviets to establish 
control/sovereignty. Of course, these icebreaking 
activities have normal and natural research and development 
objectives, but these in turn cannot be dissociated 
from the sovereignty issue. 
The present pattern of world icebreaker construction 
suggests that the sovereignty question is becoming 
increasingly significant. The Soviet Union appears to 
be embarking upon a major construction programme. It 
has ordered three large and powerful diesel icebreakers 
from the Finnish firm Wartsi'lia. 
50 
r 
+++ Two nuclear powered Arktika class, each of 
25,000 tons and 30,000 shp, are being built. In 
addition, the Soviets are planning to build the most 
powerful, icebreaker in the world. It will be nuclear 
powered with 80,000 shp. The United States has recently 
launched the Polar star and is completing another one 
of the some class. Both, with 60,000 shp, will exceed 
5o 
Icebreaker data comes from Jane's righting Ships, 
1973-74. 
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the power of any icebreaker afloat including the Soviet 
nuclear powered Lenin. It is argued that these are 
long overdue replacements for operations around Alaska 
and in Antarctica. 
The Canadian advocates of a polar icebreaker 
generally mean a "true" polar icebreaker; that is, one, 
. that could operate all year long anywhere in the Canadian 
Arctic. Such an icebreaker would be in the 33,000 to 
36,000 ton class and develop 120,000 shp. Canada could 
build such an icebreaker but at a cost running into 
hundreds of millions. The projected Canadian polar 
icebreaker will be of much less capability, if the 
government estimate of $100 million is accepted as 
likely cost. 
Government and commercial shipping in the Canadian 
Arctic waters has averaged annually at slightly less 
than 200,000 tons. This will increase as more minerals 
are extracted and oil exploration supply requirements 
increase. It is possible "that re-supply tonnage for 
oil exploration work alone could reach over 350,000 
51 
tons a year in a very few years. " 
51 A. H. G. Stors, "East Arctic Marine Supply, " 
Proceedin :: of the Arctic Transportation Conference, 
Yo owKn fc, N. W. T., Vol 2, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 
1971) p 9.5. 
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An optimistic assessment of future shipping in Arctic 
waters is "that within the next decade there will develop 
a demand for ship capacity to move out of the Arctic 
annually some five million tons of ore and concentrate, 
288 million barrels of oil and two million tons of 
liquidfied natural gas. "52 This could require 
annually some three hundred voyages of bulk carriers, 
of the 200,000 ton class. The immediate future 
shipping pattern is likely to stress the movement of 
minerals from the eastern Arctic and not involve cast- 
west shipping through the passage. For Canada, the 
crucial questions will be how much Arctic shipping 
will be reserved for Canadian ships and the extent of 
investment in icebreakers. 
It is imposniblo to predict what the future 
shipping patterns will be in the Arctic. It is possible 
to state that the presence of foreign icebreakers would 
not be in the Canadian interest. Also the greater the 
amount of shipping that is Canadian owned, the less 
will be the sovereignty problem. Furthermore, the 
sovereignty problem is not likely to become critical 
unless the Northwest Passage is used extensively for 
52 D. M. "Ripley, "Maritime Bulk Shipping and icebreaker Support, " ibid., Vol 3, p 227. 
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cast-west shipping. on a regular basis. 
53 because of the 
hummocky multi-year ice-west of the 95th meridan, use of 
the passage even for seasonal shipping on a regular basis 
poses immense problems which can only be overcome at very 
high cost. Even then, icebreakers would be need in 
case ships got stuck. The technology is available to 
build icebreaking supertankers for the Passage but the 
costs favour pipelines across Alaska, up the MacKenzie 
River Valley, and perhaps also from the high Arctic islands 
and south around Hudson Bay. 
54 
53 
Admiral Stors, former director of Marine Operations 
ßranch, Department of Transport, estimated that for year 
round work in the Passage a polar icebreaker would have 
to be of 30,000 tons displacement and have a"minimum of 
100,000 shp. SCEAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., 3rd seas., 
No 10, February 11,1969,23. Commercial icebreaker 
tankers would have to be of 300,000 tons displacement 
and develop 150,000 to 180,000 ahp. In January 1975 there 
were rumours that the United States was thinking of a fleet 
of 62 nuclear powered icebreaking tankers of 240,000 tons. 
These ships would need icebreaker assistance and this 
"presumably would be supplied by the U. S. Coast Guard". 
Halifax Chronicle Herald, January 28,1975. The rumours 
derived from a United States study on "Advances in the 
Development of Commercial Ice-Transiting Ships". The 
study does not recognize a boundary between the Canadian 
and United States Arctic arena. See John W. Langford, 
"Marine Science, Technology, and Arctic Sovereignty: Some 
Questions and Guidelines for the Federal Government. " 
First Draft, York University Transport Contra, 1975, pp 7-9. 
54 
For a pro-Middle Eastern crisis comparison of 
costs see G. D. Quirin and R. N. Wolff, "The Economics of 
Oil Transportation in the Arctic", Law of the Son Workship: 
Cnnndinn-U. S. Maritime Problems, ed, LLewis M. Alexander 
and Gordon R. S. Hawkins, Law of the Sea Institute, (Kingston: 
University of Rhode Island, 1972) pp 32-46. For an analysis 
of various surface and under the ice shipping concepts and 
comparison of costs see G. T. Gorman, "Bulk Shipping and Icebreaker Support in the Arctic", Proceeding of the Arctic Transportation Conference, Vol 3, pp 175M. 
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There does not seem to be a requirement for an 
armed icebreaking capability in high Arctic waters. 
If, in the future, the need arises, then Coast Guard 
icebreakers can be armed, and if necessary transferred 
to naval control. For naval surface operations, ice- 
breakers can always be borrowed. There is a requirement 
for naval surface presence in waters contiguous to the 
Arctic, such as Baffin Day, where initial shipping 
patterns are more likely to develop, so that national 
jurisdiction can be enforced. This could result in a 
requirement for ice-capable ships for operations in the 
area of the 60th parallel. 
A substantial naval requirement could arise if 
under the ice operations develop on an extensive scale 
for either military or commercial reasons. There have 
been designs for cargo submarines up to 300,000 tons, 
but interest has declined because pipelines appear to 
be more suitable. 
55 There remains the possibility that 
the transport of oil and gas from the high Arctic may 
prove to be only economically possible by cargo submarine. 
A shipping pattern could develop that would result in 
the use of Canadian Arctic waters and the Arctic ocean 
55 See General Dynamics Presentation on Arctic 
Submarines Transport Systems to Standing Committee on 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Evidence, 
28th Parl., 2nd sons., No 20, May 21,1970, pp 5-47. 
The writer also has had access to a still classified 
United States study on the use of submarine crude oil 
tankers in the Arctic. 
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proper, with trans-shipment at Iceland or somewhere on 
the eastern Canadian coast. There appears to be no 
question that cargo submarines can operate throughout 
the Canadian Arctic waters. 
56 
Canada has no under the ice capability at all, 
although there are some ihitial projects for such operations. 
Canada, sooner of later, will have to develop such a 
capability if economic and scientific advances in the 
Arctic are to take place. The maintenance of Canadian 
control over the destiny of the Arctic is a protracted 
and multi-facet operation of which an under the ice 
capability is only one aspect. In the maritime context, 
it is an area where military and commercial operations 
could develop, and for that reason, Maritime Command. is 
likely to be intimately involved in the development of 
a Canadian under the ice capability. 
There is a clear requirement for a Canadian naval 
general purpose capability for sen control operations 
in contiguous waters. This general purpose capability 
could be enlarged or reduced as required with relative 
ease because the sunk costs would be relatively small 
for each system. Each system could be sold or transferred 
to other departments or industry because of their multi- 
purpose uses. Once the basis of this general purpose 





or remain static, depending on the nature of likely 
future requirements. It is possible that the likelihood 
of overt challenges will not materialize and therefore 
the emphasis could shift to routine tasks. However, 
the presumed inherent flexibility of these general 
purpose capabilities would allow for relatively easy 
and rapid adjustment. 
A General Pur ose Naval Capability and National Maritime 
Interests 
The 1960s witnessed the emergence of now maritime 
interests that were both coastal and purely national in 
character. The exploitation and protection of those 
interests will require a completely independent Canadian 
effort. Forms of international cooperation, such as 
the continuance of ICNAF, could mean tangible economic 
loss to Canada. 57 Therefore, the basic principle for 
future Canadian naval policy must be the preservation 
of sufficient naval capability to protect those interests 
as a completely independent function. Reliance on United 
States naval power for other than collective defence tasks 
57 For a pessimistic assessment of the continuance 
of ICNAF sec Francis T. Christy Jr., "Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Arrangements: A Test of the Species Approach, " 
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol 1, 
No 1, Spring ßy3 . Ue argues that affective management 
is 
vital, is not being done by ICNAF and "in order to 
prevent failure, modifications of an economic nature will 
have to adopted. And these will be of such significance 
that the result will constitute an economic zone. " p 91. 
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can only prove to be counter-productive. In fact, 
Canada must accept United States opposition to the 
expansion of Canadian maritime interests, particularly 
in the Arctic and on the continental margin. The 
indivisibility of the coincidence of maritime interests 
between Canada and the United States and other major 
maritime states has ended for the foreseeable future. 
There is no question that the protection of the 
new maritime interests requires a more general purpose 
fleet than the present naval capability. There is a 
requirement for more balance and more flexibility in 
the naval force structure than there is at present. 
However, a naval capability that is incapable of posing, 
independently, a credible counter to foreign naval 
intervention and undertaking sea control operations, 
is neither general nor purposive. There is no way 
that the strategic future can be analyzed to produce 
a series of clear answers for future requirements. The 
peacetime forppulation of Canadian naval policy has 
to be an ongoing process. There is no need to embark 
on a large naval construction programme as there was in 
1939 and in the 1950s. The requirement today is to combine 
the naval capabilities to undertake both independent 
and collective defence naval tasks. 
Independent Naval Tasks and Collective Defence Tasks 
The end of the indivisibility of command of the seas 
in war as a naval objective; the and of the indivisibility 
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of the seas for universal economic use in peace; and 
the end of the indivisibility of the coincidence of 
maritime interests between Canada and the major maritime 
states have in large part destroyed the traditional basis 
for the formulation of Canadian naval policy. Any 
new policy must be able to reconcile the requirements 
for independent naval tasks and those for collective 
defence. This reconciliation must be an ongoing process, 
but the basic criterion must be a naval capability that 
can ensure the unhindered use by Canada of its contiguous 
waters, continental margin and their resources. This 
requires that no naval vacuum develop through a lack 
of Canadian naval capability. No foreign naval activity. 
should be allowed to operate with impunity in Canadian 
contiguous waters for hny purpose. 
Because in practice it is impossible to dissociate 
naval activity in the context of the nuclear balance 
from "national interest" tasks, opting out of nuclear 
balance related activity does not solve any problems. 
In fact, it complicates the problem because a naval 
vacuum by default is created. The creation of a vacuum 
that is filled by foreign naval activity will make more 
difficult, and over a protracted period of time, perhaps 
impossible, Canadian sea control operations. Canada 
does not have the option of concentrating on independent 
naval tasks at the expense of collective 
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defence tasks until the latter are non-existent. It 
is not a question of priority between independent and 
collective defence tasks, but of building onto the 
naval capability for collective defence the necessary 
capability for independent naval tasks. The greater 
the likelihood of challenges, the greater the capability 
that will be required for independent naval tasks, and 
the more. important it will be to ensure no naval vacuum 
is created. 
The degree of'independence any Canadian naval 
capability will have in relation to United States naval 
power will be related directly to the ability to carry 
out tasks independently. The less capability, the more 
dependent Canada will be on United States seapower. 
Independence or dependence is not a function of Canadian 
involvement in collective naval defence tasks but of 
Canadian naval capability. Canadian withdrawal from 
collective defence arrangements would not changes the 
naval strategies of the superpowers and hence Canadian 
naval requirements. Canadian independence can only be 
enhanced if Canada maintains a naval capability 
sufficient to ensure unhindered use of its contiguous 
waters, margin and their resources. 
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CHAPTER 0 
THE CANADIAN ARCTIC, TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AND NATO'S- 
NORTHERN FLANK 
The Canadian Arctic 
Canadian Arctic developments until the late 1960s 
have been an extension of those of the Northwest frontier 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The extension has not 
been into the true Arctic but into the sub-Arctic regions 
of the Yukon and Mackenzie River Valley. The true Arctic 
divides from the sub-Arctic along the tree line which runs 
from Fort Churchill on Hudson Day in a northwesterly 
direction to the mouth of the Mackenzie River. Above 
the tree line lies the true Canadian Arctic, embracing 
the mainland territory and the islands of the high Arctic 
archipelago. The true Arctic is 32 per cent of the total 
area of Canada. 
Only small parts of Alaska, Norway and the Soviet 
Union are classed as true Arctic. For. purposes of this 
analysis, the term Arctic is defined arbitrarily as the 
region above 60 degrees North. This covers the northern 
areas of Canada and the USSR, and Alaska and Norway com- 
pletely. 
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Canada did not assume sovereignty over the Arctic 
until the late 19th century. It was the beginnings of 
United States interest in the Arctic that prompted 
the British government in 1880 to hand over the res- 
ponsibilities for sovereignty to the new Dominion. 
Not until 1897 did Canada make any overt act to assert 
Canadian sovereignty, when the first of a series of 
sovereignty voyages was initiated. The unfavourable 
result of the Alaska Boundary Treaty in 1903 and activities 
of United States whalers prompted increased RCMP presence 
and greater efforts to ensure respect for Canadian 
sovereignty. it is generally accepted that Canadian 
sovereignty in international law over the land areas of the 
present Canadian Arctic was confirmed by the 1930s. 
1 The 
United States never fully accepted Canadian sovereignty 
until the DEW line Agreement of 1954. 
Canadian military activity in the Arctic began 
in 1898 with the sending of the Yukon Field Force to 
maintain order and sovereignty during the Gold Rush. 
2 
1 For Canadian Arctic sovereignty and international law 
see Gordon W. Smith, "Sovereignty in the North, " pp 196-211 
and V. Kenneth Johnston, "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands. " 
Canadian Historical Review. Vol XIV, No 1, (March 1933) pp 24-41. 
2 See George C. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, pp 275-7. 
6 
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In the inter-war years, the Royal Canadian Signal Corps 
developed and manned the first radio-telegraphy stations 
of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System. 
3 
The RCAF engaged in aerial survey work, mercy missions, 
and assisted scientific expeditions in the Northwest and 
Hudson Bay areas. 
Military activity in the Second World War was con- 
centrated in the Northwest with peripheral activity in 
the eastern Arctic. It was the Cold War and the develop- 
ment of the long range nuclear armed bomber which gave 
the Arctic region a strategic significance because of 
the air routes over the eastern Arctic. The principal 
SAC targets were in European Russia and those of the 
Soviet Long Range Airforce in central and eastern United 
States. The emphasis for territorial defence was 
in the 
northwest and the protection of the Northwest Highway 
System. 
Territorial Defence and the Arctic 
Planning for the post-war force structure of the 
armed forces began in 1943, but it was not until 1947 
that the services took the form they wore to have until 
rearmament in the early 19500.4 The first peacetime est- 
imates allowed for an army of between 20,000 and 25,000 
3 For a description of the origins and organization of the 
communications system sea John S. Moir, History of the Royal 
Canadian Corps of Signals 1903-1961, (Ottawa, 1 pp 2G7-87. 
4 Sec James Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, pp 77-96. 
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and it was an all volunteer force. The government 
was not prepared to provide any justification other than 
that the propsed structure provided for "-n basic military 
establishment and which (could) be added to or developed 
as future circumstances require. "5 
In 1947 Brooke Claxton became Minister of National 
Defence. In attempting to plan the peacetime roles of 
the services, he concluded that Canadian forces would not 
be required to fight in Europe for at least five years, 
and only after a fairly lengthy mobilization period. There 
was no requirement to maintain extensive mobilization stocks 
or equipment. North America would be a secondary theatre 
subjected to bombing to hinder reinforcement of the Europ- 
ean theatre. Attacks "on North America of the kind en- 
visaged would not require large forces immediately ready 
to meet them but require a relatively small, highly trained 
force. 
This small, highly trained force of brigade group 
size became the only active force available in the army, 
5 Douglas Abbot, Minister of National Defence, Canada, House 
of Commons, Debates, 1945,2nd sass., Vol 1, p 1135. 
6 Quoted in James Dayrs, peacemakin and Deterrence, p 92 
from a memorandum entitled "Observations on the Defence Needs 
of Canada, ", dated January 17,1945. Professor I: ayrs gives no 
reference but presumably it is from the Claxton papers to which 
he had access. 
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which by 1947, had only an establishment of 14,185. 
The Mobile Strike Force, as the brigade group became 
known, consisted of three airborne battalions. In 1948, 
the RCAF procured 23 North Star transports to provide 
the necessary air transport for the force. The requirements 
for territorial defence were considered small because the 
threat was so remote. General Foulkes appreciated that: 
For the actual territorial defence they (the 
planners) do not look to attacks on this country 
to be of a serious nature. As I mentioned earlier 
we expect spasmodic raids designed to tic down as 
many troops in this country as possible and to up- 
set morale. lie can expect landing parties, up to 
a battalion, to be landed in the Canadian North, 
either by air or by ice-breaker., The main thing 
is we must be prepared to see off any landings in 
the Canadian Arctic. 7 
No formation training was undertaken in the North 
until 1949 when Exercise Eagle was conducted in the Peace 
River Valley. This was a battalion exercise designed to 
study attack methodn against enemy lodgements. This was 
followed in 1950 with a joint Canadian/United States ex- 
ercise called Sweotbriar. 
8 This was the first one of its 
kind, undertaken in mid-winter and with airdrops. The ox- 
erciso scenario was the defence of the Northwest Highway 
against an enemy attempting to fight his way down it. 
7 "Extracts from an address by the Chief of Staff, " 
Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes, as reprinted in James 
Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, p 392. 
0 Canada, llouso of Commons, Debates, 1950,1st secs., 
Vol 1, p 853-4 for a description oo the exorcise. 
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In the period 1950-54, a series of exercises were 
conducted to test the capability of the Mobile Strike Force 
to operate in the Arctic. These exercises demonstrated 
a somewhat greater concern for defence of the Arctic. 
When troops were sent to Korea and Europe, they were 
specially recruited, and the Mobile Strike Force was re- 
tained for the defence of Canada. 
The emphasis on continental air defence and the 
central European front in the late 1950s and the 1960s 
pushed territorial defence far into the background. In 
1963, the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant Gen- 
oral Walsh, stated that he considered a major attack on 
North America highly unlikely. 
9 ' There was the possibility 
of small raiding parties designed to create a feeling of 
insecurity and thus affect civilian morale. To counter 
such a threat, there was a Defence of Canada Brigade, 
successor to the Mobile Strike Force, consisting of three 
battalions for Arctic operations. The joint Canadian- 
United States plans for the territorial defence of con- 
tinental United States, Alaska and Canada wore reviewed 
each year, but the exercises of the early 19509 were no 
longer conducted. The 1964 White Paper on Defence was 
little concerned with territorial defence. Churchill as 
a winter warfare training contra was closed to achieve a 
9 Testimony of Lieutenant General G. Walsh, Standing 
Committee on Defence, Evidence, 26th Parl., 1st sass., No 5, 
July 11,1963, pp 142-9. 
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a financial saving. In January 1974, it was announced that 
it would be re-opened. 
The North Alaska slope oil discoveries in the late 
1960s and the possibility of massive gas and oil reserves in 
the Canadian Arctic revived the issue of Arctic sovereignty. 
The Canadian Arctic is one of the largest remaining 
unexplored geological areas in the world. There are known 
deposits of sulphur, lead, zinc, coal and high grade iron 
ore. 
10 There is sufficient geological evidence to predict 
the eventual discovery of gold, coppor, uranium, tungsten 
and other base metals. By 1969, it was being estimated that 
the Arctic sedimentary basin, which includes northern 
Yukon and nearly all the islands of the archipelago, con- 
tained vast oil and gas reserves. 
11 The idea of using the 
armed forces as a means of protecting sovereignty came to 
the fore once again. The then Minister of National Defence, 
Mr. Cadieux, stated: "Although we do not consider there is 
a military threat to the Arctic at the present time, we 
feel it is essential to develop the capability of keeping 
10 G. T. German, "Bulk Shipping and Icebreaker Support in 
the Arctic, " Proceedin s of the Arctic Transportation 
Conference, pp 196-7. 
11 
Oilweek, November 3,1969, pp 34-5. The Geological 
Survey of Canada in November 1973 estimated the ultimate 
recoverable potential of oil and gas in the Arctic region 
(land and offshore) as 42.9 billion barrels of oil and 782.9 
trillion cubic feet. This total is slightly less than half of 
the total Canadian ultimate recoverable potential. 
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on top of this situation, particularly in view of pro- 
spective commercial developments. "12 
Mr. Cadieux's statement came after the 3 April prima 
ministerial announcement on the new priorities for the 
armed forces; the first priority being the surveillance 
of our territory and coast lines, i. e. the protection of 
our sovereignty. There was considerable political capital 
to be made in setting this as the first priority. The 
government was under intense pressure over the issue of 
Arctic sovereignty. 
13 The government was also faced with 
making a decision on Canada's NATO commitment and, if 
it was to be reduced, finding justifications that would be 
acceptable at least at home. It has been argued that the 
Government ... deliberately manipulated 
the 
issue of Arctic Sovereignty ... to withdraw its 
armed forces from Europe, thereby further con- 
tracting the legimate opportunities of its 
generals in the independent exercise of high 
command, staff work and intelligence liaison, 
and reasserting that degree of political con- 
trol which since 1945 the technological en- 
hancement of military power and its perpetuation 
within a formal European alliance structure has 
done much to erode. 14 
12 SCEAND, i 28th Parl., 2nd sons., No 16, March ýsiý. 
3,1970, p 9. Mr. Cadieux as successor to Mr. Denson agreed 
with Mr. Drowin M. P. when the latter stated "we are now 
contemplating not a major attack or a major attempt to 
establish military forces on Canadian soil, but what might be 
called small scale incidental invasions of our sovereignty, " 
SCEAND, , videncv, 28th Parl., 4th sass., No 
21, February 29, 
1972, p 11. 
13 
See Peter Dobell, Cnnncin's Seereh for Now 1to1o : Fornicin 
Policy in the Trudenu Era, (oxford University Paperback , 1972) 
pp 69-70. 
14 
Adrian Preston, "Canada and the Roof and of the World: 
Military Politics and the North-West Passage, " The-Army Ouirterly 
and Defencr__, 7eurnal, Vol XCIX, No 2, (January, 1970) p 162. 
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Defence in the 70s assumed that Canada's sover- 
eignty and independence depended ultimately on security 
from armed attack. Ilo ever, it stated that defence 
policy must consider other challenges to Canada's sover- 
eignty and independence, mainly non-military in character. 
Aside from any challenge to internal security, "Challenges 
could occur through the actions by foreign agencies or 
their nationals involving territorial violations or in- 
fringements of Canadian laws governing access to and activity 
within these areas. "15 Defence in the 70s specified the 
following activities as relevant to counter these challenges: 
1. general surveillance of foreign fishing fleets off 
the coasts; 
. 
2. specific reconnaissance missions on a quick-response, 
short-term basis to locate fishing fleets when they move 
and fail to appear , were expected; 
3. area surveillance of offshore waters to detect and 
report suspected illegal seismic and other exploratory 
activities; 
4. assistance in ice reconnaissance operations; 
5. surveillance when needed of Canadian waters off the 
Cast and West coasts and in the North to detect pollution 
at sea; 
15 Defence in the 70s, p 8. 
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6. surveillance of Canadian territorial waters to 
detect and report foreign vessels illegally present 
therein; 
7. surveillance of sites of mineral exploration and 
exploitation projects in the North when verification of 
their location and status is required; and 
8. during the appropriate seasons, provision of ob- 
server space on aircraft engaged in northern surveillance 
operations to permit wildlife observation. 
16 
Most of these activities involve the air and maritime 
elements of the armed forces rather than those of the land 
element. Defence in the 70s simply said that the three com- 
bat groups and the Canadian Airborne Regiment provided air 
transportable and airborne forces for operations in the 
North and "In the event of a requirement to defend the 
land mass of North America, a mutual support arrangement 
exists with the United States. "17 
A northern region headquarters had already been 
established at Yellowknife with a military liaison staff at 
Whitehorse. it has the responsibility for co-ordinating 
the implementation of the objectives of contributing to 
the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty; maintaining 
16 Ibid., p 19. 
17 Ibid., p 24. 
f 
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operationally ready forces capable of deäling with the sit- 
uations-encountered= providing effective search and rescue 
in Canadian territory and making co-operative contributions 
in adjacent international areas; and contributing to northern 
developments. 18 
To implement these objectives, no now equipment was 
purchased. If the government had considered that major 
capital expenditures would have been necessary, it is doubt- 
ful if protection of sovereignty would have received the 
priority it did. Since 1969, northern activities by the 
armed forces have been fairly intensive. Argus long range 
patrol aircraft have been flying "sovereignty surveillance" 
flights. 19 Mobile Command has conducted annual exercises 
the North and for the first time in the high Arctic. 
The sovereignty role did provide a rationalization 
for the employment of the 115 cr-5s. In 1964, fir. Hollyer 
had chosen the CF-5 over the F-4 Phantom an the aircraft 
20 
to meet the requirements of tactical air support. It 
was chosen because of its relatively low cost of $1.5 mill- 
ion per aircraft and the arrangements to manufacture it 
under license for foreign sales. The aim was to provide 
18 Brigadier General R. M. Withers, "Defence Requirements 
North of Sixty', " Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 1, No 1, 
(Summer, 1971) p 71. 
19 
"MARCOM Keeps Watch Over the Arctic, " Srntinel, (November- 
December, 1970) p 24. 
20 
See "The CF-5: best of the second bent, " by John Gellner, 
Toronto jpn and Mal, March 4,1966. The ferrying range is 
1250 miles and speed 1000 mph. Its cost was less than half 
the F-4 Phantom. 
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the newly organized air transportable brigades with their' 
own integral tactical air support for reasonably high level 
operations. Considerable emphasis was given in the 1964 
White Paper on Defence on providing a now force structure 
for peacekeeping/peace-restoring operations, up to and 
including a Korean War type campaign. For this scenario, 
the CF-5 had much merit as a fighter bomber and battle- 
field surveillance aircraft. 
Two Boeing 707s have been fitted to provide an in- 
flight refueling capability for the CF-5 for quick de- 
ployment overseas and within Canada. It has the capability 
to operate from make-shift runways such as highways or ice, 
but it is generally restricted to hard-top runways. Its 
principal disadvantage was its short range, but in-flight 
refueling, has minimized this. 
21 
The CF-5s began to come into service just as the govern- 
ment had revised its defence priorities and relegated 
peacekeeping to the lowest priority. The 115 CF-5s were an 
embarrassment. Defence in the 70s announced that they would 
be employed to provide a quick-response photographic rec- 
onnainsance capability in Canada and over the waters off 
Canadian shores. Two squadrons were allotted to Allied 
Command, Europe (ACE) Mobile Force but are to be Canadian 
21 For a discussion of the CC-5 see Colin S. Cray, Canadian 
Defence Priorities, p 171. 
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based. 22 
Much criticism has been levelled at the CF-5 air- 
craft because it is ill-suited to a purely surveillance 
role. For operations in the Arctic, more and better air- 
fields are required. For operations off the cast and west 
coasts, its advantages can be better put to use because of 
the greater availability of bases. It in well equipped 
to deal with any use of limited naval power in Canadian 
contiguous waters. It could be used in any future peace- 
keeping/peace-restoring operations. In general, it pro- 
vides the necessary tactical air support for the territorial 
defence of Canada and its contiguous waters with a capability 
for overseas deployment as required. 
The protection of sovereignty role is a vague way ' 
of increasing military involvement primarily in the Arctic 
without being overly specific about the reasons or the 
threat to Canadian sovereignty. The reasons are probably no 
more than it appears to be a good thing at. thin time, has 
domestic political advantages, and should be inexpensive. 
It implies that the territorial defence of Canada is 
not a credible defence role because the threat of actual 
attack is toominimal to justify any serious concern. Pro- 
tection of sovereignty implies a very low level of challenge; 
22 Defences in the 70s, pp 18 and 35. 
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in fact really a commercial rather than 
.a 
military challenge. 
The idea that territorial defence is a requirement is out 
of favour and considered to be a hangover from the Second 
World War. 23 Canadian planners have never given much 
credence to the military lodgement, except in a general 
war and with the intention of diverting Canadian efforts 
from the European theatre. 
Analysis of the Military Threat 
The Soviets could seize a northern installation by 
an airborne operation. Small raiding parties could be 
landed by submarine. It is not the lack of capability 
which minimizes the threat but the lack of suitable object- 
ives. Of the purely military objectives, only Alert could 
be classed as'important. Frobisher Day and perhaps Res- 
olute Day are the only civilian objectives in the eastern 
Arctic. 
The seizure of Alert could have strategic implications, 
but unless Thule was seized as wall, it could be sealed off 
and operations mounted from Thule and Foisher Day to re- 
capture Alert. Fnbishor Bay could be sealed off more easily 
and recaptured using Fort Chime, as a mounting base. The key 
factor would not be so much enemy opposition as the weather. 
23 The testimony of Dr. Arncll, SCEAND, Evidence, 28th 
Parl., 1st Bess., No 40, May 1,1969, pp 1374-5. 
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Other than a protracted general war there is no scenario 
for a Soviet lodgement in the Arctic that has a military 
objective. Incursions from the sea using nuclear sub- 
marines could become a threat if counter SSIN operations 
using land based systems become more extensive 
During the 1960s, there was and there remains some 
concern over the Soviet fishing ships operating in the 
western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. 
24 The fear is that if 
the international situation suddenly deteriorated, the crows 
of these ships would pose a threat to coastal installations. 
They are also a form of hostage in that they could be sunk 
at will. If war should break out or if it appeared likely, 
the Soviets would have little option but to land on the 
coasts or face being sunk. The fishing fleet has certain 
para-military functions and the largo numbers of fisher- 
men who might be forced to land (perhaps as many as 10,000) 
would pose a threat far exceeding any Arctic lodgement. 
To counter such a threat "ready forces" were organized 
in the 1960s to deal with a series of landings by para- 
military forces. 25 As the likelihood of Cast-West con- 
frontations on ttio scale of the Cuban Missile Crisis has 
lessened, there has been less emphasis on countering this 
24 John D. Ilarbron, "The Concept of Ma ritimo Strike, " 
RCAF Air Force College Journ , 1963, pp 73-8 and the 
testimony 
of Admiral Landymore, Standing Committee on Defence, Evidence, 
26th Parl., 1st sess., No 12, June 23,1966, p 312 
25 The writer commanded the Ready Force Company for one 
year on the Atlantic coast. 
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threat. Yet is is a more dangerous and more probable 
one than Arctic lodgements because of the annual presence 
of the Soviet fishing fleet. 
It may wall be legally possible to set up stations 
on Arctic ice that have an explicit military role, such 
as radar or underwater listening devices. There is no in- 
dication that such action is contemplated. The reasons 
appear to be both political and military. The military 
advantages compared to other means available would seem to 
be minimal. There could be some advantage to the deploy- 
ment of underwater listening devices if the need should 
arise to undertake systematic detection of submarines op- 
crating under the pack ice. Politically, the deployment 
of military bases would be provocative but less so in 
the central Arctic basin area than if contiguous to land 
areas. If the United States should. deploy ice bases con- 
tiguous to the Soviet Union or vice versa then strong 
pressures would be generated to increase national juris- 
diction over extensive areas of the Arctic Ocean and the 
air space above. The Arctic would become an area of in- 
creased strategic significance in which the differentiation 
of national, alliance, military and commercial objectives 
would become very difficult. 
The Canadian Military Response 
Paradoxically, the land and air elements of the armed 
forces have a greater capability for territorial defence 
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than they have over had. Since the 1964 White Paper 
On Defence, the re-equipping and the re-structuring of 
the land and, air elements have increased mobility and 
flexibility of these forces to counter any threats to 
Canadian territorial integrity. In Canada today, there 
are the Canadian Airborne Regiment and three combat groups 
(light brigade groups) with two squadrons of CF-5s avail- 
able for the territorial defence of Canada. 
The concept for the territorial defence of Canada 
calls for the creation of tasks forces tailored for par- 
ticular tasks. Operations would be commanded, controlled 
and supported through the establishment of bases (mounting, 
supporting and forwarded bases) and of an airhead as close 
to the objective as possible. 
26 
Since the new priorities 
were announced, the land forces have carried out the most 
intensive training yet for Arctic and nub-Arctic operations 
with territorial defence scenarios. Joint Canadian-United 
States exercises have been resumed under the aegis of the 
Alaska, Western Canada, Western United States (ALCANUS) de- 
fence arrangement. 
The force structure and training programmes are 
clearly oriented towards territorial defence, that is, the 
destruction of any enemy forces which impinge on Canadian 
territorial integrity. The declaratory policy is protection 
26 The writer was the primary author of the manual for 
Canadian and European Arctic tactical operations. 
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of sovereignty, which is related to non-military challenges 
to Canadian sovereignty. This dichotomy between force 
structure and declaratory policy derives primarily from 
two factors. The first is the sunk costs in structure 
and equipment deriving from the 1964 White Paper on Defence 
with its emphasis on mobility and war fighting capabilities. 
Second, the training and equipment for territorial defence 
operations is ideal for northern Norway operations. Thus, 
the force structure and training of the Canada based 
forces is dominated by overseas and alliance commitments 
as an inheritance of the 1964 White raper on Defence. 
The protection of'sovereignty declaratory role is 
so nebulous as to be artifical. If an increase in land 
forces' presence is required, then territorial defence 
exercises are one of the most suitable moans of providing 
it. It is not possible to train or exercise to protect 
Canadian sovereignty. 
The artificiality of the protection of sovereignty 
role should not disguise its inherent weakness. The force 
structure and training required for tho"protection of 
sovereignty tasks are of a minimal nature. If-the logic 
behind them should become the dominant influence in deciding 
the force structures, 
27 Canada would have no war fighting 
capability for land operations at all. Canada would be 
left completely vulnerable to any form of attack, incursion 
27 Interviews with Treasury officials in September 1972 
suggest that this logic is held by some sectors of government. 
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or lodgement. It would be dependent completely on the 
United States and this would be counter-productive for 
the protection of sovereignty, whatever meaning is given 
the term. 
No matter how minimal the threat, geography and 
climate require a force structure that has both strategic 
and tactical mobility and sufficient reserves to deal 
with a number of perhaps widely dispersed threats/challenges. 
A force' structure designed for the territorial defence of 
Canada and overseas operations can meet all the require- 
ments for land based sovereignty tasks. It ensures, in 
the context of the continental imbalance, that all the res- 
ponsibilities for Canadian territorial defence can be 
carried out by Canadian forces. It ensures that collective 
defence arrangements are an extension of, and not a sub- 
stitute for, Canadian defence repponsibilites. 
The fear that increased Canadian military activity 
may "set back the peaceful use of the whole circumpol4r 
north" and may not be well viewed from "beyond the north 
pole" has been voiced. 
28 Considering the extensive Soviet 
activity on their side of the pole, it seems somewhat 
incredible that any increaood Canadian activity confined 
to'Canadian territory would be provocative. The fear is 
28 Trevor Lloyd, "Some International Aspects of Arctic 
Canada, " International Journal, Vol XXV, No 4, (Autumn, 1970) 
p 725. 
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really a red herring of those who want some form of in- 
ternationalization of the north, including reciprocal 
arrangements to organize an "open area" for scientific 
investigation and the total removal of arms. 
The most often used analogy is that of the inter- 
national arrangements for Antarctica. The analogy is a 
false one because, in contrast to Antarctica, all the land 
areas of the Arctic region are under sovereign control. 
But more importantly the Canadian Arctic is for Canada to 
develop to meet its own needs as an integral part of the 
Canadian state. The Canadian Arctic, no more than the 
Soviet Arctic, cannot be separated from the overall devel- 
opment and defence requirements of each state. 
Any planning for Arctic defence must be long term 
and flexible enough to adapt to changing political, strat- 
egic and technological factors. The Canadian Arctic cannot 
be isolated from developments in the whole Arctic region. 
Planning must be based on a continuous appreciation of 
Canadian interests, changes in superpower strategic per- 
ceptions and the application of new technologies to economic 
and military uses in the Arctic region. Today, superpower 
attention is concentrated in the Norwegian sector of the 
Arctic and not the Canadian Arctic. 
The Commitment to ACE Mobile Force (North) 
The main impetus given to the review of foreign and 
defence policies derived from a dissatisfaction with Canada`s 
dafenco commitmonta and the dosiro to put a coiling on 
defence expenditures. The government in 1969 reaffirmed 
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the Canadian political commitment to NATO, but reduced 
its European based forces from 10,000 to 5,000 men and 
co-located the land and air elements at Lahr in southern 
Germany. The Canadian based commitment of one battalion 
group to be followed by the remainder of an air/sea trans- 
portable combat group to the ACE Mobile Force (North) 
was increased by two CF-5 squadrons for operations on 
NATO's northern flank. The history of this commitment 
to northern flank operations is interwoven with Canadian 
dissatisfaction with the commitment of forces permanently 
based on the central front. 
Canada played an instrumental role in the formation 
of NATO but saw it as a means of politically reassuring 
a devastated Europe and "made no secret of the fact that 
one of the advantages .. * of NATO 
in 1948 was that it 
seemed safer to join a multilateral alliance than a highly 
unequal bilateral alliance. "29 It was ansumed that NATO 
would be a means of pooling the members' military strength, 
thereby reducing "the total expenditures which each of the 
29 
John ilolmes, Canada and 
and Security Issues, Be Hind the 
(March, 19 0 Canadian Institute 
See Robert A. Spencer, Canada in 
and Rscott Reid, "ThaBirth of t 
International Journal, Vol XXII, 
the United States: Political 
Iea ines, vo XI , Nos 1-2 
of International Affairs, p S. 
World Affairs, pp 256-65 
he North Atlantic Alliance, " 
No 3, (Summer, 1967) pp 426-40. 
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twelve countries would have found necessary for their 
security had there been no pact. "30Canadian defence 
planning and the small rearmament programme begun in 1949, 
with defence expenditures rising to a little over $360 
million, were based on the premise that the European 
theatre was the primary one. It was considered that Canada 
would have time to mobilize for a protracted conflict 
along Second World War lines. The Korean War changed 
Canadian perceptions of the Soviet threat from being pri- 
marily political to military. 
31 It "triggered" the large 
Canadian rearmament programme of the 1950s, with annual 
expenditures reaching a peak in 1953 of $1.9 billion 
(7.6 per cent of the GNP). This figure was not to be sur- 
passed until 1972-73 in absolute terms and when less than 
2 percent of the GNP was being spent on defence. 
In 1951, General Eisenhower, the recently appointed 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACCUR), came to Ottawa 
and requested the temporary dispatch of troops to assist 
in reassuring Europeans of the North American commitment 
to the defence of Europe. A brigade group was recruited 
specially and dispatched in the winter of 1951-52. An air 
division of 12 squadrons of day fighters following in early 
1953. In addition, Canada was committed to increase the 
30 Department of National Defence, Canada's Defence Programm( 1949-50, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949) p B. 
31 
See D. Stairs , "The Military as an Instrument of Canadian foreign Policy, " ! lector J. Massey, ed., The Canadian 
Military: A Profile, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972) pp 94-101. 
1 
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brigade group to a division-after the first day of mobilization 
and'to follow this with a corps headquarters and a second 
division if necessary. 
32 
The brigade group was shortly after motorized, and 
with the exception of the Centurion tank, was largely 
equipped with United States equipment, as were the Canadian 
based forces. This complicated the logistical support 
for the brigade group because it was part of the British 
Army of the Rhino (DAOR) and dependent on British supply 
organizations to handle many non-British items. 
The force structure of the Canadian Army became 
almost completely oriented to operations on the central 
front. The stationing of Canadian forces in Europo took 
on a permanent character. By the late 1950s, it was apparent 
that. both the land and air forces based in Europo would 
have to be re-equipped to conform to NATO's newly adopted 
forward strategy involving the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. At the same time the controversial NORAD Agreement 
was negotiated and Canada was faced with re-equipping its 
air defence forces and adopting nuclear weapons for them. 
The Honest John was selected as a mobile surface to surface 
nuclear rocket to provide intimate support for ground 
operations in Europe. The Honest John was really a 
divisional weapon, and its adoption added to the anomalies 
of the relationship of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
32 General Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defence policy 
in a Nuclear Age, " p 4. 
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Group (4CIBG) and BAOR. General Foulkes summarized the 
anomalies: 
However, as we have only one isolated brigade, we 
have to provide for that brigade all the support 
and facilities which would normally be provided 
by the division, by the corps and by the army... So 
we are in the position of having to meet all the 
requirements for a brigade as if it had a division, 
a corps and an army behind, and the 53jority of 
these will have to come from Ckznada. 
As early as 1958, a retired Wing Commander, John 
Gellner, proposed the concept of "fire brigade" forces 
designed to contain local conflicts. He conceived those 
forces being ready at all times to go into battle at the 
shortest notice. They were to be flexible in structure 
so as to be able to fight under any climatic conditions, 
and mobile enough that they could strike swiftly, and in 
sufficient strength, to achieve the aim of peace enforcement. 
By 1963, he was advocating that, the natural place for 
Canadian conventional forces assigned to NATO should be 
the NATO mobile force which was then taking shape. 
34 
In 1960, serious consideration was given to the 
withdrawal of the Canadian brigade from its forward 
deployment to a mobile reserve position. 
35 This now 
33 The testimony of General Charles Foulkes, Standing 
Committee on Defence, Evil 26th Parl., lot seas., No 15, 
October 22,1963, p 49 1. 
34 
John Gellner, Problems of Canadian Defence, Behind 
the Headlines, Vol XVIII, No 5, Cana an Institute 
of International Affairs, pp 11-2 and John Gallner, "Building 




Testimony of General Charles Foulkes, Standing Com- 
mittee on Defence, Evidence, 26th Parl., 1st seas., No 15, 
October 22,1963, p 497, and testimony of Genoral Foulkes, 
SCEAND, Evidence, 28th Parl., 1st seas., No 26, February 12, 
1969, p T3. 
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role was tQ be complemented by changing the role of the Air 
Division to that of air transport, a role much opposed 
by the RCAF. Consideration was also given to the cutting 
of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe. These 
considerations derived from the dilemma of having to 
mechanize fully the brigade if it was to retain its role 
and be deployed forward. At the same time the amount 
available for capital expenditures was decreasing as operations 
and maintenance costs continued to rise. Both these 
solutions were rejected, but no decision was made on ro- 
equipping. It was apparent that re-equipping along fully 
mechanized lines would produce major incompatibilities 
in organization and equipment between the needs of the 
European based forces and the Canadian based and peacekeeping 
forces. 
The desirability, for political, financial and 
organizational reasons, of reducing those developing 
incompatibilities was demonstrated during the hearings of 
the Special committee on Defence in 1963. Lieutenant General 
Guy Simonds, a retired Chief of the General Staff recommended 
a tri-service or integrated force which would be used for 
early intervention to prevent escalation, and would moot 
both NATO and other peacetime requirements. He explained: 
I believe that a role which is suited to a country of 
our size having regard to the. financial burdens pos9iblo 
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to be borne over a lengthy term, would be a tri- 
service force whose main objective was peacekeeping. 
I believe its organization should be very much like 
that of the United States marine corps which is 
mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and 
able to meeS6what are commonly called brushfire 
situations. 
General Foulkes, recently retired Chairman of the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, argued for a mobile ready 
reserve, available immediately for NATO deployment, to meat 
t UN tasks anywhere in the world, or to maintain Arctic 
sovereignty. 37 lie foresaw such a structure allowing for 
all Canadian troops to be Canadian based. lie reiterated 
a proposal he had apparently made to the government as 
Chairman in 1960. lie advocated withdrawing the brigade 
group from its forward role on the central front, 'and 
changing its role to that of an airportable mobile reserve, 
with the ultimate objective of basing it in Canada. 
The debate was not just over the roles and equipment 
of the forces, but also over Canada's position in the world 
and what role it should be playing. In the early 1950s, 
both politically and militarily, Canada had been an important 
member of NATO whose contributions were significant. The 
determination to continue to make a significant contribution 
to collective defence had been behind the decisions of 
the Diefenbakor government, a determination shared by the 
37 Testimony of General Foulkes, Evidence, 26th Parl., Ist sass., October 22,1963, p 507. 
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Liberal opposition. 
Mr. Pearson's role in the creation of the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for service in the Middle 
East began to focus attention on peacekeeping as an 
international role. Contributions to UNEF were followed 
by ones for the Congo force and Cyprus. Peacekeeping 
came to be seen as the true role for Canada as a "middle 
power" as Canadians were calling themselves. It satisified 
the "idealistic impulse" for a special role that difforontiatoc 
Canada internationally from the other NATO states and 
qualified its support for the United States in the Cold 
War. 38 It had added advantage that advanced weapons were 
not required, and'therefore, defence costs could be hold 
down. John 11olmes writing in Foreign Affairs in 1963, 
after arguing that Europeans should provide more for their 
own defence, summarized these feelings: 
In Canada there is also a strong opinion that its 
most useful services are those which it provides for 
international peacekeeping operations and that its 
armed forces should to an increasing extent be 
trained and organized for these iniddle-power functions. 
39 
The Special Committee on Defence in its December 1963 
Report had recommended that: "Study should be given to the 
role of, the two brigades that are presently committed in 
the case of emergency an back-up to the Brigade in Europe 
and to the transport and mobility of those forces as wall 
38 See Peter Doboll, Canadn's Search for Now Roles for 
a discussion of the "Idealistic Impulse, " pp 132-42. 
39 John W. Holmes, "Canada in Search of a Role, " 
Foreign Affairs, Vol 41, No 4, (July, 1963), p 663. 
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as that of Canada's brigade in Europe. "40 It made no 
specific recommendations. In January 1964, it was rumoured 
that the possibility of transferring the Canadian brigade 
to Norway was being canvassed in high NATO circles. 
41 
The move was considered to be primarily political so 
that the brigade would have a non-nuclear role. Also 
in any transfer to Norway, part of the brigade would be 
earmarked for duty with the Nordic contingent that Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden already had established for UN service. 
In 1963, the Liberals came to power as a minority 
government. Mr. Ifellyor, the now Minister of National 
Defence, espoused the idea of greater service integration 
and greater mobility for the services. lie was firmly 
committed to the concept of collective defence and had 
agreed with Mr. Pearson's decision to accept nuclear 
weapons. 
Mr. Ilellyer's 1964 White Paper on Defence listed 
four parallel methods by which the objectives of Canadian 
defence policy had been pursued since 1945. There were: 
Collective measures for the maintenance of peace and 
security as embodied in the UN Chartert Collective 
Defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty; Partnership 
with the United States in the defence of North America; 
and national measures for security and protection of Canada. 
0 
40 Standing Committee on Defence, Third Report, 26th 
Parl., 1st sess., December 20,1963, p 805. 
41 "Shift of Canadians to Norway Studied", Toronto 
Globe and Mail, January 7,1964. 
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The 1964 White Paper on Defence outlined the new integrated 
force structure with the choice of priorities based on 
the following requirements: 
1. Forces for the direct protection of Canada which could 
be deployed as required. 
2. Forces-in-being as part of the deterrent in the European 
theatre. 
3. Maritime forces-in-being as a contribution to the 
deterrent. 
4. Forces-in-being for UN peacekeeping operations which 
were included in (1) above. 
5. Reserve forces and mobilization potential. 
42 
The first requirement and its corollary, the fourth 
" requirement, were to be not by re-equipping two of the 
Canadian based brigades as an airportablo force. Those 
brigades would also provide the rotational personnel for 
the European brigade. The third brigade was to be turned 
into a special service force. To provide for the necessary 
strategic lift, 24 C-130 Hercules aircraft were purchased 
and three naval support ships were built. Tactical air 
support was to be provided by the CF-5. The 1964 White 
Paper on Defence programme was largely implemented by 
1968, except the special force idea was dropped and the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment substituted. I 
For the second requirement, the 1964 White Paper on 
Defence announced that the European brigade would not be 
42 The 1964 White Paper on Defence, p 24. 
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withdrawn in favour of making a contribution to an air- 
portable force based in Europe and available for employment 
on NATO's flanks. The reasons were: the brigade was a 
useful contribution in a vulnerable area; the importance 
of a Canadian presence on the central front; support 
could be moved from Canada to the flanks; it was considered 
to be more economical than the stationing of a mobile 
reserve in Europe; and it was more acceptable than with- 
drawing operationally ready front-line battalions for 
service on the flanks. 
43 
The European brigade was re- 
equipped as a completely mechanized force. 
The previous government had by no means committed 
its successor to mechanizing the European brigade. This 
was the Pearson government's decision. His government 
believed that Canadian interests wore served by a continued 
presence on the central front and rejected a changed 
role. Yet the incompatibility of the newly structured 
airportable, non-nuclear Canadian based forces and the 
fully mechanized nuclear armed European forces was widened 
to include organization, equipment, roles and training. 
The squaring of the circle was, however, begun with the 
committment of one battalion group from the Canadian based 
forces to the newly formed ACC Mobile Force. Thus the 
desire for compatibility, a non-nuclear role, and wholly 
Canadian based forces was introduced into the military 
committment to NATO's ground forces not by reconfiguring, 
43 Ibid., p 21. 
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redeploying or reducing them, but by increasing them. 
This now commitment was made evident when the Black 
Watch Battalion Group was lifted by air and sea from Canada 
to Norway in 1966. A second battalion was committed for 
operations on the southern flank, but this commitment was 
withdrawn in 1970 without any troops taking part in exorcises. 
The commitment to the northern flank was further incroaspd 
by the addition of the remainder of a brigade group to follow 
the deployment of the battalion group if necessary. A 
Canadian, General Giles Turcot, became the second commander 
of the ACE Mobile Force. 
Thus at the time when Mr. Trudeau's government initiated 
its review of foreign and defence polices in the spring of 
1968, mobility and compatibility were part of the force 
structure for some of the forces committed to NATO. Aside from 
the undesirability of the incompatibility in structure between 
Canadian and European based forces, there was a strong 
feeling 
that the Canadian political and military commitments to NATO 
required fundamental revision. In addition, decisions were duo 
for the re-equipping of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group 
(CMDG) with a new tank. The most likely purchase was the 
British Chiefb«n for a possible expenditure of $150 million. 
The nuclear armed strike reconnaissance CF-104a deployed 
in the early 1960s were becoming obsolete and the goverment 
was faced with the interrelated decision over role and a 
new aircraft. The only non-nuclear ones were those of 
close air support, air transport, and air defence. The 
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air defence role conflicted with the European pattern of 
territorial air defence forces. There was no air transpott 
role except for movement to the flanks. The ACE Mobile 
Force contingents were exercised as little as once a year, 
and there was sufficient transport available already in 
Europe. The close air support role was the only acceptable 
one, but the CF-5 was not well suited for a central front 
role. The best aircraft would have been the Phantom F-4, 
but this aircraft had already been rejected because of cost 
and the. government was in no mood to purchase Phantoms as 
well as CF-5s. 
The opponents of NATO (and NORAD) saw it as a United 
States dominated alliance which restricted the development 
of'an "independent" foreign policy, diverted resources 
which should be used for foreign aid, and lessened Canada's 
credibility as a peacekeeper. 
44 They wanted to withdraw 
from both NATO and NORAD or at least radically reduce any 
Canadian Commitment. There was a strong moral crusading 
element in their outlook, and they represented an aspect 
of the idealistic impulse underlaying much of declaratory 
Canadian foreign policy. They dismissed the political and 
44 The literature is fairly large. Three representative 
books are Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign 
Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McCle an a-nd Stewart, 1968): 
Lewis ! lertzman, John Warnock and Thomas Iiockin, Alliances 
and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question, L 
monton: 
Hurtig, 1969)1 and John Warnock, Partner to tic emoth: The 
Military Policy of a Satellite Cana a, (Toronto: New 
Press, 1970). 
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security functions of collective defence organizations 
and overstressed what an independent foreign policy could 
achieve. 
The proponents for NATO and collective defence were 
generally on the defensive as defenders of the status quo. 
They stressed the need to make a direct contribution to 
European stability, the importance to Canadian interests 
of the influence achieved through military commitments, 
and the value of NATO membership as a counterbalance to 
continentalist pulls. 
The final decision was a compromise that reflected 
a serious division in the cabinet. 
45Mr. 
Trudeau's 3 April 1969 
statement to the press reaffirmed Canada's political and 
military commitment to NATO but stated that Canada had 
decided to "bring about a planned and phased reduction 
of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe. "46 On 12 
April, the prime minister defended the new defence policy 
on the grounds that NATO had had too great a role in 
determining Canadian foreign policy and that " our 
defence policy, which flowed from this foreign policy, of 
NATO, now was more to impress our friends than frighten our 
enemies. "47Also Canada should no longer close its options 
45 
Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p 138. 
46 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "A Defence Policy for Canada, " 
Statements and Speeches, No 69/7, April 3,1969, Department 
of External Affairs. 
47 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, "The II, lation of Dufenca Policy to 
Foreign Policy, " Statements and Spreche , No 69/8, April 12,1969, D'partment of External Affairs. i rpts fran an address by Prim 
Minister Trudeau to a Dinner of the Alberta Liberal Asnociatial, 
Calagary, April 12,1969. 
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by devoting all its military strength to NATO. This last 
theme was subsequently more fully articulated in the 
European booklet, Foreign Policy for Canadians. In referring 
to future Canadian contributions to NATO, it said that: 
The precise military role that Canada assumes at 
any given time will depend impart on the role of 
Canadian forces in the defence of Canada and North 
America and in part on the requirements for peacekeeping. 
It will also take account of the economic recovery 
of the countries of Western Europe and their enhanced 
ability to provide for their conventional dofence. 40 
The Canadian decision to reduce its European based 
forces was ill-received by other NATO members. The original 
decision had been for a two-thirds reduction but this was 
revised to only one-half because of NATO pressure. 4 
CMBG was reduced to a mechanized battle group and the 
Honest John battery disbanded. In theory, Canadian land 
forces were now non-nuclear. in fact, they wore just 
as involved in the nuclear business as before because 
they remained deployed on the central front. The only change 
was that direct tactical nuclear support would come from 
non-Canadian nuclear forces. The Air Division was reduced 
from six squadrons to three and the CF-104s were re-fitted 
for conventional bombing missions; a role for which they 
were particularly ill-suited. 
Defence in the 709 reiterated the previous arguments 
for the reduction stating, that: "In addition, Government- 
wide financial restraints, and the resulting need for 
. compatibility of roles and equipment for our home and over- 
seas based Armed Torces, dictated the need for some adjustment'. 
48 rorQign Policy for Canadians (Europe), p 24. 
49 Defence in the 70s, p 32. 
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Although Defence in the 70s confirmed that the government 
had no plans for further reductions, it had been decided 
"that the land force should be reconfigured to give it 
the high degree of mobility needed for tactical reconnais- 
sance missions in the Central Region reserve role. " And 
"the result will be enhanced compatibility of Canadian and 
European based forces, and a lighter, more mobile land 
force capable of a wide range of missions. " 
so The new 
policy gains the objectives of compatibility, reduction 
in size and non-nuclear roles, but not that of having all 
the forces Canadian based. 
One of the arguments for a Canadian withdrawal from 
NATO had been that the previous forces had played no signifi-' 
cant role for the defence of Europo. The new structure 
was far less significant militarily, but the political 
arguments for a retention of a Canadian presence on the 
central front proved effective once compatibility, a 
reduction, and a non-nuclear'role had been achieved. The 
achievement of compatibility was somewhat diminished in 1973 
when it was decided to delay purchase of a direct fire 
support vehicle (light tank) for central front operations. 
Defence in the 70n, in announcing that the Canadian 
50 Ibid., p 35. The April 3,1969 statement to the 
press had stated that "The structure, equipment and training 
of our forces must be compatible with (roles in collective 
security and peacekeeping activities], and it is the 
intentioc 
of the Government that they shall be. " 
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commitment to the ACE Mobile Force would be increased by 
two squadrons of CF-5s, argued that this decision "will 
enhance NATO's deterrent strength and add to its ability 
to carry out the strategy of flexibility in response (sicj, 
which requires emphasis on conventional capability. "51 
The Canadian ACE Mobile Force commitment was retained 
and slightly increased. This was not because of new 
perception of the strategic threat to the northern flank 
or to the Arctic region as a whole. It was because such 
a commitment was compatible in structure and function with 
Canadian based forces and provided tangible evidence of 
the Canadian commitment to NATO. 
The government, in its foreign and defence policy 
reviews, made no attempt to continua the previous declaratory 
policy that continental defence and NATO commitments 
were related organizationally. Their separation was 
accepted and emphasized in the new priorities. By 
continuing previous government policies designed to 
increase compatibility, to find non-nuclear roles, 
and to home base the maximum number of troops, the government 
was able to remove much of the dissatisfaction with 
Canadian foreign and defence policies. 
The commitment of Canadian forces to a central front 
role was maintained because there was a mutual interest 
between Canada and the other NATO countries for a 
continued Canadian presence, however small., A complete 
51 Defence in the 70s, p 36 
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withdrawal could have had adverse political consequences. 
For all its 
0toric, 
the government was not prepared to 
chance losing too much influence. It was again demonstrated, 
that however tenuous or intangible, there is a relationship 
between a Canadian military commitment and political 
influence in Europe. 
The strategic reasons given for the continued maintenance 
of Canadian forces in Europe "reflected the Government's 
judgement that Canadian security continues to be linked to 
Western Europa and that Europo is still probably the most 
sensitive point in the East-West balance of power. " It 
is the area "from which any conflict, however limited, might 
most readily escalate into all-out nuclear war engulfing 
Canadian territory. " 
52 The government considered that 
hostilities could still occur over Berlin or from an 
accidential spillover from unrest in Eastern Europe. 
Canada his been somewhat uncertain over its relations with 
the EEC, but Defence in the 70s was unusually frank when it 
argued that the "community of interest we share with these 
countries through common NATO membership should be a 
positive factor in these negotiations" for trade. 
53 
The government of Mr. Trudeau, both in its composition 
and the public support it had, was in a very strong position 
to withdraw militarily from Europe. That it did not do 
so was a clear political decision. The political need 
52 Ibid., p 33 
53 Ibid., p 34 
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for influence in Europe and thus find a counterbalance to the 
influence of the United States and to help in overcoming the 
sense of psychological subordination that has developed 
in Canada in the post-war years54 was a crucial consideration 
in the decision. The deeply entrenched Canadian desire to 
offset the continental imbalance by looking overseas, was 
again clearly the option chosen. 
The choice was further emphasized by a series'of 
government statements on the importance of Canadian-European 
relationships in the autumn of 1974. The 1975-76 defence 
estimates call for a 12 per cent increase to offset in- 
flationary pressures for a budget of $2.8 billion, an 
increase of one billion since the 1969 ceiling. Even then, 
personnel reductions are forecast, but these will not affect 
Canada's NATO commitment or peacekeeping forces. They will 
be made in the protection of sovereignty and continental 
defence forces. 55 In practice, the 1969 priorities have 
been reversed. 
54 Peter Dobell, Canada's Search`for New Roles, pp 86-101. 
Mr. Dobell makes a forceful argument for the importance of 
Canadian-European links. See also Leonard Beaton, "The 
Strategic and Political Issues Facing America, Britain and 
Canada, " The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol 9, No 4, 
Winter, 1971-72 for the importance of transatlantic links. 
55 Speech by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. 
James Richardson, to the Canadian Defence Association, 
January 17,1975, Transcript, provided by the C. B. C. in Halifax, 
N. S. On three different occasions while on trips to Europe 
in 1974-75, Mr. Trudeau has stated that the overall troop 
size of 5000 men for the Central Front commitment will not be, 
reduced. The composition may change to an all-land or 
an all-air commitment. Press reports suggest the Prime 
Minister favours an all-land commitment but Mr. Richardson favours an all-air commitment. In this writer's opinion, 
the eventual decision will be a return to an, mechanized brigade 
group, equipped with main battle tanks, possibly German. 
Government statements have already reverted to calling the Canadian land component on the Central Front as the 4th 
Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. 
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The Strategic Significance of the Northern Cap 
NATO's Northern flank includes both Norway and Denmark 
but the term Northern Cap is more relevant for purposes 
of strategic analysis. 
56 The term Northern Cap embraces 
the northern areas of Norway, Sweden, Finland and European 
Russia; in essence the European arctic. Until the 1950s, 
the strategic signifcance of the Northern Cap was related 
to the use of Finnish territory as an invasion route into 
the Soviet Union. The deployment in the 1950s of intercon- 
tinental nuclear delivery systems changed this. 
57 The most 
fundamental chance has come with the large expansion of the 
Soviet Northern Fleet and the general growth of Soviet 
maritime power. 
The operational areas of the Northern Fleet have 
extended gradually westward under the requirements of 
a forward deployment strategy. Its area of operations now 
extends to all the Norwegian Sea and occasionally into the 
Atlantic. In case of war or a crisis situation, it seems 
that a Soviet "forward defensive zone" would be established 
in the Greenland-Iceland-Faoroes gap covering the access 
5 
routes to and from the Atlantic. 
6 
The Norwegian Sea affords 
56 
For a discussion of the definition of the Northern 
Cap see Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union 
with a forward by Henry Kissinger, Harvard university Center 
for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International 
Affairs, No 6, (September, 1963) p 7. 
57 See D. C. Cuthbertson, " The Strategic Significance 
of the Northern Cap, " Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies, Vol 117, No 666, (June 1972), 
pp 47 -" 
58 
Johan Itolst, Soviet Naval Power in the North Atlantic 
and Nordic Security, (NUPI N, Oslo, September 21,1971) p 8. 
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the Soviet Union with its most important transit route for 
SSDNs. 59 
It is reasonably clear that the principal tasks of 
the Northern Fleet are related to the nuclear balance and 
East-West tension. That these tasks are carried out by the 
Northern Fleet is a function of geography rather than any 
strategy related to Northern Europe. 
The increasing capabilities of the Soviet navy for 
operations in the use of limited naval power are 
adding a new dimension to the problem of Nordic security. 
If the Soviet Union should maintain a pernanent off-shore 
presence round the North Cape and along the coast of Norway, 
its ability to, carry out limited naval operations at short 
notice and without warning would be greatly increased. Soviet 
maritime presence off Norway has become the principal factor 
in any analysis of Norwegian security. 
60 
The strategic 
significance of north Norway is related to the future east 
and west requirements for the command or denial of the Nor- 
wegian Sea. 
Canadian Strategic Interests and a NATO Arctic Command 
Throughout the protracted debate on Canadian defence 
policy, only one participant, Nils Orvik, has put forward 
59 
A logical area for submarine warning systems is the lin 
from north Norway to Svalbard which marks the limit between the 
shallow Barents Seas to the deeper Norwegian Sea. See Egil 
Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper, No 81, International 
Institute o Strategic Studies, London, 1971, pp 15 and 21. 
60 
See Johan Holst, Soviet Naval Pc r in the North Atlantic and 
Nordic Securit ; Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, and General Walter Q. 
Walker, i' ems of the Defence ofNATO s Northern Flank, " Journal; 
of the Royal United Services institute for Defence Studies, Vol CXV, No 659, 
(September 1970) pp 13-22. 
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the concept of a strategic relationship between the Canadian 
Arctic defence requirements and those of the European Arctic. 
61 
lie argues that although the flanks and central'areas are 
covered by existing NATO organizational arrangements, Soviet 
naval activity and technological developments have given 
increased strategic importance to the Arctic sectors of 
Western Europe and North America. To counter these developments 
he has proposed a NATO Arctic Command which would combine 
ground, naval and air responsibilities for the defence of these 
sectors. 
The Canadian forces based in Europe, together with some 
United States and possibly some British forces, would be 
allocated a special responsibility for the security of the 
northern areas. These forces, being European based and 
having as their prime task northern defence, would offset 
the major weakness of the present NATO mobile forces, which 
are their small size and uncertainties about priorities for 
their use. Orvik argues tttat the Canadian basing of Canada's 
commitment to NATO's central front is not a satisfactory 
solution, and "Transfer to an Arctic command would give 
the Canadian forces assignment in Europe more firmness 
and purpose. " Canadian forces would be involved "in 
surveillance of areas vital to Canadian security. "62 
The basic premise of Nils Orvik, upon which he does not 
61 
Defence in the 70s: Comments on the White Paper, 
Nils Orvik, Vol XXX, Nos 7-8, (October 1970) Canadian 





expand, is that there is a strategic relationship between 
the defence requirements of the Canadian Arctic and the 
European Arctic. The advent of the nuclear armed bomber 
increased dramatically the strategic significance of both 
Arctic regions, but in the European Arctic military developments 
were confined largely to the Soviet sector. It was the 
introduction of seaborne deterrent systems and the large 
expansion of the Northern Fleet that increased the significance 
of northern Norway. In contrast, the strategic significance of 
the Canadian Arctic has declined in importance. It is the 
waters contiguous to Norway that have increased in significance 
but there has been no paralled increase as yet for Canadian 
Arctic waters. 
There is a threat to northern Norway of direct Soviet 
attack or incursions, but in Canada's case the threat is 
small. The structure, equipment and training of the Canadian 
forces for the territorial defence of Canada are equally 
applicable'for operations in northern Norway. However, 
operational similarities, no more than geographical ones, 
should not be confused with strategic ones. 
63 The Canadian 
commitment to ACC Force developed out-of the political desire 
to make a contribution to NATO that was Canadian based, 
compatible with other tasks, and was non-nuclear in role. 
Although the transfer of role of the European based forces 
to European Arctic tasks makes considerable military 
63 See D. C. Cuthbertson, "Canadian Defence Policy 
and the Northern Flank, " ßrassey's Annual 1973, (William 
Clowes & Sons, 1973) pp 174-87. 
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le 
sense, such a change would affect the political reasons for 
maintaining a central front role. Canadian political and 
economic interests are in the central front arealnot in 
the peripher, l areas. Canadian forces would still be 
permanently based in Europe, but the political rationale for 
their presence would be weakened. This political problem 
can only be overcome if the central West European powers 
conclude that a Canadian contribution to northern European 
defence is as important politically as is a Canadian presence, 
however minimal, on the central front. It would make little 
sense for Canada to maintain forces permanantly in Europe, if 
a change of role would mean a lessening of political influence 
without any compensating advantages. There will have to be 
considerable, change in European political, and strategic 
thinking before Canada is likely to agree to any geographical 
transfer of role. 
Canada does have a strategic interest in contributing 
to European Arctic defence. If, as Defence in the 70s argues, 
Canadian security is still linked with Western Europe, 
and the increasing significance of northern Europe is 
accepted not as a 
4-ý 
security problem but as a European 
and North American one, then it should be considered as a 
sensitive point in the East-West balance. Any political 
and strategic deterioration in northern Europe would result 
in increased Soviet exercise of seapower in the area. The 
threat is that such an exercise of seapower could extend 
to trade routes and to Canadian contiguous waters. 
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Possible means of countering this development could 
be Canadian participation in a NATO Arctic Command 
that would be based on a coincidence of maritime and 
Arctic interests. of Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Norway. 'Such a command would include security 
arrangements for Alaska, northern Canada, Greenland, Iceland, 
Norway and the contiguous waters. Its aim would be to secure 
the interests of'these states as the Arctic area develops 
in strategic and economic significance. for the littoral 
countries. However, no NATO, or for that matter, North 
American command structure, would be acceptable to Canada 
that would seem to impinge on Canadian sovereignty and 
control of the Canadian Arctic and, its contiguous waters. 
The strategic arguments for the interrelationship 
between Canadian and European Arctic defence will not 
make much impression unless the threat becomes considerably 
more perceptible to both Canadians and Europeans. There is 
a definite desire by the Canadian government to maintain 
a clear separation between the two. Its presumed fear is 
that Canadian Arctic defence policies would become as 
dependent on a northern NATO strategy as have been previous 
policies on a central front strategy. The nationalistic 
tenor of Canadian Arctic policies makes this politically 
unde 
jirable. 
Such an interrelationship could become 
strategically desirable if'the perceived threat increased'. 
However, Canada would not consider it politically desirable 
unless Canada could withdraw from a central front role 
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without loss of political influence, unless it helped to 
offset United States pressure for possible Arctic defence 
arrangements, and unless there was a clear recognition. of 




THE ARMED FORCES AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
The Canadian Experience 
Section 91 of the British North America Act begins 
by charging the federal government with the responsibility 
for the "peace, order, and good government of Canada. " 
There is no mention of abstract right's in the DNA act. It 
is a very prosaic act of the British Parliament. In the 
hundred years since Confederation, Canadians have never 
boon overly concerned about abstract principles and rights. 
Rather, they have been concerned about peace, order, and 
good government. Political pragmatism, emphasis on 
national development, and the regional and racial divisions 
in Canadian society have combined to submerge and localize 
any revolutionary or extra-parliamentary radical activity. 
However, there have been challenges to governmental 
authority, which have been violent in form or were 
perceived to be potentially violent. l Pre-Confederation 
and post-Confederation governments have reacted forcefully 
1 Challenges to governmental authority can, of 
course, take many forms, but here we are only concerned 
with those challenges that are overtly violent or are 
perceived to be. potentially violent, and which, therefore, 
could require the use of the armed forces. There is no 
attempt to prescribe political strategy or military tactics 
because these are separate matters and outside the purview 
of this thesis. The aim is rather to provide a framework 
for analysis of future force requirements and structure. 
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to these challenges to their authority. In such situations, 
governments have shown little hesitation in employing the 
armed forces. In general, Canadian public opinion has 
supported government during the 1837 Rebellions, the Riel 
Rebellions of 1869-70 and 1885, the Winnipeg General Strike 
2 in 1919, and the October 1970 Front de Liberation Crisis. 
The French-English division in Canadian society 
was a principal factor in the Lower Canadian 1837 Rebellion 
and the October 1970 Crisis. It was of much lesser 
significance as a factor in the Riel Rebellions, but the 
hanging of Riel seriously divided Canada along racial lines. 
Class divisions were prominent in the Winnipeg General 
Strike, the Upper Canadian 1837 Rebellion and to a lesser 
extent the October 1970 Crisis. The 1837 Rebellions 
2 
There is, of course, a large amount of 
literature, much of it controversial, on each of these 
challenges to government authority. For the 1837 
Rebellions see Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1769-1967, 
revised edition, Vol. 1 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 
1968) pp 152-219 and Gerald M. Craig, Upper Canda: The 
Formative Years, 1784-1841, (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1963) pp 188-251. Both these works provide a 
reasonably detailed account of events and a contemporary 
perspective. For a penetrating analysis see D. G. 
Creighton's, "The Commercial Class in Canadian Politics 
1792-1840" and "Economic Background of the Rebellions of 
1837" in his Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected 
Essays, (Toronto: 
, 
MacM 1 an of-Canada, 1972) pp 84-102 
and 103-21. The Riel Rebellions have retained their 
reputation for controversy. The best survey of varying 
interpretations and including contemporary documents is 
Hartwell Dowsfield, ed., Louis Riel: Rebel of the Western 
Frontier or Victim of Politics and Prejudice? in the series 
Issues in Canadian History, (Copp Clarke, 969). For the 
Winnipeg General Strike see D. C. Masters, The Winnipeg 
General Strike, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1950) and Kenneth McNaught's A Prophet in politics: A 
Biography of J. S. Woodsworth, (Toronto: Univers ty of 
Toronto Press, 1959 pp 99-131. For the October crisis 
see later references. 
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were an overt challenge to government, but the Riel 
Rebellions were somewhat more complicated. There is much 
evidence to suggest that the actions of Riel and his Metis 
followers wore primarily designed to gain concessions in 
order to maintain a nomadic way of life rather than as a 
complete rejection of Canadian governmental authority. 
The Winnipeg' General Strike was perceived by government at 
" the time as a conspiracy to overthrow government. It is 
generally accepted today that "there was no seditious 
conspiracy and that the strike was what it purported to 
be, an effort to secure the principle of collective 
bargaining. "3 The FLQ certainly was (and is) a clandestine 
movement whose aim was to bring about the secession of 
Quebec by violent revolution. 
4 However, whether the 
3 D. C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, p 134. 
4 For a good account of the aims and more 
particularly the psychology of the members of the terrorist 
element in the FLQ see Gustave Morf, Terror in Quebec: Case 
Studies of the FLQ, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970). 
Principal d ocuments of the FLQ are three: 
(i) The FLQ's first Manifesto (1963), reprinted in Canadian Dimension, Vol. 7, Nos. 5 and 6, December 1970, pp 31-2. 
(ii) Strategie revolutionnaire et role de l'avant 
garde, a clandestine document, author 
anonymous, which was presented in camera 
" to the Parliamentary Committee investigating 
the activities of the, by then, infamous 
Company of Young Canadians. It was published 
in the Montreal Gazette on October 31,1970. 
The probable date of composition 1968-9- 
(iii) The FLQ manifesto read over Radio Canada on 
October 8,1970'in response to the demands 
of the kidnappers of-James Cross. Gerard 
Pelletier, The October Crisis, tr. by Joyce 
Marshall, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1971) in his Appendix III, pp 212-247 has 
reprinted a survey of FLQ writings and 
pronouncements. 
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kidnappings themselves were designed to bring about an 
insurrection at that time remains debatable. 
5 
However debatable the causes and aims of these 
I. 
challenges to government, there are a number of deductions 
that can be made which are relevant to internal security 
operations in Canada. First, there is no common or 
recurring pattern of cause and aim of relevance to any 
discussion of future challenges to government. Secondly, 
all these challenges were localized in character and in 
geography. Thirdly, none of these challenges were 
sufficiently protracted to gain a momentum that could 
overcome their localized character. Fourthly, violence 
has tended to be sporadic and minimal. Fifthly, government 
has shown little hesitation in reacting, if not overacting, 
to these challenges. The sophisticated, controlled 
response so much in favour today, has not been a predominant 
element in Canadian government reactions to perceived 
violent challenges to its authority. 
When faced by an overt challenge, or what was 
perceived as an overt challenge, government has shown 
little hesitation in employing the armed forces. Martial 
law was proclaimed in 1837 and again during the Quebec 
5 This is discussed later, but here it is suffice 
to point out that much depends on one's analysis of the 
"revolutionary" situation in Quebec at that time. In 
essence, would the two kidnappings have triggered off an 
insurrection? This writer has been unable to locate any 
source that is anything approaching an objective' analysis. 
This writer's personal view is that the kidnappings could 
have triggered off fairly violent disturbances, 
but not 
an insurrection. Therefore, the use of troops was a 
sensible precautionary measure, but the invoking of 
the 
WMA was unnecessary. 
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City anti-conscription riots in 1918. Military force was 
used to crush both the Riel Rebellions. Troops were 
deployed during the Winnipeg General Strike in support of 
the police and again during the October 1970 Crisis. On 
both these latter occasions, the War Measures Act (WMA) was 
in force or invoked. However, there was, and is, no 
requirement to invoke the WMA before troops can be used. 
in the past, the calling out of troops to aid the 
civil power in maintaining law and order was a fairly 
regular. occurrence. The primary reason was the small size 
and decentralized organization of Canadian police forces. 
Throughout the 19th century, the Militia was regularly 
called out in the absence of effective local and provincial 
police forces. They were often "a magistrate's only resource 
for even such routine duties as guarding a hanging or 
breaking up a boxing match. "6 Between 1876 and 1914, the 
Militia was called out on 48 occasions; on five occasions 
to prevent orange-Green riots and 33 times to intervene in 
strikes. Sir Frederick Borden, as Minister of the Militia, 
claimed that "The principal objective [of the Militia] is 
perhaps upholding of the Civil Power in the different parts 
of the Dominion. "7 
The Militia was called out under Section 27 of the 
6 Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics 
and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904, (Toronto: University 
o Toronto Press, 1970) p 15. 
7 Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The 
Canadian Militia in Support of Social order 1867-1914, " 
Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LI, (December 1970) p 407. 
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1868 Militia Act which was based on a pro-Confederation 
act of the Canadas. This act simply required local 
officials, such as a mayor or magistrate, to request in 
writing the local Militia officer to call out his troops. 
The local Militia officer was required to recover his 
expenses from the local community. After 1904, the 
Department of the Militia assumed this responsibility. 
Also in that year, a new act stated that men of the 
permanent force were to be used before the Militia. 
During the pro-World War I period, there was regular 
use of the Militia to break strikes. The confrontation 
between the stickers and the troops was seldom violent, 
and between 1867 and 1914, only one man was killed. This 
changed in the inter-war years as riots and disputes assumed 
a violent form and the troops and police used were often 
veterans, as were the rioters. The changed situation was 
first demonstrated during the March, 1918 anti-conscription 
riots in Quebec City. Uncontrolled rioting began over the 
arrest of a man by the RCMP, who later released him when 
they found his papers were in order. The mayor refused to 
read the Riot Act and the officer commanding the district 
called out the troops. His action was later legalized by 
an Order-in-Council (the WMA was in effect) which also 
specified that "the orders of the General officer or of 
the Offiper Commanding the troops shall in all respects be 
obeyed by the civil population and that offenders against 
the law, or persons disobedient to such military orders', 
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shall be tried and punished by courts martial .. . "8 
The troops used bayonets, cavalry, and machine guns to 
break up the rioters. Four civilians were killed and 58 
arrested. The Quebec anti-conscription riots posed a 
threat to law and order but no threat to government. Yet 
the reaction of the government had been extreme and the 
political handling of the situation insensitive to say the 
least. However, it was not outside the Canadian tradition 
of strong government reaction. And it should be noted that, 
in general, the Quebec populace supported the government. 
In contrast, in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 
there were no riots until after the federal and provincial 
governments intervened and arrested the strike leaders. 
The Winnipeg General Strike is the only general strike 
Canada has had, although Quebec strikes of 1972 took on' 
the semblance of an unplanned general strike. The Winnipeg 
8 Order-in-Council, 4 April 1918, read in the House 
on 5 April 1918. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1918, 
pp 378-9. The order-in-Council also stated 
And whereas at common law it is the duty of a 
military officer with the troops under his 
command to interfere, when such interference 
is necessary, to put down riot, insurrection 
or civil disturbance. 
If, the opinion of the General Officer or the 
Officer-Commanding the Military district in which 
any riot, insurrection or civil disturbance takes 
place, the circumstances be such as to demand or 
justify the intervention of the military power, 
it shall be competent to and within the authority 
of the General officer or the officer commanding 
the said military district to issue orders for 
such intervention ... 
See also Elizabeth Armstrong: The Crisis of Quebec 1914-18, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) pp 225-37. 
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General Strike was very much an event of its time. War 
weariness, high prices, a feeling that labour was being 
left out of the political process and the inspiration of 
the Russian Revolution all contributed to a highly militant 
radicalism in Western Canada. 9 The pro-strike rhetoric of 
the militant labour leaders was out and out revolutionary, 
but their actions during the strike, which lasted 40 days, 
were the opposite. They urged restraint, took no 
provocative actions, but did organize an ad hoc strike 
committee to ensure the delivery of essential supplies to 
the populace. The issue was, as noted before, the right 
of collective bargaining. However, the federal government 
perceived a threat to the authority of the government to 
govern. The acting Minister of Justice and later Prime 
Minister, Arthur Meighen, made this clear in the House when 
he argued that the strike committee had taken control of 
the necessities of life: 
These pretensions are an assertion of government 
authority. But the strike leaders were driven 
to make them if they were to continue effectively 
anything in the nature of a general strike. 
Consequently I say it is proved by the example 
of Winnipeg, and indeed follows inevitably from 
the very logic of the situation, that a general 
strike to succeed or, indeed, to continue, must 
result in the usurpation of governmental authority 
on the part of those controlling the strike. It 
did so result in Winnipeg;, it must over so result. 
It was essential that the greater issue raised 
by the assumption of Soviet authority - and it 
9 For the background of militant western Canadian 
radicalism going back to the 1890's see Martin Robin, 
Radical Politics and Canadian Labour 1880-1930, (Kingston: 
Queen's University, 1968). 
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was nothing less on the part of those in 
control of strike in the city of Winnipeg - 
should be once and for all decided and be 
decisively beaten down .. . 10 
S. D. Clarke in his foreword to D. C. Masters' book 
on the strike, remarks: 
The vigorous intervention of the federal 
government and the threatened use of military 
force were in the Canadian tradition of calling 
upon the authority of the state to suppress any 
movement which assumed too radical a character. 
Influences of geography which favoured the 
dispersion of authority were offset by a strong 
sense of responsibility for the maintenance of 
order on the part of the central government. 
The toleration by the Canadian population of 
the use of the force, and its sensitiveness to 
any act which threatened constituted authority, 
placed nonconformist political elements at a 
serious disadvantage. To carry out the'general 
strike, the Winnipeg labour leaders were forced 
to constitute' themselves as a sort of ad hoc 
government. Fifty years earlier in the same 
Western community Louis Riel and his Metis 
followers had been forced into a similar 
position in seeking to negotiate better terms 
with the Canadian government. , 
13oth movements 
carried a threat which would not be tolerated 
by a state such as Canada, with its long lines 
of communication to defend, and both met with 
the decisive intervention of centralized 
authority. 11 
The government's perceived threat to government 
derived as much from the "Red Scare", then pervading Canada, 
as it did from the logic of a general strike. Senior 
military officers in the immediate post-war period were 
much concerned over the danger posed to law and order by 
bolshevism. 12 Aid of the civil power was seen as a 
10 Canada, house of Commons, Debates, 1919, Vol. III, 
pp 3037-9. 
11 D. C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, p X. 
12 See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the 
Great War to the Great Depress on, pp 62-4. 
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significant and immediate role. Troops were called out 
on "strike duty" in Quebec City in 1921, twice in Sydney, 
Nova Scotia in 1922 and for a third time in 1923. The 
result was the amending of the militia Act so that only the 
attorney general of a province could request troops. This 
stopped local officials from requesting almost at will. 
Throughout the Great Depression, troops were called 
out or alerted to deal with strikes or threatened strikes 
including a threatened general strike in Vancouver. This 
use of troops for strike duty naturally produced much 
resentment, and although troops were alerted during the 
Ford strike in 1945, they were not used again for strike 
duty until the Montreal policemen's strike in 1969. However 
during the 1960s, they were routinely alerted for riot duty 
in the province of Quebec. 
13 They were alerted at least 
once for threatened trouble in Vancouver. The reason was, 
as before, the small size and decentralized organization of 
police forces. Montreal and Toronto police forces established, 
riot squads in the late sixties, but they were-the exceptions. 
It is. generally assumed that until the FLQ began 
operations in 1963, Canada had never had any terrorist 
activity. This is true except for the terrorist activity 
of the Sons of Freedom sect of the Doukhobors in the 
Kootenays in British Columbia. In a thirty-year period 
up to 1970, the Sons of Freedom (about 2,500 people) were 
13 The writer during part of this period was one of 
a number of officers of the armed forces responsible for 
the writing of the revised doctrine for internal security 
operations. Very seldom was the public aware of these near 
routine troop alerts and movements. 
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responsible for 1,200 bombings, 20 deaths and $20 million 
worth of damage. 
14 At the peak of activity in 1962, 
there were demands for the imposition of martial law. The 
sect was defeated by a combination of police measures and 
by the separation of children from parents with the children 
being sent to boarding schools; in fact held as hostages 
for good behaviour. In terms of lives lost, numbers of 
bombings and property damage, the FLQ were never able to 
come close to the Sons of Freedom. However, the Sons of 
Freedom were no threat to government and their resistance 
to compulsory schooling did not become a cause celebre. 
Initially, the FLQ bombings were not considered a 
threat to government and generated little support. It was 
not until 1968 and after, when there were serious 
disturbances and bitter strikes and the provincial 
government appeared weak in dealing with the mounting 
social unrest, that the FLQ began to become a political 
force. However, it was not until the kidnappings of James 
Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, and Pierre Laporte, 
the Quebec Minister of Labour, in October 1970 that the 
FLQ came to be recognized as a threat to government, or as 
an FLQ leader, Charles Gagnon, put it: 
The actions of the FLQ since 1963 have been 
very positive in the revolutionary evolution 
of Quebec's people and the last action of 
the FLQ, the kidnapping of Cross, is a new 
14 In contrast the FLQ record was 
51 bombings, five 
deaths, and minimal damage. The FLQ did carry out 
21 thefts 
of arms, dynamite and money. See Gerard 
Pelletier's October 
Crisis, Appendix 1 for a list of terrorist activities- 
attributed to the FLQ, pp 197-205. The 
figures for the 
Sons of Freedom came from the Toronto 
Daily Star, October 17, 
1970. " 
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kind of action for the FLQ. This action 
forces the establishment to negotiate with 
the FLQ and at the same time to recognize 
it as a political power in Quebec. 15 
The countering of the kidnapping challenge to 
government posed considerable problems for both the Quebec 
and federal governments. These governments considered that 
the normal processes of law were insufficient to meet the 
threat. They therefore turned to the only legislation that 
seemed to provide the necessary powers. This was the WMA, 
which had been passed in 1914. On proclamation, the WMA 
gives extensive powers for the imposition of censorship and 
for arrest and detention as well as powers to regulate the 
economy. It is an all-embracing act and allows the Governor- 
in-Council to "do and authorize such acts and things, and 
make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he 
may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, 
invasion or insurrection deem necessary or advisable for 
the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of, Canada 
16 
The WMA had been invoked only for both world wars 
before it was invoked on 16 October 1970 at 4 a. m. "after 
consideration of all the facts, and particularly of letters' 
received from the Prime Minister of Quebec and the authorities 
of the city of Montreal reporting a state of apprehended 
15 Interview with Charles Gagnon, Canadian Dimension, 
Vol. 7, Nos. 5 and 6, December 1970, p 21. 
16 Revised Statutes of Canada 1970, Vol. 11, 
Chap. W-2,3.1 . 
ý' 
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insurrection. , 17 Mr. ßourassa's letter had requested the 
authority to "apprehend and keep in custody individuals 
who ... are determined to overthrow the government through 
violence and illegal means. "18 At the same time, the 
government of Quebec requisitioned troops under the aid of 
the civil power legislation of Section 233 of the National 
Defence Act. These two requests were certainly politically 
complementary, but they were not legally complementary., 
The succeeding debate has revolved around the use of these 
acts, particularly the WMA. 
One of the principal defences of the government's 
position was made by John Turner, the Minister of Justice, 
and it bears quoting at length both as a contemporary 
statement of government attitude and as part of the Canadian 
tradition: 
We have also a series of bombings and violence, 
a rising increase in thefts of dynamite now 
available in some hidden caches in the province 
of Quebec. More disturbing, we have a type of- 
erosion of the public will in the feeling among 
some sincere people that an exchange of prisoners 
for the victims of the kidnappings would somehow 
ease the situation. 
... Governments have to exercise and fulfil their responsibilities in meeting it [violence) 
... the recent call for a public manifestation by men like Gagnon, Vallieres and Chartrand 
established and escalated the whole coming 
together of an infiltration of FLQ doctrine in 
certain areas of society of Quebec - in the 
unions, among universities and in the media - 
and the growing feeling among the people of 
Quebec, particularly the citizens of Montreal, 
17 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 28th Parl., 
3rd Sess., 1970, Vol. I, p 193. 
18 Ibid. Letter dated October 16,1970. 
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that they are living under a reign of terror. 
Also, at this stage, when we are dealing with a 
situation which is not completely clear, when 
we are dealing for the first time in Canada with 
a type of organization which in peacetime is 
dedicated to violence and the terroristic 
overthrow of government, there is advantage in 
having a certain amount of flexibility, in 
seeing what we need to deal with this proposition. 
... the concept of absolute freedom which at times is dressed up through verbal sleight of 
" hand such as "political prisoners" and "liberation 
of the people" - this sleight of hand implying 
that there are absolute rights and absolute 
liberties in any particular society - is a 
perversion of the rule of law ... We have been living through a charade that mocks, a 
charade that seeks to destroy. 19 
The full reasons for the government invoking the 
WHA have by no moans been made clear and probably will not 
be for a long time. however, Mr. Turner's statement seems 
to have been directed primarily towards a number of public 
figures in Quebec, who, rightly or wrongly, the federal 
government thought were trying to set up a provisional 
government that would be separatist in inclination if not 
overtly so. 
20 
There was talk of a government of national 
19 Ibid., pp 212-6. As a statement of the government 
view, there is-also Gerard Pelletier's October Crisis but 
it is written from the personal point of view. 
20 As with all such events, speculation remains rife 
and the hard evidence is in inverse proportion to the amount 
of speculation. Yet there is some indirect evidence such as 
Mr. Turner's speech and Gerard Pelletier's October Crisis. 
For a summary of the indirect evidence see Dennis Smith, 
Bleedin Hearts ... Bleeding County : Canada and the 
Quebec 
Crisis, Edmonton: M. G. Ilurt g, 1971) pp 26:: 37,49. 
Pro essor Smith is opposed to the invocation of the WMA. 
He and others concentrate on Mr. Trudeau and'generally avoid 
discussing Mr. Turner's speech, which, I would argue, was 
the basic defence of the government. For them the use of 
the WMA was an aberration caused by deficiencies in Mr. 
Trudeau's political philosophy. 
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unity which would include Rene Levesque. In essence, the 
federal government and certain members of the Quebec 
government saw a threat of a separatist government of 
national unity coming to power over the backs of the FLQ. 
The counter proposition is that the federal government 
used the FLQ and the murder of Laporte to stage a coup 
d'etat against the right. of the Quebec government to deal 
with the FLQ as a normal provincial responsibility for the 
administration of justice. Rene Levesque, the leader of 
the Parti Qu4becois, charged that "Quebec no longer has a 
- government ... The stump-state we had was swept away at 
the first hard blow. The ßourassa government has stood 
aside and is no longer anything but the puppet of federal 
leaders. "21 
Whatever the truth of the matter, the federal 
government once again made clear that it would tolerate no 
apprehended or actual threat to government, and that it was 
prepared to dispense with civil liberties and use the armed 
forces to enforce its authority. The vast majority of 
Canadians were reassured and the elite of Quebec given a 
psychological shock. 
22 The FLQ, as a terrorist organization, 
21 As quoted in Canadian Dimension, Vol. 7, Nos. 5 
and 6, December 1970, p 8. 
22 There appears to be no disputing that the 
Canadian people, both French and English speaking, supported 
the government and were reassured by its actions. It is, 
however, speculative that the aim of the government was to 
administer a psychological shock, but this would seem to 
be the reading of Gerard Pelletier's October Crisis. 
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lost most of the public support it had-had in Quebec. 
23 
The'FLQ was a nationalist movement attempting to 
bring about the secession of Quebec by violent means. It 
has been compared to violent protest movements and terrorist 
cells among religious, ethnic, and cultural minorities such 
as the Irish Republican Army in Ulster, the Black Panthers 
in the United States and the Utashi in Yugoslavia. 
24 The 
threat posed by the FLQ appears to have greatly receded. 
It was another challenge to government in Canada but it 
was unique, localized, short lived, and part of a 
contemporary transnational trend in violent resistance to 
government. 
As remarked in the beginning of the chapter, there 
23 Pierre Vallieres, the leading intellectual and 
organizer of the FLO in the middle 1960's, defected after 
the October Crisis to the Parti Quebecois. lie argued that: 
The October 1970 Crisis gave those in power a 
general rehearsal of this classical scenario, 
at a moment when the organization (FLQ], which had through its action set off a crisis, had 
no means of sustaining a long offensive against the power holders nor of offering the Quebec 
people the strategy and the arms which would have helped it resist oppression, and still less the method of revolutionary action which would have helped it reach its goals: the conquest of 
power and the construction of a new society. 
... the intellectual conviction that an armed 
confrontation ... can justify recourse to 
armed agitation as a method of revolutionary 
political action in the present situation, was 
modified by the October crisis ... armed 
agitation, is today counter-revolutionary. 
Vallieres' statement was published in Le Devoir on 13 and 14 
December 1971; the translation used here is from Henry Milner, 
"The Implications of Valliares' Declaration, " Our Generation, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1972, pp 27-35. 
24 Robert Moss, "International Terrorism and Western 
Societies, " International Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, 
(Summer 1973) p 422. 
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appear to be no recurring patterns in cause and aim for 
violent challenges to government in Canada. It is extremely 
difficult to forecast future challenges. Viewing the 
Canadian political scene today, there are residues of labour 
and student militancy in Quebec as an aftermath of the 
militancy of the 1960's and the widespread strikes of the 
spring of 1972 when the slogan was "Nous: contra le 
gouvernment. "25 There remain individuals and small groups 
in Canadian society who desire the creation of a libertarian 
socialistic society'*, 
26 However, they lack a radical 
constituency, which they can exploit, and any propensity 
to violence seems largely relegated to rhetoric. 
In the short term, there appears to be little 
evidence of any maturing threat to government, or law and 
order in Canada. In the long term, one can only analyse 
in generalities, such as the increase in transnational 
violence, seemingly world-wide decreasing legitimacy of 
governments, the adverse effects of increasing urbanization 
unsupported by proportional increases in facilities to 
25 For a favourable but reasonably detailed view 
of these events see Robert Chodos and Nick Auf Der Maur, 
eds., Quebec: A Chronicle 1968-1972, (Toronto: James Lewis 
and Samuel, 1972) p 77-142. 
26 English Canadian radicalism remains localized 
to small groups in universities and a small, but often 
penetrating and articulate, radical press. It is very 
nationalistic (anti-American) and therefore in contemporary 
Canada has more influence than might otherwise be expected. 
Paradoxically, the intellectual influences are principally 
American. The influences of Hubert Marcuse and the neo- 
Marxists remain, but this appears to be being superseded 
by more orthodox social democratic thinking. For a survey 
of the more radical fringe's writings see Dimitrios J. 
Rossopaulos, ed., The New Left in Canada, (Montreal: Our 
Generation Books, Black Rose Press, 1970). 
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enhance the quality of life and so on. 
27 However valid 
deductions suggesting the increasing likelihood of violence 
in the world may be, there is every reason to be beware of 
extrapolating these into a Canadian context. It should not 
be forgotten that during the world-wide internal unrest in 
many countries in the 1960s, Canada emerged largely 
unscathed. Furthermore, when one remembers the proximity 
of the United States, it was all the more remarkable. 
It would be unwise to forget the FLQ threat, which 
did last from 1963 to 1970, but its violence was never 
perceived to be a threat to government until the kidnappings. 
It never reached anything approaching the scale of the 
politically motivated violence in the United States or 
Northern Ireland. Canada has by reason of geography, wealth, 
history and constitution, a considerable capacity to 
withstand the pressures of the post-industrial world. It 
has space to expand and challenging new Arctic and maritime 
frontiers. It has the potential to be the wealthiest state 
er capita in"the world, although it may use its wealth 
unwisely. It has a history of tolerance and political 
compromise. The'Canadian constitution has been under 
considerable strain, but apparently its inherent flexibility 
is providing the required solutions, however disjointed the 
process may appear. Canadian smugness may be a vice, but 
it has had certain virtues in isolating Canada from 
27 There is a plethora of literature on this 
subject. A recent interesting addition is Ian Smart, "The 
advanced societies: revolution or devolution? ", 
International Journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, (Summer 1973) 
pp 403-17. 
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international trends in violence. 
The above is not a plea for complacency in 
preparedness for internal security requirements in Canada, 
but rather to provide a framework, a perspective, for a 
consideration of any future challenges and hence of 
requirements. Today, there appear to be no challenges on 
the horizon that would require a substantial increase in 
internal security measures such as an increase of the armed 
forces or the establishment of para-military forces. There 
is a clear requirement to maintain a level of manpower, 
flexibility and mobility so that the armed forces could 
respond to any sudden request such as the October Crisis. 
The necessary flexibility and mobility are built into the 
present structure. However, the command and purposes of 
troops, when employed on internal security duties in Canada, 
remain important questions. 
The Law and Internal Security 
It appears that troops may be called out to the 
aid of the civil power in at least five different legal 
contexts. 
28 
1. Under Section 233 of the National Defence Act: 
The Canadian Forces, or any unit or other 
element thereof, or any officer or man, with 
28 See SCEAND, Third Report, 4th Sess., 28th Par., 
No. 19,, June 29,1972, pp 20-2 and D/Gen McLearn, "Canadian 
Arrangements for Aid of the Civil Power, " Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, Summer 1971, pp r6-31. B /Gen 
McLearn was Judge Advocate General for the Canadian Armed 
Forces. lie also appeared in camera before SCEAND. The 
sections of the National Defence Act referred to are from 




material, are liable to be called out for 
service in the aid of the civil power, in any 
case in which a riot or disturbance of the 
peace requiring such service occurs, or is, 
in the opinion of an attorney general, considered 
as likely to occur, and that is beyond the powers 
of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, 
or deal with. 
There are two main aspects that require elaboration. 
First, it is mandatory by law for the federal government to 
respond immediately to such a request by a provincial 
attorney general. It is, the sole responsibility of the 
provincial government to decide whether or not troops are 
required. This arises from the British North America Act 
which gives responsibility for the administration of justice 
to the provinces. However, how many and what troops are 
sent is at the discretion of the Chief of Defence Staff. 
Furthermore, the present thinking is that the troops sent 
come under the operational control of the provincial 
government. In October 1970, the Chief of the Quebec 
Provincial Police (QPP) had operational control of the 
troops deployed. This arrangement works well if there is 
political agreement between the federal and provincial 
governments; if not, serious complications could arise in 
which the committed troops could be placed in the most 
difficult of situations. 
Secondly, it is generally agreed that the "riot or 
disturbance" must be clearly seen to be beyond the 
29 
capabilities of the provincial authorities. What is 
29 D/Gen if. A. McLearn, "Canadian Arrangements for 
Aid to the Civil Power, " p 26. 
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beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities is open 
to judicial decision based on the actual circumstances and 
the law. The actual circumstances are crucial because 
there is considerable difference in capabilities between 
a small provincial government and a large one. Quebec and 
Ontario have large provincial and municipal police forces. 
When in 1969 there was a perceived threat by Vancouver 
hippies and students to take over Stanley Park as a "People's 
Park", troops were alerted. This was done because what was 
really likely to be a minor disturbance was beyond the 
police forces that could be quickly mobilized and deployed 
in Vancouver. Such a disturbance could have been handled 
easily by government authorities in Quebec and Ontario. 
2. Other federal departments can call on the 
Department of National Defence for duties related to federal 
responsibilities such as penitentiaries, protection of 
federal and diplomatic property and airports. During the 
October Crisis, troops were used to guard federal buildings, 
embassies and federal personages. In April 1971 the 
Solicitor General requested troops to deal with a prison 
riot at Kingston Penitentiary. In July 1975, a one-day 
strike by federal prison guards resulted in the calling out 
of troops to guard the federal prisons. Any form of 
international terrorism during the 1976 Montreal Olympics 
could result in troops being called out under this provision 
if the acts took place on federal property, such as an 
airport. 
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3. Under Section 34 of the National Defence Act, 
Canadian Armed Forces can be used in the case of disasters 
declared by the Governor-in-Council to be a "national 
concern. " So far there has been no disaster declared as a 
national concern, and whether one would include internal 
security duties remains unknown. 
4. Under English common law (although this is not 
reflected in Canadian statute law) if all else fails, the 
armed forces have an obligation to maintain the fabric of 
society. "If the effective government of a province were 
to be incapacitated and in consequence there was no local 
civil authority to take the requisite steps to obtain 
immediate military'support, the commander of troops would 
be justified in taking action under the common law to 
maintain authority and order. "30 The parliamentary committee 
report suggests that this authority has never been used, 
but during the 1918 anti-conscription riots in Quebec City, 
the local commander acted when the mayor refused to read 
the Riot Act. His action was later legalized by an Order- 
in-Council. It seems highly unlikely with today's command 
and control systems, that any commander would so act again 
without prior political authority. 
S. Finally, under the WMA and complementing 
regulations, troops could be used as the federal government 
saw fit to deal with a real or apprehended insurrection. 
Section 239 of the National Defence Act provides 
30 SCEAND, Third Report, 4th sess., 28th Parl., 
No. 19, ' June 19,1972, p 21. 
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that when troops arc called out for aid of the civil power, 
they have the powers and legal protection of constables. 
Under a recent amendment to the criminal code, troops called 
out for internal security duties under authority other than 
Section 233, will have the same powers and legal protection. 
Furthermore, regulations now no longer require troops to 
act in formed bodies under the command of an officer and to 
be accompanied by a magistrate. Troops can now be accompanied 
by a police officer and may be "employed in whatever may 
be 
reasonably necessary for the purpose'of suppressing or 
preventing a riot or disturbance of the peace, including 
patrol duty ordinarily performed by members of a police 
force to protect persons and property or to keep the peace, 
and also to guide traffic . "31 These changes are designed 
, to allow for the more flexible use of troops for internal 
security duties. 
Canadian Police Forces and Internal Securit 
Important factors in any analysis of the purposes 
for using the armed forces are the small size and 
decentralized organization of police forces in Canada, and 
the relatively small number of troops available for internal 
security duties. The disturbances in the United States in 
the 1960s and in Northern Ireland have demonstrated that 
internal security duties in urban centres require. large 
numbers of troops and police. 
32 Although each 
31 13/Gen McLearn, "Canadian Arrangements 
for Aid 
of the Civil Power, " p 29. 
32 For a good survey of the military problems 
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of the disturbances in the United Staten lasted only a few 
days and involved ghetto riots that could be localized, 
divisions ware deployed. Much of the manpower was used to 
guard and patrol rather than confront rioters. In Northern 
Ireland, the protracted nature of the conflict has placed 
unanticipated demands on manpower. The primary requirement 
for dealing with urban disturbances, particularly any of a 
protracted natura, in manpower. The number of urban 
guarillas, or just plain rioters, in less significant than 
their ability to operate over thickly populated urban areas 
without ever staging an overt insurrection that could be 
defeated in a sat-piece military operation. 
33 
In Canada, there are three main police organizations. 
34 
First, there in the RCt4P with a strength of about 13,000 
distributed all across Canada in small detachments. Second, 
there are the Quebec and Ontario provincial police forces 
of about 3,500 and 4,800 respectively. The RCMP acts as 
during the American ghetto riots see Robin fligham, ed., 
tin ongtn in the Strontn: The Use of Troops in Civil 
Uinturbancon, (Lawrence, Kansas, University of Kansas, P and (r Northern Ireland see Robert Moss, Urban % Guerillas, (London: Temple Smith, 1972). See also a 
recent article by Charles Douglas ! tome, "Reaching the 
Limits of a Wall-chart War, " The Times (London), 19 December 
1973, p 14. tie quotes a senioro officer saying that "if 
Protestant violence flared badly, coinciding with more of 
the soma from the IRA, you could lose a whole division in 
Belfast - 20,000 men. " 
33 For an analysis, of urban insurrections and their 
defeats see Martin Oponhoimer, Urban Guerillas, (London: 
Penguin, 1970) p 95. Even though desirous of bringing 
about a revolution in the United States, he reached the 
conclusion that ghetto insurrections were not the answer. 
34 Soo Canada Year Book 1972, pp 509-12 for figures 
on police strengths. 
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provincial police in the other provinces. Third, there are 
the municipal police forces with a total strength of about 
25,000 with Montreal having the largest force of about 3,500. 
It is also the only city with a really well trained and 
practised riot squad. Other large urban police forces have 
a vary limited disturbance control capability. Neither the 
RCMP nor the provincial police forces are well trained in 
riot control, principally because, being dispersed, they 
cannot easily be brought together for regular riot control 
training. 
Many countries have special police forces for dealing 
with major disturbances. This has been recommended for 
Canada on a provincial basis but there has been no evidence 
that any government is interested. 
35 The primary reasons 
are cost and what to do with such forces when there are no 
riots, which in Canada has been the normal condition until 
very recently, and then riots have been localized in Montreal. 
The level of disturbances would have to rise considerably 
before such a force would be created and that level was not 
reached in the 19609. 
The result of having small and decentralized police 
forces is the lack of any significant capability, outside 
35 See SCEAND, Evidence, testimony of Dr. Szabo, 
28th Parl., 4th Sess., No. 4, March 7,1972, p. 7. Ile 
advocated increasing the training time for Quebec Provincial 
Police recruits so that sufficient number would be available 
for riot duty. Ile suggested abouta battalion size force. 
Ile was opposed to the French CRS concept. Ilowever, the size 
of force he advocated is about one-fifth of the total QPP 
strength; a force with a low turnover in personnel. This 
suggests the impracticability of the idea. There just is 
not the requirement for such a force, which would be 
expensive, and there is always the "Army". " 
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of Montreal and Toronto, to deal with a major disturbance-. 
Montreal and Toronto do have such a capability but this 
would vanish if a major disturbance became protracted; and 
by protracted is meant longer than 24 to 48 hours. 36 This, 
as, in the past, leaves only the armed forces. This reliance 
on the armed forces was noted in Defence in the 70 s: 
The Canadian' experience over the last two 
years clearly indicates the necessity of being 
able to cope effectively with any future resort 
to disruption, intimidation and violence as 
weapons of political action ... While civil disorder should normally be contained by the 
civil authorities, and the strength of municipal, 
provincial and federal police forces should be 
maintained'at levels sufficient for the purpose, 
we must nevertheless anticipate the possibilities 
that emergencies will again arise which will 
necessitate the Canadian Forces coming to the 
aid of the civil power. It is important that 
the latter should be able to rely upon timely 
assistance from the Forces. The Forces' role 
in such situations is important and could be 
crucial. 37 
Mobile Command commands the only trained and 
organized forces for internal security duties. A little 
over 8,000 were deployed during the October Crisis and it 
is not likely that much more than a maximum of 12,000 could 
be deployed today. 
38 
If one relates this figure and Canadian 
police figures to recent disturbances in other countries, 
then one can see the inherent weakness in the, Canadian 
36 Exhaustion of the Montreal Police Force during 
the October Crisis was one of the principal reasons given 
by the Chief of Montreal Police for calling in the troops. 
37 Defence in the 70 s, p 11. 
38 The total strength of Mobile Command is 2.0,000. 
There are three combat groups (small brigade groups) 
permanently in Canada with a total approximate-strength 
of 12,000. One of them is French-speaking. 
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internal security capability. For example, to control a 
nuclear disarmament demonstration in London, the Metropolitan 
police mobilized 19,000 policemen; that is, the equivalent 
of total Mobile Command, Toronto City Police and the Ontario 
Provincial Police resources. To meet the demands of a 
Northern Ireland situation would be well beyond present 
Canadian' resources. 
39 Canadian resources are probably 
sufficient to meet the requirements of a single major, but 
not overly protracted, urban disturbance. Mr. Denson, when 
Minister of National Defence, stated that: 
. the troops handled the crisis of 1970 
very well. It does put a strain on the 
forces, of course, if numbers have to be 
moved ... if one had to do the same kind 
of operation in several places in Canada at 
the same time, then one would have to 
consider using reserve forces at that 
particular time. 40 
Canada's reserve forces are today down to a little 
over 15,000 and it has been stated that they would be used 
for duties only ". .. to the extent that commanders' of the 
Commands concerned considered them qualified to fulfil . "41 
This has been elaborated to mean support functions. 
Military Aid and Non-Military Aid 
The present doctrine is for the regular troops to 
39 The average number of British troops stationed 
in Northern Ireland over the last few years is 16,000. To 
meet the requirements of rotation, there is a requirement 
for at least double this figure. 
40 SCEAND, Evidence, testimony of Mr. E. Benson, 
28th Parl., 4th Sess., No. 1, February 25,1972, p 12. 
41 SCEAND, Third Report, 4th sess., 28th Parl., 
No. 19, June 29,1972, p 24. 
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be deployed to support the police and the changes discussed 
above were designed to facilitate this deployment. This is 
a departure from previous thinking for: "It has always been 
considered a vital principle that the military acting in aid 
of the civil power remain under military command and carry 
out their functions in a military way, thus assuring that 
the aid they give is not merely supplementary police aid, 
but aid of a different character. "42 This difference between 
supplementary aid and aid of a different character was 
reflected in Mr. Ian Smart's testimony to SCEAND. 
Military forces command today a number of 
skills which are of growing relevance to 
internal security, but only a few of those 
skills are uniquely or strictly military in 
the sense of being associated with the use 
or threat of potentially lethal force. In 
a very large number of cases, if you look at 
the record, military forces are only called 
upon for internal security duties because 
they constitute a reservoir of trained 
manpower; because they possess a highly 
organized command structure; because they 
have a high mobility on land, sea and air, 
at long range and at short range; and because 
they can deploy an efficient communication 
system. Only in rare cases have they recently been called upon to threaten or to use lethal force internally. I do not question that the 
obvious potential ability of military units 
to bring lethal force to bear may enhance 
their effectiveness in some internal security 
situations, but I am convinced that civil 
security agencies, when they call in the army, 
are often calling not for military-force, as 
such, but for the non-military resources and 
skills - mobility, communications, and the 
rest - which only seem to exist within national 
military forces. 43 
42 B/Gen. Ii. A. McLearn, "Canadian Arrangements for 
Aid of the Civil Power, " p 30. 
43 I. M. Ii. Smart, The Armed Forces and the Civil 
Authority: Controlling Violence, Behind the Headlines, 
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.I believe that military forces, as such, 
should only be called upon for internal security 
when it is military force, rather than non- 
military support services, which is required. 
In most Western countries that will be on very 
rare occasions indeed - occasions so rare that 
I am far from persuaded of any general need for 
new types of lethal internal security forces of 
a para-military nature. 44 
The difficulty lies in separating in practice 
supplementary, or non-military aid, from aid of a different 
character, or military aid. In the October Crisis, troops 
wore called out for both these tasks. Troops were deployed 
to do what were really police tasks such as house searches. 
Many became policemen in practice because this was perceived 
to be the priority requirement. Troops were also retained 
in formed bodies ready to threaten or use lethal force. 
This dual function derived from the nature of the threat. 
There were no large-scale riots, lot alone an open threat 
at insurrection. There was only the potentiality of a 
"military" task. There were, however, requirements to search 
houses for arms, explosives and presumed FLQ sympathizers, 
to guard buildings and public personages and to patrol. If 
a state (for example France) has a large, centrally controlled 
police and para-military force, then the dual function role 
is unlikely to arise for troops. In Canada's case, such 
police forces are highly unlikely to materialize without 
the development of a major and seemingly protracted challenge 
Vol. XXXI, Nos. 7-8, (December, 1972) p S. This is a 
transcription of his presentation to SCE1ND on 16 March 
1972. 
44 Ibid., p 6. 
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to law and order. 
In meeting the challenge of serious urban violence, 
it is the demand for disciplined and organized manpower 
that is the principal requirement. Most of the tasks of 
the October Crisis allocated to the troops could have been 
performed by policemen. If there had been sufficient police, 
then the troops could have been held in reserve. Direct 
command could have been retained by the federal government, 
and the troops committed when there was a "military" task. 
The dual function role is not a satisfactory one 
for the armed forces, government, or the police, but is is 
difficult to see what the alternative is for Canada. Aid of 
the civil power in Canada has always been predicated on 
using troops to deal with riots and disturbances, and this 
is made clear in the past legislation. However, dealing 
with urban violence is no longer just a matter of riots and 
disturbances, but of various forms of urban guerrilla 
warfare. 45 The changes in Canadian regulations have been 
designed to provide greater flexibility in using troops who 
have now become constables as well as soldiers for internal 
security operations. This is undesirable for many reasons, 
but unavoidable as long as the threat of urban guerrilla- 
type violence and the present small and decentralized 
nature of Canadian police forces remain. 
There are a number of ways by which the armed forces 
can assist civil authorities who have to deal with outbreaks 
45 See Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas for analysis 
of urban guerrilla warfare. 
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of minor violence. For example, the armed forces have set 
up explosive ordnance disposal centres at 24 locations, 
which the civil authorities can call on when required. 
During the period January 1971 to January 1972, these 
centres dealt with 549 calls to assist police forces. 
46 
However, this assistance does not really come under the 
category of internal security duties. There is no require- 
ment to call out troops in aid of the civil power to render 
such assistance to civil authorities. Assistance can be 
rendered with a minimum of delay and is administered in the 
same manner as assistance to fight forest fires or floods. 
These types of assistance are presumably what Mr. Smart 
would also call non-military, but they are not part of 
internal security duties. Rather, they are normal forms of 
assistance to civil authorities that will continue as long 
as people set off bombs or highjack aircraft, whether for 
political reasons or not. Internal security duties for the 
Canadian Armed Forces are those duties performed under the 
five different legal contexts discussed above and in 
particular under Section 233 of the National Defence Act. 
Since the Second World War, troops have been called out 
under this section only twice; for the Montreal police 
strike in 1969 and for the October 1970 Crisis. Only in 
the latter case was there a perceived threat to government. 
46 G. G. Bell, The Armed Forces and the Civil 
Authority: Aiding National Development, Behind the Headlines, 
Vol. XXXi, Nos. 7-8, (December, 1972), p 11. Transcript 
of his presentation to SCEAND on 21 March 1972. It should 
be noted that General Bell discusses this form of assistance 
as aiding national development and not as part of internal 
security operations. 
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Purposes and Force Structure 
In summary, the purposes for which the armed forces 
may be used to assist civil authorities in dealing with 
violence in its various forms are: 
1. maintenance of the fabric of society if 
government becomes incapacitated; 
2. an actual or apprehended insurrection; 
3. riots and disturbances that are clearly 
beyond the capabilities of civil 
authorities to control; 
4. violence in areas of federal jurisdiction 
such as penitentiaries; and 
5. supplementary or non-military assistance 
to civil authorities. 
The structural and manpower requirements can only 
be very generally matched to these purposes unless 
particular threats can also be related to them. If one 
begins at the bottom, there is a requirement for specialized 
manpower for such tasks as bomb disposal. Normal military 
capabilities have and should continue to meet this 
requirement for non-military assistance with a minimum of 
adjustment. This is equally true for assistance to other 
federal departments. Aside from nuclear war, it is hard 
to foresee the incapacitation of Canadian civil government. 
This leaves actual or apprehended insurrection and riots 
and disturbances beyond the civil capability to control. 
Earlier, it was argued that today there appears to be no 
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threat that would justify a large increase in manpower to 
moot these requirements. Therefore, the "minimal" approach 
would seem to provide the best criterion for matching 
structure and requirements.. This approach assumes that 
there will always be a potential threat to internal order 
as long as violence retains its perceived capability to 
bring about change. Furthermore, it is assumed that these 
potential threats to internal order could be beyond the 
capability of the police and therefore would require the 
use of the armed. forces. If it is also accepted that, 
barring a readily definable threat, any such threats to 
internal order are likely to be localized, then the minimal 
capability should be one that can control a serious 
disturbance in one locale. Although a disturbance may be 
localized, it can be protracted and therefore this factor 
must be built into the possible manpower requirement. Also, 
to avoid exacerbating the French-English division, it would 
be advisable to have the manpower to deploy French and 
English speaking troops in their respective linguistic 
areas. 
The control of protracted rioting, let alone urban 
guerrilla warfare, in a large urban area requires large 
numbers of police and troops. The use of minimum force 
for quelling disturbances is dependent upon having available 
" sufficient police and troops so that non-violent control 
means can be employed while still retaining a necessary 
reserve. A shortage of police and troops poses the dilemma 
of either handing over the streets-to anarchy or insurrection 
or using considerable firepower. If the past is any 
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criterion, no Canadian government will be prepared to do 
the former. The above is somewhat oversimplified, but who 
would have foreseen the requirement for 8,000 troops in 
Montreal in 1970, and it should be remembered that there 
were no confrontations with crowds. It is unlikely that 
any serious urban disturbance that took on a protracted 
character could be controlled by anything else than 5,000 
troops and the total could easily rise rapidly to over 
10,000. The very minimum level then for Canada would seem 
to be 5,000 French speaking and 5,000 English speaking 
troops and as a safety margin double those figures. 
Canada, whether by grace or good management, has 
been fortunate in having relatively minor violent unrest, 
although there has been more than is often assumed. In 
this century, government has perceived two major threats 
to its authority: the Winnipeg General Strike and the 
October 1970 Crisis. In neither case was federal 
intervention using troops brought on by large scale violence, 
rather the government moved to establish clearly its 
authority before it considered that the situation would 
deteriorate further. In fact, in both cases it can be well 
argued that the federal government used the situations to 
strike at people whom it perceived'to be threat to 
government. In neither case, in this writer's opinion, 
was there an actual- or apprehended insurrection. However, 
the federal government in both cases did not hesitate to 
act. 
The federal government may have acted precipitately 
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in both cases but its motivation was to avert any, further 
deterioration. It was the potentiality rather than the 
actuality that precipitated intervention. If Canada is 
faced in the future with other such challenges and these 
challenges should appear to be, or are, accompanied by 
some form of urban guerrilla warfare and/or communal 
disturbances, the pressure on government to intervene early 
and with maximum force will be considerable. The primary 
reason, aside from public opinion, will be the weakness of 
police and military resources to deal with any protracted 
and widespread violence. To a certain extent government 
was bluffing in October 1970, but no one apparently had 
either'the will or the means to call that bluff. In dealing 
with any serious disturbance, there is no substitute for 
large numbers of trained and disciplined troops. This 
provides government with flexibility and confidence to deal 
with the threat, actual or perceived, to peace, order and 
good government. It allows government to carry out a policy 
of controlled escalation or to act immediately with maximum 
force. Canada has been fortunate so far compared to most 
nations, but this should not be construed as weakness or 
tolerance of violence because the Canadian tradition belies 
such views. 
, Internal security will remain an 
important task of 
the armed forces. The scale and type of internal security 
duties will vary in the future as they have in the past, 
but the upholding of the authority of government 
for the 
peace, order and good government of Canada will remain 
a 
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primary task regardless of the number of tunes troops are 
called out or not called out. 
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CHAPTER 10 
RENDERING UNTO CAESAR ... AND CANADIAN DEFENCE OPTIONS 
Context and Problem 
To create a viable Canadian state in the face of 
considerable geographical, climatic and cultural obstacles 
has been an immense challenge, and the contiguous presence 
of one of the most dynamic and powerful states the world 
has ever known has vastly complicated the problem. 
1 The 
implications of this continental imbalance for Canadian 
defence policy has been only one aspect of the total problem. 
It has been a continuous problem of national psychology in 
which the preservation and development of Canadian national 
confidence has been a primary concern. To avoid being faced 
1 Perhaps the most articulate statement of the Canadian 
challenge is W. L. Morton's conclusion to his The Canadian 
Identity, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991T-, pp 113-4. 
It was ... a unity of king, church, and people Canadians, both French and English, inherited from their remoter 
past and have elaborated in their history as a monarchical 
and democratic nation. 
The preservation of such a national society is not the 
unique mission of Canada, but it in the central fact of 
Canadian history, that it has been preserved and 
elaborated by Canadians in one of the largest, harshest, 
and most intimidating countries on earth. Canada, that 
is, has preserved and confirmed the essentials of the 
greatest of civilizations in the grimmest of environments. 
It is an accomplishment worthy of a better end than 
absorption into another and an alien society, however 
friendly and however strong in its own ideals. In that 
accomplishment and its continuance lies the relevance 
of Canadian history. 
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with full implications of the continental imbalance, Canada 
has sought an overseas counterbalance, first in the British 
Empire, and then in European ties and a world role as middle 
power. The formulation of Canadian defence policy has ro- 
flected this need to offset the continental imbalance by over- 
seas commitments as a member of the British Empire, of the Anglo-- 
American alliance of the Second World War, of NATO and in peace- 
keeping. However, the influence of the continental imbalance 
should not be viewed as a single factor determinant but as a 
continuously operating factor which has varied and will continue 
to vary in its influence on the formulation of Canadian 
defence policy. 
Canadian Defence Policy and United States Isolationism and 
Expansionism 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that the influence of the 
continental imbalance on the formulation of Canadian defence 
policy would be greatest when the United States was isolationist, 
concerned with continental expansion, and acting as the guardian 
of the Western Hemisphere. However, in the last one hundred years 
United States overseas expansionism has had far greater influence 
on the formulation of Canadian defence policy than when the 
United States has been isolationist. 
In the 1860s, Anglo-American disputes arising from 
the American Civil War were the main cause Of United states 
antipathy to Canada. The extension of the Manifest Destiny 
to Canada was viewed more as a form of retributive justice 
for British misconduct than as a solution to continental 
disputes. The Treaty of Washington in 1871 removed what 
were really minor irritants in Anglo-Canadian-United States 
relations. Immediate Canadian interests were sacrificed, 
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but the gain in security far outweighed the sacrifice. 
Canada was able to gain its West with two minor military 
campaigns, a police force and a railway without overt 
United States interference. 
This mid-century United States threat did result 
in the reform of the Canadian Militia and a greater responsi- 
bility for national defence, but as a member of an Anglo- 
Canadian alliance. The Militia reforms were designed to 
provide some defence until the arrival of British military 
power, and politically to ensure that it would arrive. As 
the perceived military threat declined, Canada refused to 
make any contributions to Imperial defence on the assumption 
that the British guarantee to defend Canada would continue. 
It was not until the 1890s and early 1900s, when 
the United states entered a bellicose phase of hemispheric 
and overseas expansion, that the military threat to Canada 
surfaced again. And again, it was a non-Canadian-United 
States issue, the Venezuo1, n Incident, which caused 
invasion'to be feared. The Alaskan Boundary dispute, how- 
ever, was a Canadian-United States dispute in which the full 
extent of United States continental power and the limitations 
of the Anglo-Canadian alliance were made clear. The result- 
ing shock, the growth of Imperial sentiment and the increas- 
ing self confidence produced a metamorphosis in Canadian 
attitudes to defence and to the importance of the Anglo- 
Canadian alliance. Canada participated in the Door War. The 
essential framework for a national army was created, and the 
start on a navy was made. Canada moved to ensure sovereignty 
over the Yukon with the dispatch of the Yukon Field Force, 
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and over the high Arctic by sovereignty voyages and police 
presence. This activity resulted from fear of united States 
commercial and exploratory interests. The increase in 
military forces, as well as northern and western activity, 
reflected the development of Canada from colony to nation 
and as the Anglo-Canadian alliance grew in closeness, the 
continental imbalance declined in importance. 
United States isolationism precluded its participa- 
tion in the First World War until 1917, but Canadian partici- 
pation on a scale unimagined in the pro-war years was auto- 
matic and substantial considering Canadian political 
demography. It was Canadian economic requirements rather 
than the need for military cooperation that drew Canada and 
the United States into a short wartime alliance. The ratio 
of forces overseas was nearly 1 to 2 compared to 1 to 12 in 
the Second World War. In this period, the continental 
imbalance had insignificant influence on Canadian defence 
policy. 
The primary Canadian weakness was in naval power, 
and it was the naval question that was of crucial importance 
to Canadian defence policy in the immediate post-war years. 
For Canada, the naval question was a matter of Canadian- 
Empire-United States relations. Wisely or unwisely, 
Canadian pressure was instrumental in the non-renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty because of United States opposition 
to it. The Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament left 
the United States dominant in the Western Atlantic. 
The period 1917-1922 was a short period of active 
United States overseas involvement but it made clear that 
the United States had become a world power and unchallongo- 
able in the Western Hemisphere. Canadian defence, notwith- 
standing Buster Brown, could no longer be predicated on the 
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Empire coming to Canada's assistance. This change in the 
strategic situation was counterbalanced by improved Anglo- 
United States and Canadian-United States relations. 
In the inter-war years, both Canada and the United 
States did have very vague war plans for a North American 
war but this was not reflected at the political level. 
The United States war plans assumed war in North America' 
could result from overseas disputes and not from continental 
ones. The Canadian Defence Scheme No 1 was the result of 
ingrained anti-Americanism. Both the Canadian and United 
States military forces shared the common problem of having 
isolationist governments and until the 1930s, 'there were no 
immediate threats to the homeland. During the inter-war 
years, the continental imbalance had little influence on 
Canadian defence policy until the war clouds began to gather. 
Isolationism certainly restrained any move toward military 
cooperation, but the differing perceptions of the developing 
threat by Canadians and Americans, and in particular by the 
military staffs of the two countries, reinforced the lack of 
interest in military cooperation. 
Neutrality was never more than a legalistic option 
for Canada, whereas it was the option pursued by the 
United States until Pearl Harbor. This derived from 
differing historical experiences, interests and sentiments, 
and the military staffs in each country very much reflected 
these differences. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were 
politically precluded from actively preparing for an overseas 
expeditionary force or even providing credible defence of 
Canada forces. ttowever, they never deviated from their 
appreciation that the defence of Canada began in Europe. 
The United States was concerned with the direct defence of 
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the Western Hemisphere and its Pacific interests. In the 
period from Ogdensburg to the United States entrance into 
the war, Canadian-United States joint planning for 
continental defence was never able to reconcile these 
differing perceptions. Canada, which was at war in Europe, 
was not prepared to allow United States control over its 
armed forces to counter an invasion threat that Canada, 
considered was unlikely to materialize. For the United 
States, it was the only threat and it set itself up as 
guardian of the Western hemisphere. 
In this period of continued United States isolation- 
ism, continental defence consisted of very general planning. 
There was no United Status military presence in Canada, no 
United States control over Canadian forces and minimal 
cooperation below the planning level. In fact, there 
developed a clear conflict of interest over Newfoundland, 
and Canadian-United States cooperation was a source of 
friction there for most of the war. However, Ogdensburg 
did herald a fundamental change in the workings of the 
continental imbalance. The inclusion of the word "permanent" 
in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at Roosevelt's 
request, and without any Canadian resistance, demonstrated 
that the United States regarded continental defence as a 
permanent military fact. 
The expansion of United States military activity in 
Canada began after it had entered the war and the direct 
threat to North America had ended. The Northwest Staging 
Routo, the Alaska Highway and the CRIMSON project were 
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related to United States overseas operations and not to 
continental defence. Canada consented to these programmes 
because the United States believed, mainly mistakenly, that 
they were necessary for the overall war effort. Similarly, 
Canada accepted United States strategic direction in the 
Northwest Atlantic to avoid damaging the war effort. 
With the and of the war and overseas operations, 
United States military activity in Canada declined rapidly. 
However, the United States had developed a strategic 
interest in the Canadian Arctic, gained access to Goose Day 
as a military base and obtained virtually permanent bases 
in Newfoundland. It had in the PJBD a well tried instrument 
for military cooperation of a purely bilateral character, 
and it had hopes of drawing Canada into the military family 
of American nations. This was to be achieved by a formal 
or an informal alliance and organizational and weapon 
standardization, a replication of the Anglo-Canadian 
defence relationship of the preceding 100 years. 
However, in the interlude between peace and the 
Cold War, Canadian-United States military cooperation was 
restricted to mutual cooperation arrangements primarily 
related to the Arctic. Canada accepted that United States 
defence requirements would have to be an important factor 
in Canadian defence policy but was not prepared to enter 
into a formal bilateral defence alliance. It was, however, 
clearly understood that mutual cooperation arrangements 
would not be satisfactory if air defence became a major 
strategic requirement. Air defence was the "sleeper" and 
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the requirement for it would be decided by the prevailing 
strategic situation over which Canada had little influence. 
Although, as a direct result of the war, Canada 
had become a maritime power, it chose, for economic reasons, 
not to maintain a sustained maritime effort. However, the 
right to trade freely across the seas remained the primary 
Canadian maritime and overseas interest. The United States 
Navy, had become the dominant navy in the world and the RCN 
became a do facto sub component of it, as it had been of 
the Royal Navy in the past. This derived from the strategic 
reality of the indivisibility of command of the seas and 
the clear Canadian interest that command should remain with 
a friendly state. The new and dependent relationship with 
the United States Navy was not the result of an alliance or 
of a voluntary or an involuntary Canadian decision, but 
a consequence of strategic reality. The degree of Canadian 
dependence, as in the past, would be the extent of the 
Canadian contribution to continued United States command of 
the seas in areas of vital interest to Canada. 
As the international situation deteriorated in the 
late 1940s, Canada was in the forefront of the activity for, 
the formation of the NATO alliance, with a primary reason 
being the desire to offset bilateral defends with multi- 
lateral defence arrangements. Canadian, political and 
military leaders were united in their perception that Europe 
was Canada's strategic frontier and the allocation of 
military resources to Europe and the defence of the North 
Atlantic were greater than those allocated for continental 
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defence. In the early 1950s, a small amount of Canadian- 
United States military activity in the North, the construct- 
ion of the Pinotree line and the establishment of a joint 
air defence capability were the only continental defence 
activities. The United States military presence was for 
manning a small number of Pinetreo line stations and the 
Newfoundland bases. 
This changed, when air defence became an essential 
component of the United States deterrent system and the 
United States accepted the responsibility for the ultimate 
defence of the Western World. The strategic requirements 
for early warning and protection of bomber bases and the 
limits of available air defence technology placed a 
premium on Canadian geography for the period 1954-1964. 
The Canadian contributions in geography and military 
, resources for the protection of the United States nuclear 
deterrent were contributions to the, Western Alliance. 
Canada, the United States and Europo all benefited from 
increased security. 
The arrangements for the increase in air defence 
capability took place in a purely continental context for 
three main reasons. The first was the obvious one of 
geography. The second was the United Status insistence 
that continental defence arrangements be limited to a 
bilateral relationship. The third was the absolute refusal 
of the United States to agree to any form of alliance 
control over its deterrent. Canadian attempts to relate 
organizationally NORAD and NATO were doomed to failure 
361 
once air defence became a component of the deterrent. It 
was this strategic fact, and not the NORAD Agreement, that 
caused the continental imbalance to assume the proportions 
it did in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Canadian naval policy in the same period became 
directly involved in the protection of the United States 
deterrent. The shift from the former primary role of 
protection of shipping required no new organizational 
arrangements or equipment. It was the same navy, with the 
same equipment doing basically the same task in the same 
area but for a different strategic requirement. The multi- 
lateral NATO alliance served as a sufficient command and 
control framework because naval operations against SSBNs, 
although indivisible in an oceanic context, were divided 
into separate Canadian and United States areas. The NORAD 
typo arrangement was simply unnecessary. 
The period of very active United States overseas 
expansionism appears to be coming to an and. The Vietnam 
experience, domestic problems and detente have been the 
major reasons. At the same time, there have been significant 
changes in the strategic environment which have allowed the 
United States to reduce its overseas commitments without 
seriously affecting its basic security. Soviet and United 
States deterrents have been in part replaced by a joint 
system of deterrence that seeks to reinsure rather than 
purely to threaten. This allows greater freedom of action 
and choice for smaller states, and its operations have 




The most significant development in this deterrence 
system has boon the apparent decision of both superpowers 
not to pursue active strategic nuclear defence systems, but 
instead to rely on changes in offensive systems which can 
be homo and sea based. This has reduced the requirement 
for foreign bases, but even with advances in satellite 
early warning systems and the increased range of SLUMS, tho 
requirement has by no moans completely disappeared. For 
Canada, this has meant the and of the United States strategic 
requirement for anti-bomber defences and an apparent lessen- 
ing of activity for countor-SSDN operations. 
The Separation of National, Continental and NATO Defence 
Requirements; 
Since 1945, there have bean four white papers on 
defence (1949,1959,1964 and 1971), and each has listed 
the priorities for defence. The priorities have boon 
basically the same. They have boon the defence of Canada/ 
North America, NATO contributions, and poacokooping/non- 
NATO overseas operations. The difficulty has not been in 
the listing of what were obvious priorities, but their 
practical separation for the allocation of resources. The 
allocation of resources for peacekeeping has always boon 
simple because, as the 1964 White Vapor onDofonco stated: 
"The combined land, sea and air forces normally stationed 
in Canada and at Canadian ports will be sufficiently 
flexible to satisfy almost any conceivable requirement for 
UN or other operations. "2 Although Mr. 1lollyor has 
boon 
Tho 1964 Whito PApor on Dofonco, p. 24. 
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accused of giving too much emphasis to peacekeeping, he 
ranked it second to last, the last being reserve forces. 
The practical separation of the other priorities has proved 
the most difficult problem in Canadian defence policy. 
Canadian policy has assumed a near complete coincidence of 
security interests within the Western Alliance. This assump- 
tion has made it extremely difficult to provide a clear 
separation between national and continental defence require- 
ments and between continental and NATO defence requirements. 
The separation of national and continental defence 
has been difficult since 1939 because of the indivisible 
character of any direct attack on North America. Any 
direct attack meant the requirement for common defensive 
measures. The neatness of this equation has been dependent 
upon a common perception of the threat. 
Until the Cuban Missile Crisis, differing perceptions 
had been over the likelihood of attack and therefore how 
close should be the defence relationship, particularly for 
command arrangements. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, Canada 
found that continental defence, because of its relationship 
to United States offensive power, could be used for 
purposes not only with which Canada disagreed, but which 
were also probably inimical to Canadian interests. Yet as 
long as NORAD was considered to be an essential component 
of the United States deterrent, Canada had little option 
but to acquiesce. It has been impossible to separate 
national and continental air defence requirements as long 
as anti-bomber defences remained a strategic requirement. 
This is no longer the situation and therefore it is possible 
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to have separate national air defence forces in North 
America, while at the same time fulfilling the remaining 
United States strategic requirements for early warning and 
overflights. 
Although at certain periods the United States has 
been marginally more concerned than Canadians over Arctic 
territorial defence, there has been a common perception of 
a minimal threat. Territorial defence has never been a 
high Canadian military requirement because home based forces 
committed to overseas requirements have been always 
available. The implementation of the 1964 White Paper on 
Defence for structural and equipment changes have improved 
Canadian territorial defence capability as a by-product of 
greater mobility and firepower created for overseas 
operations. Because of this increased capability, Canada, 
today, is less dependent on the United States for territorial 
defence than it has been since 1939. National and 
continental territorial defence requirements have been the 
easiest to separate and never more so than today. This 
separation and improved territorial defence capability have 
allowed protection of sovereignty tasks to be carried out- 
as required with no increase in capability being necessary. 
The indivisibility of national and continental air 
defence requirements was formalized by the NORAD Agreement, 
but no such agreement was necessary for maritime defence. 
Until the late 1960s, there was sufficient coincidence of 
maritime intorests between Canada and the United States and 
European NATO, that there was no need to separate maritime 
defence into separate categories. Canadian naval policy was 
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really a question of how large a contribution to make to 
the common interest. There was no loss of sovereignty, 
no United States presence and largely unnoticeable and 
informal United States strategic control. The end of the 
indivisibility of command of the seas in war as a naval 
objective; the and of the indivisibility of the seas for 
economic use in peace; and the and of the indivisibility of 
the coincidence of maritime interests between Canada and 
the major maritime states are forcing Canada into a review 
of its naval and maritime policies which is as fundamental 
as the original decision to create a navy. 
The redundancy of the United States requirement for 
anti-bomber defence allows air defence to become a national 
requirement for which the equipment decisions are relatively 
simple. Such simplification is not possible for maritime 
defence. It is likely to prove the most difficult defence 
problem Canada will face in the next decades. It will be 
primarily a problem of separating collective and national 
maritime defence tasks in the context of the continental 
imbalance. How complicated the problem will be will depend 
largely on international and strategic factors over which 
Canada has little influence. Favourable international law 
of the sea outcomes and minimal requirement for counter-SSflN 
operations in contiguous waters will greatly simplify the 
problem. iowovor, present evidence would suggest that less 
favourable developments are more likely. 
Complete separation of national and continental 
maritime defence requirements will be impossible because of 
Canadian dependence on overseas trading and hence on United 
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States seapower. In a directly continental context, the 
degree of separation will be dependent on Canadian naval 
capability to carry out, independently, maritime defence 
tasks related to both collective 'defence and national 
maritime interests. 
Continental defence and NATO were, in the Canadian 
mind, parts of a whole in which the whole was greater than 
the parts. That they were to prove in practice more as 
separate entities than as parts of a whole has been at the 
root of the dissatisfaction with Canadian defence policy in 
recent years. NATO's dependence on the United States 
deterrent and the United States policy of maintaining 
independent control over it, precluded NATO from offsetting 
the continental imbalance to the expected degree. For some 
Canadians, United States dominance over NATO, inevitable as 
it was, caused them to seek, in other international activity, 
a means to offset the continental imbalance. 
Canadian' interests in Europe have never boon purely 
strategic, on the contrary, they have been primarily 
political, economic and cultural. These interests, reinforced 
by sentiment, have been far stronger for Canada than for the 
United States with its tradition of self-sufficiency and 
anti-European fooling. In Canada, anti-European feeling 
would have meant isolation and fear of United States absorp- 
tion. In the United States, it meant independence and 
hemispheric dominance. paradoxically, Canadian anti-NATO 
and anti-American fooling developed as Europe recovered in 
power and hence could act as a better counterbalance. The 
argument that Canada should reduce its military commitment 
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because of European recovery was fallacious if the Canadian- 
policy objective was to use Europe as a counterbalance. 
That the present government has reversed its policy toward 
Europe/NATO is a reaffirmation of a consistent Canadian 
policy since 1867. This reversal has been in part the 
government's response to rising anti-Americanism, and a 
realiiation that many of the presumed advantages of 
continental integration can prove to be disadvantageous in 
very material terms. 
The military aspect of the Canadian-European relation- 
ship was solved by increasing compatibility with home based 
forces, finding non-nuclear roles and home basing part of 
the NATO commitment while retaining a central front presence. 
The military forces for territorial defence, peacekeeping and 
non-NATO overseas operations, the northern flank commitment 
and central front presence are structurally the same, and 
can be rotated from task to task. On what task they are 
employed becomes largely immaterial. This rotational 
capability, however, does not solve force strength require- 
ments. Forces allocated for the central front role and on 
peacekeeping in the Middle East, for example, cannot at the 
same time be available for territorial defence/protection of 
sovereignty and northern flank operations. 
The present government by reversing its 1969 
priorities in practice has reverted to the previous policies 
of emphasizing overseas commitments. Peacekeeping provides 
a separate and morally satisfying role for Canada as a 
Middle Power, and the European commitment is one of the 




relationship it wants. These two commitments are of as 
much benefit to the national psychology as they are to 
Canadian political, economic and security interests. 
The Continental Imbalance and Canadian Defence Options 
The Canadian nationalist charge is that Canada, in 
this century, has moved from British colony to nation to 
United States satellite, and that continental defence 
relationships have'been one of the main culprits. In 
addition, Canadian adherence to a United States dominated 
NATO, long after it has outlived its security function, has 
compounded the satellite status of Canada. The nationalist 
solution is to withdraw from NATO and NORAD and to seek 
a morally uplifting role in the third world. 
Interestingly, the maritime aspects of Canadian 
defence relationships are seldom criticized. This derives 
from the lack of any formalized bilateral arrangement from 
which to withdraw, and a general unawareness of Canadian 
naval operations. In their search for independent Canadian 
foreign and defence policies, the nationalist critics fail 
to recognize that Canadian relations with the industrial 
world, principally the United States, Europe and Japan, are 
paramount. They assume erroneously that foreign and defence 
issues can be separated from these relations as though all 
that was lacking was the Canadian will to do so. As those 
in the Canadian government who favoured withdrawal'from 
NORAD and NATO in the late 1960s belatedly discovered, 
impeccable Canadian logic that NORAD and NATO were redundant 
security institutions fall on somewhat stony ground when 
overall Canadian-United States-European relations had to be 
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considered. 
Nevertheless, Canada today has more options available 
to it for defence than it has had since the late 1940s. 
This derives mainly from changes in the strategic environment 
that allow for a redefinition of continental defence 
requirements which favour a greater separation of Canadian 
national and continental defence requirements. This is 
particularly true for air defence, but less so for maritime 
defence. It allows for a re-examination of institutions 
such as NORAD and the PJIID that favours a return to mutual 
cooperation command arrangements and that emphasizes less the 
permanent and more the temporary character of the Canadian- 
United States defence relationship. However, as long as the 
United States remains a superpower with worldwide interests, 
there can be no return to the complete lack of military 
cooperation of the inter-war years. 
To what extent Canada takes up the wider set of 
options now available, will depend upon the Canadian willing- 
ness to accept responsibility-for its own air and maritime 
defence to meet both national and the remaining United 
States strategic requirements. It is not a matter of these 
defence responsibilities disappearing, but rather that 
strategic changes make it possible to carry them out as 
national defence responsibilities. If Canada accepts them as 
national defence responsibilities, it will require an 
increased Canadian defence effort which is likely to be 
marginal for air defence but perhaps substantial in maritime 
defence. Itowevor, in terms of national interest, whether 
air defence becomes a national, or remains a continental, 
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defence responsibility is of far less importance than is 
maritime defence. 
If the potential of Canada's emerging maritime 
interests develops, the development and protection costs 
of exploiting Canada's maritime frontier may be high. The 
requirement for Canada for the unhindered use of its 
contiguous waters and continental margin may wall become 
Canada's principal defence requirement. The creation of a 
substantial naval capability in peace, will require a revolu- 
tion in Canadian political and defence thought, but it may 
prove to be the most beneficial form of Canadian defence 
activity for the remainder of the century. The reason lies 
in the inherent flexibility of naval power in a world where 
flexibility in military power is becoming increasingly 
important. An increased naval capability would allow for 
United States deterrent protection requirements to be met 
with minimal United States involvement in Canadian waters, 
and for the protection of national maritime interests. At 
the same time, it would also be an additional Canadian 
contribution to NATO which would assist in offsetting the 
reduced Canadian presence in Europe and in maintaining the 
essential link between Europo and North America. 
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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS 
ABC America-British Commonwealth 
ABM anti-ballistic missile 
ACE Allied Command, Europe 
AICBM anti-inter-continental ballistic missile 
ALCANUS Alaska, Western Canada, Western United States 
ASM air to surface missile 
AWACS airborne warning and control system 
BAOR British Army of the Rhine 
B. bbls billion barrels 
BMD ballistic missile defence 
BMEWS ballistic missile early warning system 
DNA British North America (Act) 
BUIC back-up interceptor control 
CADIN Continental Air Defence Integration North 
CANLANT Canadian Atlantic (zone) 
CASS Canadian Air Surveillance System 
C. B. C. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CCF Cooperative Commonwealth Federation 
CIBG Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 
CINCNORAD Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defence 
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic 
CINCWL"'STLANT Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic 
CMBG Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group 
COMCANLANT Commander Canadian Atlantic (sub-area) 
CONAD Continental Air Defense (Command) 
CONUS Continental United States 
CRS Compagnies Republicaines do Securite 
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CUSRPG Canada-United States Regional Planning Group 
DDII destroyer escort equipped with helicopters 
DEFCON Defence Condition 
DEW distant early warning 
DND Department of National Defence 
DWT deadweight tons 
ECM electronic counter measures 
EEC European Economic Community 
ENDC Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
FLQ Front do lib6ration du Quebec 
FOBS fractional orbital bombardment system 
GIUK Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (gap) 
GNP gross national product 
GOCs General Officers Commanding 
IIMCS Her Majesty's Canadian Ship 
IIQ headquarters 
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 
ICNIUF International Convention for the North West 
Atlantic Fisheries 
IMI improved manned interceptor 
LORAN long range aids to navigation 
LOS III Law of the Sea Conference, Number Three 
MARCOM Maritime Command 
MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry 
vehicle 
MOT Ministry of Transport 
M. P. Member of Parliament 
MTE megatons equivalent 
NADGE NATO air defence ground environment (system) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
N. D. New Brunswick 
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nm nautical mile 
NORAD North American Air Defence (Command) 
NSC National Security Council 
OTII-B over the horizon - backscatter (radar) 
PC Privy Council 
PJBD Permanent Joint Board on Defence 
QPP Quebec Provincial'Police 
RCAF Royal Canadian Airforce 
RCC-S Regional Control Center- SAGE 
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
RCN Royal Canadian Navy 
RN Royal Navy 
RSC Revised Statutes of Canada 
SAC Strategic Air Command 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic 
SAGE semi-automatic ground environment (system) 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SAM surface to air missile 
SAM-D surface to air missile-development 
SCEAND Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
National Defence 
SCMF Subcommittee on Maritime Forces 
shp shaft horse power 
SLBM submarine launched ballistic missile 
SPADATS Space Detection and Tracking System 
SS steamship 
SSDN ballistic missile nuclear powered submarine 
STANAVFORLANT Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
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UN United Nations 
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force 
U. S. United States 
USN United States Navy 
WMA War Measures Act 
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